Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service
50
ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-91-235
Friday
6 December 1991

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-91-235 CONTENTS *6 December 1991*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTER-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Prague Hosts European Security Meeting 4-5 Dec 1
    Dobrovsky Delivers Speech *[Prague Radio]* 1
    Conference Ends; Eliasson Comments *[CSTK]* 1
No Agreement on Division of CEMA Assets *[PAP]* 1

ALBANIA

Alia, Parties Discuss Solutions to Crisis 2
    No Progress in Talks *[ATA]* 2
    Prime Minister Bufi Resigns *[ATA]* 2
Dokle Speech Deplores PD's 'Hot-Headed Decision' *[Tirana Radio]* 2
Socialist Party Condemns PD's 'Desertion' *[Tirana Radio]* 2
Pashko Accuses Berisha of 'Chaos' in Country *[Tirana Radio]* 3
PKSh Condemns Opposition's 'Treacherous Blow' *[Tirana Radio]* 4
Kapllani Writes to Carrington on Participation *[Tirana Radio]* 4
Nexmije Hoxha Arrested, Charged With Corruption *[AFP]* 5
Investigator Issues Statement on Shkoder *[ATA]* 5
Progress in Land Distribution Reported *[ATA]* 5

BULGARIA

Government Recognizes Ukrainian Independence *[BTA]* 6
Romanian Defense Minister Continues Talks 6
    Discusses Ties With Zhelev *[BTA]* 6
    Signs Defense Cooperation Plan *[BTA]* 6
Zhelev Holds Talks With BSDP's Dertliev *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Zhelev Talks With Democratic Center on Candidacy *[Sofia Radio]* 6
BSP Intentions in Presidential Elections Viewed *[NOVINI 29 Nov]* 7
BZNS Anticipates Political Agreement With SDS *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Poll: Zhelev Most Popular Presidential Candidate *[BTA]* 7
Academy of Sciences Criticizes 'Old Methods' *[Sofia Radio]* 8
DPS Declaration on Turkish Language Study *[PRAVA I SVOBODI 29 Nov]* 8
Intelligence Reports on DPS Links With Turkey *[BTA]* 9
Trenchev Comments on Bistritsa Occupation *[Sofia Radio]* 10
Strike Intensifies at Kazanluk Military Plant *[Sofia Radio]* 10
Defense Ministry Announces Army Reforms Progress *[BTA]* 11
Government Issues Statement on Foreign Debt *[BTA]* 11
Winter Food Supply Situation Reviewed *[BTA]* 11

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dienstbier on Ukraine Treaty, Borders, NATO *[CSTK]* 13
Vavrousek Writes Hungarian Leaders on Gabcikovo *[Budapest Radio]* 13
Czech Government Issues Statement on 1992 Budget *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 3 Dec]* 13
Carnogursky Comments on Results of Budget Talks *[Bratislava Radio]* 14
Carnogursky 5 Dec Address to SNR Reported *[Bratislava Radio]* 15
KDH: Slovak Coalition 'Must Be Preserved' *[CSTK]* 16

Pithart Discusses KAN, Czech-Slovak Relations *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 28 Nov]* 17
DS Leader Predicts Effect of Early Elections *[CSTK]* 17
Over 2 Million Sign Referendum Petition *[CSTK]* 18
Pithart Rules Out Prime Minister Reelection Bid *[RUDE PRAVO 30 Nov]* 18

HUNGARY

Antall To Meet Gorbachev, Yeltsin; Treaty Expected *[Budapest Radio]* 20
    Antall, Jeszenszky Leave for USSR *[MTI]* 20
Romanian President Cited on Consulate in Cluj *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Delegation Urges Continued Dialogue With Romania *[MTI]* 20
Kadar Assesses Effects of EC Association *[MAGYAR NEMZET 2 Dec]* 20
MAGYAR HIRLAP Republishes Democratic Charter *[3 Dec]* 22
New National Bank President Discusses Policy *[Budapest Radio]* 23
Decree Liberalizes Currency Exchange Procedures *[Budapest Radio]* 25
Hungarian-Language Broadcasters Discuss Programs *[Budapest Radio]* 25

POLAND

Reportage on Government Recognition of Ukraine 27
    Sejm Adopts Resolution *[Warsaw Radio]* 27
    Skubiszewski Issues Statement *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 3 Dec]* 27
    Council of Ministers Statement *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 3 Dec]* 27
Walesa Submits Draft Constitutional Law to Sejm *[Warsaw Radio]* 28
Parliamentary Groups Debate 'Small Constitution' *[PAP]* 28
Sejm Debates Resignation, Criticizes Cabinet *[PAP]* 29
Bielecki Interviewed on Government Resignation *[Warsaw TV]* 30
Prime Minister-Designate To Focus on Economy *[Warsaw TV]* 33
Olszewski Sees 'Exceptionally Difficult Mission' *[Warsaw Radio]* 33
PAP Profiles Prime Minister-Designate Olszewski 34
Walesa Promises To Defend Left, Right Wings *[PAP]* 34
Five-Party Coalition Favors State Power Division *[PAP]* 34
Liberal-Democrats Issue Economic Policy Document *[TYGODNIK GDANSKI 24 Nov]* 35

ROMANIA

Results of Hungarian Delegation Talks Reported *[MTI]* 36
Stolojan: Hungarian Treaty of 'Utmost Importance' *[MTI]* 36
Defense Minister Signs Cooperation Plan in Sofia *[ROMPRES]* 37
Stolojan Summarizes Results of Visit to Rome *[ROMPRES]* 37
Implications of Ukrainian Referendum Viewed *[ADEVARUL 3 Dec]* 37
Isarescu Meets U.S. Treasury, IMF Officials *[ROMPRES]* 38
Opposition Seeks 'Unitary Strategy' in Elections *[ROMPRES]* 38
Liberal Leader Explains Opposition to Constitution *[ROMPRES]* 39
Roman Rejects 'Third Way', Profiles FSN *[AZI 3 Dec]* 39
Government Authorizes Private TV Programming *[ROMPRES]* 40

YUGOSLAVIA

International

Markovic, Vance Agree on Cease-Fire Prerequisites *[TANJUG]* 41
Chamber Notes Dwindling Exchange With USSR *[TANJUG]* 41
Libyan Mercenary Found Killed in Slavonia *[Belgrade Radio]* 41
Ammunition Smuggled From Albania Discovered *[TANJUG]* 42
Federation Protests to Austria Over Citizens *[TANJUG]* 42
Austrian Economic Delegation Arrives for Talks *[TANJUG]* 42
Minister on German Break in Traffic Links *[TANJUG]* 42

Federal

JNA Corps Commander Considers War Over *[TANJUG]* 43
General: Withdrawal Leaves Croatia 'Defenseless' *[TANJUG]* 43
Army General Staff Member Views Control Over Forces *[Vienna TV]* 44
Kostic on Diplomatic Activity of Presidency *[POLITIKA 23 Nov]* 44

Croatia

Ukraine Recognized, International Status Sought *[TANJUG]* 45
Assembly Denies Markovic, Loncar Legitimacy *[TANJUG]* 45
Conditional Presence of UN Troops Accepted *[TANJUG]* 45
Forces Allegedly Use Chemical Weapons in Kordun *[Belgrade Radio]* 46
Doctors Claim Banned Warfare Means Used *[TANJUG]* 46
Unit Leader on Osijek's Future, Hungarian Troops *[TANJUG]* 46
Pathologist: No Evidence of Vukovar Massacres *[TANJUG]* 47
Draskovic's Letter to President Tudjman *[NEDELJNA BORBA 23-24 Nov]* 47
Article Examines Draft Law on Minorities *[VJESNIK 22 Nov]* 48
Consequences of Army Victory in Vukovar *[POLITIKA 22 Nov]* 50

Serbia

Belgrade TV Assesses Croatia Nationality Bill 52

Kosovo

Kosovars Request UN Troops for Kosovo-Metohija *[TANJUG]* 53
Kosovars Investigated for Celebrating National Day *[Zagreb Radio]* 53

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Markovic Arrives in Sarajevo for Izetbegovic Talks *[TANJUG]* 53
Markovic Holds Talks With Izetbegovic, Pelivan *[TANJUG]* 53
Bosnian Serbs Condemn EC Sanctions *[Sarajevo Radio]* 53
Bosniak Group Wants UN Troops on Serbia Border *[Sarajevo Radio]* 54
Mostar Garrison Denies Troops Put on Streets *[TANJUG]* 54
Army Command in Mostar on Peace Problems *[TANJUG]* 54
Army Prevents Mostar Territorials Arms Inspection *[Sarajevo Radio]* 55
Banja Luka Mission Disagrees With Zagreb Report *[TANJUG]* 55
'Serious' Economic Situation Examined *[OSLOBODJENJE 21 Nov]* 55
Sandzak SDA Plans Muslim Government *[BORBA 23 Nov]* 56

Macedonia

Vice President Georgievski Submits Resignation *[TANJUG]* 57
No Celebrations Held for Republic Day *[TANJUG]* 57
Parliamentarian Interviewed on Independence *[BORBA 22 Nov]* 57
Malevski Comments on Ties With Greece, Bulgaria *[BORBA 25 Nov]* 59

Prague Hosts European Security Meeting 4-5 Dec

Dobrovsky Delivers Speech

LD0412233791 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] As we have already reported, a conference on security in Europe, organized by our Institute of International Relations and Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, opened in Prague this morning. Richard Seeman reports from the conference:

[Seeman] This afternoon's discussion culminated with a speech by Lubos Dobrovsky, Czechoslovak minister of defense. He drew the attention of the participants from the United States, Canada, Soviet Union, and number of European countries to the fact that currently the certainties which had been the result of two large-scale world wars were disintegrating. Now the fundamental task should be to build the new standards of relations between states if we want to avoid a possibility that we are going to be forced to do so by a third world war. In his view, the biggest danger is nationalism which through an emergence of new state entities can distance central and Eastern Europe from Western Europe and thus achieve a completely opposite result from the one that we aimed for by unifying Germany, abolishing the Warsaw Pact and opening our borders. Minister Dobrovsky pointed out that time was running out to identify this danger and create a new architecture of European security.

Conference Ends; Eliasson Comments

LD0512220491 Prague CSTK in English 1708 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 5 (CSTK)—An international conference on the future of European security, which ended here today, confirmed that the existence of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is justified, the head of the Prague-based CSCE Secretariat, Nils Eliasson, said today.

Eliasson was speaking to journalists after the two-day conference entitled "CSCE and the Future of Security in Europe".

Eliasson said in particular small European countries consider the Helsinki process their natural guarantee at international talks.

According to Ivan Busniak of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, the January meeting of the CSCE ministers' committee in Prague is expected to deal with CSCE voting procedures because the current rule of consensus has served to block discussion of some contentious issues.

No Agreement on Division of CEMA Assets

LD0612105391 Warsaw PAP in English 1710 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec 5—The most recent session of the liquidating commission set up to divide the assets of the now-dissolved Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) between the ex-member states did not arrive at an agreement, PAP was told by a deputy minister for foreign economic relations.

The dispute concerns the high-rise which served as CMEA's headquarters in Moscow and some other real estate, said Deputy Minister Andrzej Budzinski, who returned from the talks Thursday [5 November].

Poland is entitled to 12 percent of CMEA's assets and would like to let the equivalent section of the building to Polish private companies. However, the Soviet side does not agree. It wants to keep the building and pay off the former CMEA states in roubles, to which they do not agree.

Another session of the commission is likely before Dec. 13 originally set as the deadline for liquidation of assets, Budzinski said.

Alia, Parties Discuss Solutions to Crisis

No Progress in Talks

AU0612142191 Tirana ATA in English 1314 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 6 (ATA)—On December 6, 1991 ,the president of the republic, Ramiz Alia, continued consultations with the representatives of five political parties, members of the political agreement of May 1991, on whose basis there was formed the stability government.

Attending the meeting from the socialist party was Servet Pellumbi, from the Democratic Party Sali Berisha, from the Republican Party Sabri Godo, from the Social Democratic party Skender Gjinushi and from the Agrarian Party Meno Gjoleka.

Attending was also Ylli Bufi, chairman of the Council of Ministers .

Today's meeting was devoted to the solution of government crisis. President Ramiz Alia persisted in that the above parties attain a common thinking for creating a new government, bearing in mind that the lofty interests of the homeland and of the people stand above the party interests.

Following the debate on this issue, there was attained no solution acceptable to all. Under these circumstances the president will also continue further the consultations with the other political parties of the country to form the new government on another base.

Meanwhile the president demanded from the chairman of the Council of Ministers Ylli Bufi that the government headed by him continue to be on duty.

Prime Minister Bufi Resigns

AU0612142791 Tirana ATA in English 1318 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 6 (ATA)—On December 6 the chairman of the Council of Ministers Ylli Bufi, forced by the government crisis due to the withdrawal of the ministers of the Democratic Party from the Government of Stability, presented his resignation to the president of the republic.

President Ramiz Alia demanded from the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Government of Stability that until a quick and correct political solution is found, he should continue to be his at his post, in order to guarantee the functioning of the state, law, order and cope with the great daily economic difficulties, in order to bar the way to anarchy, chaos, spontaneity, which would be of rather dangerous consequences for the people and the country.

Dokle Speech Deplores PD's 'Hot-Headed Decision'

AU0412202891 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Speech by Namik Dokle, chairman of the Socialist Party's parliamentary group, to the People's Assembly in Tirana on 4 December—recorded]

[Text] Two parliamentary groups began work this morning to prepare the laws urgently presented to the Assembly by the government: some laws about the economic reform, a special law to ensure order and prevent crime, the law on national symbols, and many other important bills.

It seemed that after a long impasse created by the absence of the Democratic Party's [PD] deputies from the parliament, we were setting off on our normal path again, as the Albanian people have so much wished. We embarked on legal solutions, on the basis of the principles of the CSCE, to all the problems the parties discussed for days on end at a roundtable, in the government, and even with the president.

It was precisely at this moment, when the people hoped for an end to winter and a solution to the danger of food, fuel, and medicine shortages, etc., in other words precisely at the moment when we were joining all Europe's democratic political and economic institutions, that the people were given the glad tidings of a statement or news conference held by the PD, at which Sali Berisha, the party's chairman, announced the withdrawal of the ministers from the government.

In effect, this is a brazen and peremptory declaration of a government crisis, a crisis in the state, and a broader national crisis. It represents the brink of a catastrophe. To take such a hot-headed decision at such a time only does harm to the people. Therefore, by a unanimous decision of the Socialist Party's parliamentary group, we ask the group to leave this session in order to consult as a group and to make a mature decision, not in the heat of the moment, so that our consciences will be clear before the people tomorrow.

Socialist Party Condemns PD's 'Desertion'

AU0512211291 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] The Socialist Party's [PSSh] Managing Committee and parliamentary group held a joint meeting this morning in connection with the stand of the Democratic Party [PD] on the government crisis. Dr. Servet Pellumbi reported at length on the exceptionally difficult situation created for the homeland, the people, and the nation by this decision of the PD and the paths that must be chosen to confront and overcome this crisis.

A statement by the PSSh's Managing Committee and parliamentary group points out among other things that we are faced with a difficult situation. A very serious danger threatens the homeland and democracy. At the precise time when the People's Assembly more than ever needed stability and support for the government and the measures it had planned in order to enable the people to surmount as painlessly as possible the winter, the start of the reform, the distribution of the land, and the liberalization of enterprises; when with the experience it had gained it could have more confidently led the people toward new and early elections, the PD created a deep government crisis with the withdrawal of its ministers.

The PSSh, consistent in its opinion that the formula of a stability government was the most appropriate and wisest solution, has insisted on supporting this government. However, the PD's leaders have taken the immoderate and dangerous step of breaking the political agreement, in effect creating a crisis of the state. We think that regardless of the situation the country is experiencing, their withdrawal from the government is a real act of desertion and is irresponsible behavior with extremely serious consequences.

The PSSh firmly dissociates itself from and rejects the accusations leveled against it in the statement issued by the PD and its leaders, blaming the PSSh for the crisis.

The PSSh and its parliamentary deputies have firmly stood by the formula decided jointly by the five parties, demanding that problems be solved in a legal way with tolerance, patience, and the necessary compromises. The Socialist Party has shown its tolerance in many cases, even to the detriment of its prestige, solely for the sake of as smooth as possible a development for the reform and pluralist democracy.

The six months of the National Stability Government were very difficult for it and its members. Strikes, street pressure, and repeated threats of resignation from the government added to the understandable difficulties of the problems that had to be confronted. In no case did the PSSh either join in nor accept such behavior and attitudes. With moderation and cool heads, we coped with the absurd situation in which one party or the other on the one hand took part in the government coalition and, on the other hand, put itself forward as a genuine opposition, erupting in savage and groundless attacks against the realistic views of the PSSh in its support of the National Stability Government.

The situation that has now been created is fraught with dangers for the destiny of the country and the entire nation that are unprecedented in our history. It is incomprehensible how such a step could be taken when the situation around us is deteriorating and the cancer of the Yugoslav crisis is spreading toward Albanian territories in Kosovo and other areas. Every Albanian and patriot asks whether such behavior serves the national cause and all- national conciliation.

In this critical situation, we appeal to the PSSh's members and supporters and to all honest people to think and act without base political passions, to place above everything the pannational interests of our people, and to avoid as previously all the provocations that will no doubt not be lacking.

Even under these extremely serious circumstances, the PSSh does not evade its historic responsibility, but will always render its assistance, together with other parties, in order to advance toward free and democratic elections.

The PSSh has no prejudices about how the elections should be organized or their date. The PSSh stands by the view that the political formula approved in the joint agreement continues to correspond to the country's essential interests and also offers a valuable solution to the situations through which we will pass before the new elections. It turns once again to the political forces represented in the National Stability Government to listen to the voices of reason and sound logic and to once again discuss wisely and moderately the possibility of continuing on this path.

If other forces conclusively state that this is unacceptable, the PSSh is ready to make contacts, and welcomes every initiative or other form of constructive dialogue in order to find the most suitable solution to overcome the government crisis and to prepare as soon as possible the necessary conditions to go to new elections in order to ensure supplies for the people and security of labor, public order, and people's lives; in order not to leave in the lurch the planned reforms that have begun; and to guarantee relations with other countries, international bodies, and the banks of foreign investors.

Pashko Accuses Berisha of 'Chaos' in Country

AU0512195491 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] The latest political developments in Albania have drawn the attention of the world public. REUTER's Paul Hall states that the Albanian opposition is divided over the decision to leave the government and that the Albanian Democratic Party was heading for a bitter split on Wednesday [4 December], when its leader withdrew it from the coalition government in which it shared power with the former communists.

Party Chairman Sali Berisha announced this decision in Tirana after the parliament, dominated by the Socialist Party's deputies, refused his request for early elections. However, REUTER states that Deputy Premier Gramoz Pashko, Berisha's cofounder of the Democratic Party who is now in London, indignantly accused his former ally of leading Europe's poorest country toward anarchy and chaos. It is not an appropriate time for us to resign. We must have a government that must continue to exist until the elections, in order to bring us out of this political crisis, Pashko said to REUTER. He stressed that he will obey the party's order to hand in his resignation after his return to Albania, but added that this is a split in the Democratic Party.

The Democrats have asked for elections before 23 February and the removal of former communists from leading posts in the administration, the economy, the press, and the media. Their demands also include the investigation of corruption charges against the former leaders of the government of the former Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha, who ruled the small Balkan country for more than four decades.

Berisha stated at a news conference in Tirana that our views have been forced on us by the attitude of the communists. Pashko, who is in London to sign Albania's membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, stressed that he had asked the party not to make any decision while he was abroad. The problem is that they are creating real chaos and anarchy, he stressed.

PKSh Condemns Opposition's 'Treacherous Blow'

AU0512212891 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] A statement by the Albanian Communist Party [PKSh] points out that a party born of the people for the people, and not out of another party, as Sali Berisha claimed at the government meeting yesterday evening, has mother Albania as its emblem. It has vowed to demonstrate by deeds, not by words, and by democratic means that communists, as carriers of humanity's noblest ideals, are at the same time the greatest democrats. Our wise people are convinced today, but will be even more fully persuaded tomorrow, that this party takes orders neither from any political party within the country nor from overseas, but from the homeland and only from the homeland.

Our party takes the view that mother Albania stands on the brink of an abyss, and that the withdrawal of the ministers of certain political parties from the National Stability Government is a treacherous blow attempting to overthrow this government in the most tragic way. Our party considers the premeditated creation of the governmental crisis an act of suicide.

Some politicians who devise or act out ready-made ill-omened scenarios are not the people. They are not Albania or the nation. We are not only threatened by hunger for bread: The freedom and independence of our country, washed in blood and sweat, are at risk. Some party leaders must realize that it is not too late to defend our freedom and independence in brotherhood, with our unity and our own breasts, and not with green or black helmets. Now or never, we need national heroism, not a national crime. Now or never, we need farsightedness and not blindness.

It is to the honor of communists that, in this exceptional situation, they support the National Stability Government, the call of President Ramiz Alia, and the patriotic stand of the ministers of the opposition, in the conviction that in this way they support the good of the people and the nation. Those who act differently will be responsible to history, the PKSh's statement stresses.

Kapllani Writes to Carrington on Participation

AU0512180091 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani sent a letter yesterday to Lord Carrington, chairman of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia taking place in The Hague in the Netherlands, which states among other things:

Because it is a Balkan country, and especially because more than 3 million Albanians live on their own territories within the borders of what is still called Yugoslavia, Albania is watching with grave concern the escalation of the crisis in this country.

At the same time, we have been concerned at the possible spread of the conflict to the south of the country, which would directly affect the fate of the Albanians. A people of 3 million that has for a long time been subjected to the most massive violations of national and human rights and has been denied the right to self-determination is now faced with the danger of a real attack by the savage Serbo-Slav military machine.

Unfortunately, Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani stresses, the Albanians' legitimate representatives have not been invited to take their places at the discussion table. What is even more serious is that they have not been sent to the conference so far and Serbia even goes there and speaks in their name.

Albania is fully convinced that the conflict that has enveloped Yugoslavia can only be solved in a democratic way and by peaceful means, respecting international regulations and the principles of the CSCE. At the same time, Albania holds fast to the opinion that it is impossible to reach a fair and final solution to the Yugoslav crisis without considering the interests of all sides.

We, Foreign Minister Kapllani points out, have supported the proposal to deploy blue helmets in Yugoslavia, and think that this should be done in Kosovo too. Such a measure is necessary to prevent the consequences of the presence of the Serbian Army there. It is as tragic as it is cynical that the Albanians, who long ago unequivocally expressed themselves to be in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and their own problems, are being sent by Serbia to the conflict areas as cannon fodder, and are being killed for a cause that is quite alien to them.

Moreover, the letter concludes, as the kin-state of the Albanians who live on their own territories beyond the borders of the Republic of Albania, we think that it is Albania's undeniable right to be invited to and heard at The Hague Conference in the Netherlands, and are convinced that this will contribute to the conference's success and the solution of the Yugoslav crisis by eliminating at an early stage dangerous flashpoints of other crises that could appear in the near future.

Nexmije Hoxha Arrested, Charged With Corruption

AU0512143091 Paris AFP in English 1427 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 5 (AFP)—Nexhmije Hoxha, widow of Albania's former hardline ruler Enver Hoxha, has been arrested and charged with corruption and abuse of power, a spokesman for the opposition Democratic Party told AFP Thursday [5 December]. Hoxha, aged 71, was arrested in Tirana on Wednesday [4 December], the spokesman said by telephone from the Albanian capital. Prime Minister Ylli Bufi made the announcement at a meeting with the opposition which was shown on television. Former politburo member Rita Marko, a close aide of the late Hoxha, has also been arrested.

Investigator Issues Statement on Shkoder

AU0112204391 Tirana ATA in English 1305 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Statement issued by the Investigator-General's Office in Tirana; date not given]

[Text] Tirana, November 30 (ATA)—Taking into consideration the worry with regard to the inquiries in the issues related to April 2, 1991 events in the city of Shkoder and the abuses to the detriment of the people's interests by the former party and state leaders we report as follows:

1. The penal case with regard to April 2, 1991 events in Shkoder being turned down by the court for completing the inquiries, measures were adopted for the quick investigation of the case intending to find out the murderers. Despite the work done and contacts with the Greek state organs to find out and turn back seven persons who were in the composition of organs of order and after the event illicitly crossed the Albanian state border together with the armaments they possessed, it was impossible to find them out,thus hindering the drawing of full and accurate conclusions on the authors of crimes.

Under these circumstances, the investigation to find out and judge the killers continues, whereas the penal case against the defendants Capajev Taci, Dilaver Papare, Gjek Xhelaj, and Xhemal Dymylja accused of the crime and abuse of their posts has been sent to court on November 12.

2. The penal case against the former Party of Labour and state leaders is in its final stage. Through an intensive work a great number of investigation operations have been carried out to make clearer the abuses with the state asset to the detriment of the interests of the people.

For reasons not depending on the Investigation Office, investigations were not over on November 30, 1991 as it was defined, hence this case will be sent for trial in the first week of December, the report of the General Investigation Office says in conclusion.

Progress in Land Distribution Reported

AU0212142691 Tirana ATA in English 0940 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 2 (ATA)—According to recent data of the Ministry of Agriculture, the land division is advancing at fast rates. Hence in 15 districts its division has passed the figure of 50 percent. In the district of Elbasan there has been divided 88.2 percent of land, in that of Lushnje 71 percent, of Tirana 62 per cent, of Durres and Vlore 58 percent, etc.

During the last two weeks rates had been accelerated in the districts of Fier and Korce, dividing respectively 9,300 and 5,500 hectares. In these two districts as well as in Korce and Fier, [as received] which have the largest acreage, work is going on at fast rates.

Lagging behind are the districts of Shkoder, where only 7 percent of the land is divided, that of Lezhe 30 per cent, Kruje 14 percent. In the district of Diber only 17 percent of the land has been divided although land division has started in 50 villages.

Government Recognizes Ukrainian Independence

AU0512150491 Sofia BTA in English 1459 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—Bulgaria recognizes the independence of the Ukraine and expresses readiness for cooperation in all areas, according to a decision which the Bulgarian Government adopted at its meeting today.

Romanian Defense Minister Continues Talks

Discusses Ties With Zhelev

AU0512175491 Sofia BTA in English 1602 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—Today President Zhelyu Zhelev received Romania's Minister of Defense, Lieut. Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu. The Bulgarian president expressed his belief that the environmental problems clouding the traditionally good Bulgarian-Romanian relations would be soon resolved. Dr. Zhelev pointed out that he is looking forward to Romanian President Ion Iliescu's visit to Bulgaria for the purpose of signing the new bilateral treaty, the text of which has been finalized.

Gen. Spiroiu conveyed President Iliescu's greetings to Dr. Zhelev. He expressed his hope that all doubts arising in connection with a recent statement by Romania's head of state have been successfully cleared up. According to Gen. Spiroiu the statement (which the Bulgarian press described as a manifestation of territorial designs on Bulgaria) was misinterpreted by the Bulgarian mass media.

Signs Defense Cooperation Plan

AU0512185491 Sofia BTA in English 1733 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—Under the cooperation plan between the armies of Bulgaria and Romania which was signed today by the two countries' defence ministers, Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev and Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu, the armies will act together in the case of accidents at nuclear power plants and chemical works, floods and other disasters. This plan can be followed by the signing of a cooperation agreement between the two countries' armed forces after President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria and President Ion Iliescu of Romania sign a bilateral treaty.

The plan envisages the exchange of military delegations and experience, consultations on expert level, cooperation between the two countries' air forces and military schools, cooperation in the field of social security of the military, etc. Joint initiatives of the two armies' general staffs are also planned.

Both Mr. Ludzhev and Gen. Spiroiu believe that the plan is an important component of the relations between the armies of Bulgaria and Romania and that it will help promote mutual openness and confidence.

x x x

This morning the delegation led by Romanian Defence Minister Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu visited the Higher Navy School in Varna. The delegation was accompanied by Gen. Yordan Mutafchiev and Vice Admiral Dimitur Pavlov, commander of Bulgaria's naval forces.

Zhelev Holds Talks With BSDP's Dertliev

AU0512113991 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] At the invitation of the Executive Bureau of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP], the President Zhelyu Zhelev visited the party's headquarters at 37 Ekzarkh Yosif Street. A wide range of questions about the upcoming presidential elections was discussed, BTA announced.

Dr. Petur Dertliev, chairman of the BSDP, presented the party's views on the president's function and asked a series of questions on Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policies. President Zhelev answered in detail stressing that Bulgaria at the moment needs strong presidential power that will be a peace-creating factor in our country. He emphasized that if he is elected he will strive to be the president of all Bulgarians, and not of a specific political force.

The BSDP Executive Bureau continues to work on its position to the nominations for the future president and vice president of the country.

Zhelev Talks With Democratic Center on Candidacy

AU0512200091 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] In connection with the presidential election campaign, Zhelyu Zhelev visited the headquarters of the Bulgarian Democratic Center [BDC] in Sofia today and had a meeting with the BDC leadership.

Later the BDC leader, Stefan Radoslavov, informed a BTA reporter that the talks with the president were very productive, and that the BDC Political Council would announce tonight or early tomorrow morning whether it will support Zhelyu Zhelev's candidature in the presidential elections.

In the same connection, Petur Slabakov, chairman of the Ecoglasnost Political Club, told BTA that his organization, which together with six other parties makes up the BDC, will endorse the president's candidature for a second term of office.

BSP Intentions in Presidential Elections Viewed

AU0412093991 Sofia NOVINI in Bulgarian
29 Nov 91 p 1

[Interview with Svetoslav Michev, member of Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council Presidium, by Simeon Danevski, NOVINI reporter; place and date not given: "One Card Remains Up the Sleeve in Presidential Patience"]

[Text] The names of the candidates for the presidential elections dropped on the table like the jacks and kings in a deck of cards. Some of them are known figures, others are completely unknown, and yet others were greeted with a smile, as was the case in the recent parliamentary elections. We still expect two names. One of them—anyone hardly doubts it—will be the name of the current head of state, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. The other name is written on a card that still is face down. Would Mr. Svetoslav Michev, member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council Presidium, let us in on that secret, especially as it became clear that the campaign again will be subject to party colors....

[Michev] The BSP has a clear views as to what policy the president should conduct, who he must be, and what positions should he defend. We also have several requirements regarding the president as a personality that must unite the nation, the three most important being:

—The president must conduct a policy that is focused on Europe and direct Bulgaria's foreign relations toward Europe and the EC.

—The president must defend the national interests. The national idea must be a central element of his platform.

—Social policy with all its components must be a clear and categorical element of his platform.

It is on the basis of those three factors related to the personality of the future president, that we will determine our support and preference for this or that candidate.

[Danevski] As you could anticipate, I will ask you the names that are mentioned most frequently in talks in the BSP Supreme Council?

[Michev] I do not want to commit myself by mentioning names. The term of registering the candidates has been prolonged by five days. I think that by the end of the week it will become clear whom the BSP prefers.

[Danevski] Under what circumstances will the BSP support Dr. Zhelev's candidacy?

[Michev] If the BSP were to support Dr. Zhelev the question would arise: Against whom will the current president compete in the elections? Please, forgive my frankness, but potential candidates for the presidency who do not have the support of the BSP voters, i.e., 33 percent of the voters (or perhaps even more), have no chance at all. In any event, Dr. Zhelev's personality needs a strong opponent. I could hardly imagine that Dr. Zhelev could be supported by such a colorful spectrum from the extreme right through the center, to the left. This is absurd!

[Danevski] You did not mention Dr. Petur Dertliev's name. Is this an accident?

[Michev] The name of Dr. Dertliev, leader of the Bulgarian Social Democrats, was among the potential candidates. There is nothing special in this. He answers our three basic requirements. Regarding Dertliev, there is a different question—whether our voters would accept him without any reservations. As you see, we have yet to resolve a difficult task.

One card remains up the sleeve in the presidential patience. It could serve a real surprise.

BZNS Anticipates Political Agreement With SDS

AU0412213091 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] The regular briefing of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Party [BZNS] Permanent Board at the SOFIA PRESS AGENCY headquarters today once more took place without the participation of Chief Secretary Milan Drenchev.

It was announced that in the morning the permanent boards of the two BZNS organizations acquainted themselves with the results of the dynamic talks between the two working teams put in charge of the negotiations on agrarian unity. It is also expected that by the end of this week a political agreement will be signed between the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the Nikola Petkov BZNS for partnership in the process of democratization and decolonization of the country.

Georgi Pinchev, organizational secretary, expressed his opinion that in a future united BZNS there will be no place for Ivan Glushkov, the coordinator of the BZNS and the Future Reformist Movement.

Poll: Zhelev Most Popular Presidential Candidate

AU2611182191 Sofia BTA in English 1616 GMT
26 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 26 (Iva Toncheva of BTA)—The incumbent president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, stands the greatest chance to win the presidential elections scheduled for January 12, according to an unpublished representative sociological survey of the National Public Opinion Centre, known as the Bulgarian "Gallup," conducted two weeks ago.

With 47 per cent of Bulgarians singling out Dr. Zhelev as the most appropriate figure for the presidency, he seems to be an indisputable candidate. His closest rival, Mr. Zhorzh Ganchev, leader of the Bulgarian Business Bloc, got only 12 per cent of popular approval. 10 per cent of respondents opted for Mr. Ginyo Ganev, former deputy chairman of parliament. Ex-prime minister Andrey Lukanov of the Bulgarian Socialist (ex-Communist) Party [BSP] is fourth with 6 per cent. Mr. Aleksandur Tomov and Mr. Georgi Pirinski, prime minister and deputy prime minister of the BSP shadow cabinet, respectively, were given less than 4 per cent. Only 1.4 per cent of Bulgarians pointed to BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov as the most appropriate person for president. Ex-prime minister Dimitur Popov was approved for this post by an insignificant number of respondents. Bulgaria's exiled King Simeon II was the choice of 2 per cent of Bulgarians. However, he cannot be nominated for the presidency because under the Constitution Bulgaria's president must have spent the last five years in Bulgaria.

The second figure of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] besides Dr. Zhelev is Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, who comes eighth with the approval of 2.6 per cent of respondents.

Parliament is expected to pass the amendments to the Presidential Elections Act this week. According to them, candidates for the presidency will run on ballot papers coloured on a party basis. According to Mr. Kolyo Kolev, research associate at the National Public Opinion Centre, this will have considerable influence on the electorate. According to the latest sociological surveys, if parliamentary elections were held now, the SDS would win 37 per cent, which is 3 per cent more than in the October 13 elections. Therefore Dr. Zhelev will receive a solid 37 per cent of the popular vote because he will run on the blue ballot paper. But he has been given a maximum of 47 per cent in polls so far, which means that a runoff can be expected. The candidate for the vice-presidency will be of key importance to Dr. Zhelev's success. Poetess Blaga Dimitrova, a dissident in the past and a possible SDS nominee, would increase his chance of success. But the SDS has not announced officially its candidate for the vice-presidency.

The survey shows that a Socialist candidate would stand a slim chance to win the presidential elections. It is difficult to predict what will happen if the Socialists back an independent. Probably Dr. Zhelev will meet in a runoff with the other top vote-getter who can be expected to be backed by many voters on account of the colour of the ballot papers.

According to the survey, the tandem Academician Blagovest Sendov-Ginyo Ganev, both of whom are not members of any party, will get enough votes to put to the test Dr. Zhelev's indisputable candidature. Sociologists believe that a "small" independent figure can become "great" if backed by a party or if he or she launches a moderate election campaign. The Socialists probably have staked on this possibility, that is why they have not nominated their candidate yet. They must have reckoned with another conclusion of the latest sociological surveys: After the October parliamentary elections there is a certain withdrawal from political affiliations and an aversion to the parties and their strife.

Academy of Sciences Criticizes 'Old Methods'

AU0412211691 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Academician Blagovest Sendov, current chairman of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences made the following statement to the Academy's Presidium: It is simply insulting for us that we should now resolve the financial problems of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences' Institutes and that this document, which is of decisive importance for the future of science in Bulgaria, should subsequently be called a rag according to the method of total negation that was also applied in dealing with the Law on the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences passed by the former National Assembly.

As a matter of fact, today's session was expected to deal with the budget and the financial problems of the academic institutes. However, the honorable gentlemen with their well-deserved titles of academicians and corresponding members, refused to discuss a proposal that, according to them, is likely to earn only insults and slander.

According to the Academy's Presidium members, the scientific and personnel changes in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences are being dictated by the new regime with the old methods. The following comparison was made: Francois Mitterrand, president of France, paid a visit to the Academy of Sciences, while our president has so far failed to do so.

As a matter of fact, this is how the session of the current acting Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Presidium ended, without results, but with dignity. The additional activities of the academy are expected to be determined by the General Assembly.

Another piece of news from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences reads as follows: Academician Blagovest Sendov decided to run in the upcoming presidential elections as an independent candidate with Ognyan Stefanov Saparev as his running mate and candidate for the post of vice president.

DPS Declaration on Turkish Language Study

AU0412163891 Sofia PRAVA I SVOBODI in Bulgarian 29 Nov 91 p 1

["Declaration of the Central Council of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms" on Turkish Language Study]

[Text] At its meeting on 22 November the Council of Ministers adopted a decision to restore the study of the Turkish language in Bulgarian schools as a noncompulsory, elective subject that will be studied four hours weekly in grades three to eight.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] thinks that this decision of the first democratic government of the Republic of Bulgaria in almost 50 years confirms its own commitment to guarantee and truly defend basic human rights and freedoms in the spirit of international agreements.

This attempt to radically resolve problems created during the time of the so-called "restoration process" became possible only after the supreme executive power was transferred to the hands of a noncommunist political formation.

It is well-known that the DPS has always been sensitive to the problems of Bulgaria's ethnic minorities in being able to study their languages. After the moratorium on Turkish language study until September 1991, which was adopted in February by the Grand National Assembly, the former government headed by Dimitur Popov not only refrained from doing anything constructive to positively resolve the issue, but even prevented the restoration of that right by the beginning of the 1991-92 school year.

One is puzzled by the fact that at the same time the National Assembly, in a biased manner, adopted the anti-democratic and discriminatory Law on National Education, particularly its Article 8, paragraph 2, which regulated the study of the mother tongue on the part of minorities outside the Bulgaria schools and under state control.

The position of the former government and the National Assembly decision were aimed at artificially creating ethnic tension immediately before the elections for the National Assembly, municipal councillors, and mayors. In essence, they were an attempt to adopt the results of the restoration process as accomplished facts and turn them into part of a permanent status quo.

Consequently, the boycott announced by the parents of students from grades two to eight, which was supported by the DPS, must be seen as a natural reaction and a radical protest against the violation of certain basic constitutional rights.

The DPS Central Council thinks that the content of the government decree corresponds to the basic demands of the parents and complies with the international standards of human rights and communities. Therefore, the DPS Central Council calls for stopping the boycott throughout the country and creating conditions for normal study at the schools.

DPS Central Council, 23 November 1991, Sofia.

Intelligence Reports on DPS Links With Turkey

AU0512174191 Sofia BTA in English 1547 GMT 5 Dec 91

["Counterintelligence Reacts to ZEMYA Publication"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—In its two latest issues the "ZEMYA" daily carried an article headlined "The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) in Classified Counterintelligence Reports." The newspaper describes as "a top secret counterintelligence report" its publications on the connections of the DPS and its leader Mr. Ahmed Dogan with the Turkish secret services.

According to the newspaper, these connections date to the spring of 1990. On successive visits to the Turkish Embassy in Sofia, the DPS leaders and Turkish officials reached agreement on comprehensive support for the DPS which should be kept secret so as to prevent accusations of intervention in Bulgaria's domestic affairs, the newspaper claims. Upon establishing their earliest contacts, the DPS leaders made the movement dependent on Turkey's assistance and, based on the two sides' naturally identical purposes, they systematically subordinated the DPS to Turkey's strategic interests in keeping with the doctrine of "external Turks," according to "ZEMYA."

The Turkish diplomatic circles recognize Mr. Ahmed Dogan as the "indisputable leader of Muslims in Bulgaria, who has personal merits as a politician and is capable of struggling for a better condition of the 'Turkish minority' in the country," "ZEMYA" writes. According to the publication, Turkey realized that without its help the DPS cannot exist and develop as a legitimate political formation. That is why it set up a network for financial and material support provided both directly and through private persons and organizations in Germany, including the Islamic Cultural Centre. That was the most often used channel through which the DPS received vehicles, computers, copiers, fax machines, video cameras, etc. from Turkey.

"So far (the date is unspecified—BTA's note) we know that leaders and activists of the movement have met on more than 300 occasions with diplomats of the Turkish Embassy in Sofia and the Consulates General in Plovdiv and Burgas," the newspaper writes. Further on "ZEMYA" discusses what it calls "coordinated actions of the DPS and Turkish diplomacy" "to widen the movement's international contacts and help its recognition as a political organization of the 'Turkish minority' in Bulgaria." At the Council of Europe, NATO, the European Parliament and other international organizations Turkey invariably promotes the thesis of "ongoing abuses of Muslims' rights in this country," the newspaper writes. The analysis made at the National Security Service proves that the report, which was signed by Mr. Ahmed Dogan and circulated in July 1991 by Turkey to prominent foreign public figures who attended the meetings of the International Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, was actually drafted at the Turkish Embassy in Sofia, the publication says.

"ZEMYA" points out that the numerous visits to Turkey by DPS leaders and activists have established durable contacts with Turkish and Islamic organizations, "including ones of Pan-Turkish orientation," that at the request of the DPS Turkish officials expressed readiness to send several thousand Turkish teachers to help set up a network of Turkish schools in Bulgaria. The Turkish consulates in Bulgaria give priority to visa applications from DPS members, but the Turkish diplomatic missions and the DPS are now taking coordinated action to restrict emigration to Turkey because they are concerned by the "proportions which the emigration hysteria is assuming in the areas with compact Muslim population," according to the daily.

"According to data in our possession, any responsible decision of the DPS leadership and its parliamentary faction is made after it is cleared with Turkish officials," writes "ZEMYA." The paper points out that the Turkish secret services have intensified their operations in Bulgaria since November 10, 1989.

Approached about the reliability of the material, Mr. Chavdar Petkov, director of the National Security Service, supplied to the BTA the text of a letter he had sent to "ZEMYA" in connection with the first installment. The counterintelligence chief writes to the editors of the daily that the National Security Service has never made information of such a nature available to the mass media, the "ZEMYA" newspaper included. "I believe that such publications do not only harm the improving relations with the Republic of Turkey but incite ethnic hatred and endanger the system of national security," writes the director of the National Security Service.

Performing its functions and acting according to a definite procedure, the National Security Service conveys collected information to the government and other competent authorities concerned with national security problems, he adds.

"Only nationalism is a destabilizing factor in Bulgaria and in Europe," Mr. Petkov told the BTA. He did not rule out the possibility of an investigation into the case, should the competent authorities decide to carry it out.

Trenchev Comments on Bistritsa Occupation

AU0412190991 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Interview with Konstantin Trenchev, chairman of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, by Petur Donchev in Sofia on 4 November—recorded]

[Text] Let us now report on one of the most topical issues of the day, namely the occupation of the International Management Center in the Bistritsa Residence by the Podkrepa Labor Confederation. Petur Donchev has recorded the following interview:

[Donchev] Between the briefing of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria and the news conference of the Business Trade Union, I had the opportunity to pass by the headquarters of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, where I happened to meet Dr. Trenchev in the elevator and this is what he stated a few minutes later in the lobby. It was 1345. This is the full recording of my interview with Dr. Trenchev:

[Trenchev] I have just returned from Bistritsa. Everything is peaceful, and I think that things are proceeding as they were intended. Naturally, we will insist that the government makes a decision on the issue. I know that they are overworked, but I think that the problem is of some importance. If Mr. Maxwell's representative would like to talk to us, I have nothing against it, but we hope that it will be Ognyan Doynov [former Communist Party Politburo member who left Bulgaria after the events of 1989 and was reportedly employed by Maxwell], because we have some other questions to ask him if he would be willing to come from London for negotiations. This is all. We intend to settle down in the residence and even to hold our councils in that place.

[Donchev] Are you convinced that this would be legal? Many questions are being asked by radio listeners as to whether the whole of your so-called action is legally justified?

[Trenchev] Well, as you know, Article One of the Constitution used to be a law, but it no longer is. Article 108 of the Penal Code was also a law, but it has been considerably amended. Article 273 was also a law. I would like to say that the communists passed a great number of laws over 45 years through which they led us to the present desolate state of affairs. I think that it is high time for people to take their destinies in their own hands, because no one has changed the situation as yet, and I am convinced that we should no longer go on like this. I think that everyone would understand this. Naturally, this is a private opinion.

Strike Intensifies at Kazanluk Military Plant

AU0512210691 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Telephone interview with Anton Dzhabandzhov, secretary of the regional union of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and spokesman for the strike committee at the Arsenal State Company in Kazanluk, by correspondent Petur Donchev on 5 December—recorded]

[Text] [Donchev] Good afternoon, Mr. Dhzabandzhov, what is the situation now with the strike at the Arsenal State Company?

[Dzhabandzhov] To use military terminology, the situation is escalating, in the sense that more workers are continuously joining the strike. A big rally is taking place in front of the administration building, attended by people who are awaiting the arrival of a government commission and representatives of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation.

Mr. Krum Khristov, deputy general director of the company, made a rude gesture to the strikers who gather every morning in front of the administration building. Our view is that this is a self-evident sign of the management's attitude.

[Donchev] How is one to understand this rude sign, is it a gesture of cynicism, or do you mean it figuratively?

[Dzhabandzhov] I mean it literally, not metaphorically. He gave them the finger when he came out of the door to switch off the strikers' microphone, and then went inside and locked the door. The people in front of the administration building are from almost all the divisions of the Arsenal Company.

[Donchev] Is any attempt being made at least to start negotiations between the company management and the strike committee, or is everything at a standstill?

[Dzhabandzhov] We can hold talks with them after such a disrespectful gesture was made to the company's workers and specialists. The strikers are now demanding the resignation of the economic management.

[Donchev] What can we expect to happen today?

[Dzhabandzhov] We will have to wait until the Podkrepa representatives are here. I have just been told that representatives of the government are here.

[Donchev] The point is that the acute problems can only be resolved through negotiation. I hope that you will agree with this judgment.

[Dhzabandzhov] We can agree with this, because this is the wish of our own trade union members and the local members of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], who have joined the strike, with the exception of the local KNSB leadership.

[Announcer] In the meantime, we have received a report that negotiations started at the plant, but were then broken off by the economic management because it could not accept the strike committee's demands.

Defense Ministry Announces Army Reforms Progress

AU0612084891 Sofia BTA in English 2022 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—[passage omitted] At today's press conference the spokesman for the Ministry of Defence announced that more than half of the weapons stolen from a military unit in Zvezdets had been recovered and the thieves detained. The thefts of weaponry, ammunitions and explosives have become frequent of late, the crimes becoming more difficult to detect because very often the weapons are stolen by soldiers who can get a high price for them in the black market, it was said at the press conference.

The reform in the military sphere is advancing well, an official of the Press Centre of the Ministry of Defence said. The personnel replacement in the Armed Forces is going on: 116 generals and 4,379 officers have been dismissed since 1989, 2,591 of them retired on pension, others left the Army voluntarily as they refused to sign the required depoliticization declarations. Until recently there were 280 generals in the Army, now they are only 78. The average age of the present command personnel is 34-45. [passage omitted]

Government Issues Statement on Foreign Debt

AU0512215291 Sofia BTA in English 2052 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 5 (BTA)—At today's session the cabinet considered the letter received from Deutschbank which chairs the bank advisory committee set up in connection with Bulgaria's foreign debt. It is insisted in the letter that by the end of January 1992 the commercial banks should receive guarantees from the Bulgarian Government and the National Bank of Bulgaria for the debt of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, the press centre of the Council of Ministers announced. Otherwise Deutschbank will resign from the presidency, the letter says.

"The first non-communist Bulgarian Government deplores the peremptory tone of the letter," the press centre release goes. The present difficulties have been caused by the suspension of the debt service payments declared on March 29, 1990, by Andrey Lukanov's Socialist cabinet, the Council of Ministers reminds.

Before clarifying all problems arising in connection with the debt restructuring, it would be difficult for the Bulgarian Government to make the required steps which, according to this country's Constitution, lie within the exclusive competence of the National Assembly. The Bulgarian Government hopes to receive the support of the Group of Seven and believes that its position on the debt rescheduling is in compliance with the international standards.

A Bulgarian delegation will leave for Vienna on December 10 to continue in a businesslike way the negotiations on Bulgaria's debt to the foreign commercial banks. It is expected that a lasting solution to the problem may be achieved before the end of 1992.

Winter Food Supply Situation Reviewed

AU0412175491 Sofia BTA in English 1620 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, December 4 (BTA)—Bulgaria will need an extra half a million tonnes of bread grain in order to feed her population till the next harvest, experts of the Ministry of Agriculture claim. But if there is no bread, we can eat cakes. Conditions for following this proverbial advice of Marie Antoinette's were established by the numerous importers of sugar. The market was flooded with sugar and the drop in prices is a disincentive to local producers. The uncontrolled import of rice has created similar problems for its local producers.

Bulgarian consumers may just as well turn to the staple foods in Bulgarian cuisine: Beans and lentils, of which there is a glut according to experts. This year's (prognosticated) local produce alone amounts to 36,000 tonnes, the "subsistence minimum" in this country being 34,000 tonnes.

The quantities of vegetable oil are also sufficient, the expected output for this season being 147,000 tonnes.

Dienstbier on Ukraine Treaty, Borders, NATO

LD0512191691 Prague CSTK in English 1520 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 5 (CSTK)—Czechoslovakia has begun work on a state treaty with the Ukraine, which could be signed as early as January, Federal Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier today told a joint session of the Federal Assembly (parliament).

He said Czechoslovakia supports sending an international peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia and is prepared to grant diplomatic recognition to the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia.

Dienstbier said that the issue of the Czechoslovak-German borders has been settled. The Czechoslovak-German friendship treaty, which has been recently initialled, recognises Czechoslovakia's continuity since 1918 and considers the Munich Agreement null and void from the very beginning.

Dealing with the replacement of the term "transfer" (of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia) with "expulsion" in the text of the treaty, he said the Germans cannot claim any restitution on the basis of this term.

He said he believes there is no danger that the treaty would not be ratified by the Czechoslovak parliament.

Commenting on the current crisis in Yugoslavia, he called for coordinated procedure by the international community. The failure to reach a European consensus would result in the escalation of violence. "The Yugoslav crisis is also dangerous for the process of European integration," he stressed.

On the subject of Czechoslovakia's relations with NATO, Dienstbier said a status of an associate membership of the alliance does not exist. "The Helsinki process is the only institution offering participation to all countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok," he said.

He did not rule out the possibility of opening a Czechoslovak consulate on the territory of Subcarpathian Rus if there is interest in it.

Answering the question whether Czechoslovakia might claim the return of Subcarpathian Rus, Dienstbier said Czechoslovakia is obliged to respect international conventions and the Helsinki Final Act and does not think that problems can be solved by changing the borders, but rather by removing them.

Vavrousek Writes Hungarian Leaders on Gabcikovo

LD0512175291 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] The Czechoslovak minister for the environment urges a more constructive attitude from the Hungarian side in the Gabcikovo power station affair. In an open letter addressed to the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the government, Vavrousek says that the Hungarian experts have not come forth with any proposal for a solution other than a full halt, while at the same time they reject, one after the other, all the Czechoslovak alternative proposals.

The head of the Prague federal ministry admits, nonetheless, that the water barrage has seriously damaged Czechoslovakia's most fertile regions, completely destroying 40 square kilometers of arable land, and it has worsened the local living conditions, as well as Slovakia's living conditions, generally.

Czech Government Issues Statement on 1992 Budget

AU0512150091 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 3 Dec 91 pp 1-2

[Statement issued by Czech Government in Prague on 2 December: "The Czech Government Does Not Alter the Budget"]

[Text] On 2 December, shortly before two o'clock in the morning, after an extraordinary session of the Czech Republic Government, its prime minister, Petr Pithart, acquainted reporters with this position:

"In its session in the night of 1 to 2 December, the Czech Republic Government determined that no reasons exist to alter its resolution on the Czech Republic 1992 budget passed on 29 November. The Czech Government considers the reactions by the Federal Government and the representatives of three parties and movements [Civic Democratic Party, Civic Movement, and Civic Democratic Alliance] to be unjustified. It insists that the draft budget does not break the federation, but it is ready for additional talks nonetheless."

On 2 December, the Czech Republic Government adopted a statement that provides additional details to its resolution on the Czech Republic state budget:

The Czech Republic Government discussed the 1992 budget thoroughly, and in full awareness of its responsibility toward the citizens of the Czech Republic. It considered what there was to be considered and agreed to such a system of the three budgets that would support the federation, i.e. that would include the transfer of funds for social services to the economically weaker regions.

We want to emphasize, however, the following: The Government approves of a budget that supports the federation, despite the fact that the acceptance of a common state is not general, and despite the uncertainty as to whether the federal arrangement will prevail.

A sufficient guarantee would be, for example, a referendum in the Slovak Republic, where several influential parties are promoting a confederation. A confederation is, however, an arrangement that does not include any federal budgets. Another meaningful guarantee would be if the composition of the Slovak Government were not questioned and the federalist attitude of its majority not queried.

The Czech Republic Government has not received any such guarantees. Nevertheless, it agrees to such a budget that takes into account the existence of the federation. This attitude of the Czech Government should not be scorned, but rather acclaimed.

The Czech Republic Government will not agree, however, to transfers that would endanger the fundamental needs of the Czech Republic by preventing it from covering the necessary expenditures on health care, education, police, and drinking water.

The Czech Republic Government did not breach any treaties and, therefore, it rejects the declaration by the representatives of the three parties of the former Civic Forum and by the Federal Government. The objective of the small financial council's Bratislava talks was to find a model for drafting a budget system, and nothing more. Its conclusions cannot be considered a binding agreement.

We reject the alternative of submitting a deficit budget to the Czech National Council. We are convinced that another solution will be found, and we are ready to contribute our own ideas in future talks.

Carnogursky Comments on Results of Budget Talks

LD0512164491 Bratislava Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] The extraordinary government session started a short while ago, 15 minutes ago, in fact, and information about the results of the deliberations in Brno, naturally, is the first point on the agenda of today's two-point program. Slovak Prime Minister Carnogursky began to report on its results. At the moment, however, he has interrupted the deliberations, and he came here to give us some information.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, did you expect such a favorable result in Brno?

[Carnogursky] In part, this could be expected because the Federal Finance Minister Klaus and his deputies indicated yesterday or the day before that some way out is on the horizon. This way out was worked out, perhaps, by erasing some budgetary sections in the federal budget and cutting 5 billion korunas. I would also like to say that today's extraordinary Slovak Government session has no connection with the deliberations in Brno—that is a mere coincidence. The Slovak Government session is taking place to discuss a report on the economic policy priorities of the Slovak Government in the coming period.

[Correspondent] Yes, this, in fact, is the second point.

[Carnogursky] Yes, and tomorrow we are submitting it to the Slovak National Council, and it would not be good to submit something to the Slovak National Council without it being discussed by the government.

[Correspondent] So if we are to pick up where you left off, the federal side has reconciled itself without problems to the demand to increase the budget of the Czech Republic, and thus also of the Slovak Republic.

[Carnogursky] Well, I do not know if it was without problems—it will not be completely without problems because the Federal Government will now be compiling the federal budget, or it will be compiling it anew and we will have to compile it in such a way that, put simply, it saves the 5 billion. So this means that there will be problems.

[Correspondent] Do you think that the Czech Government, which was or even is in session this afternoon—we have no information at the moment—will adopt the conclusions of the communique from Brno?

[Carnogursky] This is a difficult question. It is up to the Czech Government to decide.

[Correspondent] Yes, but you certainly assume that there is a chance because the 6 million are still, so to speak, hanging in the air.

[Carnogursky] It seems to me that it should accept it because the alernative is truly almost tragic. The alternative is, in fact, separating the Slovak and Czech economies. The Czech Government must realize this too and make decisions accordingly.

[Correspondent] And what result do you expect in the Slovak National Council? Will the deputies in the Slovak National Council be satisfied with this result?

[Carnogursky] I do not know, but the government will go to the Slovak National Council with a detailed explanation of the Slovak budget proposal, as well as with this solution that we reached in Brno and with the recommendation that the Slovak National Council adopt the draft Slovak budget.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, the campaign over the budget has a political background. Can you explain it to the listeners?

[Carnogursky] Yes, political undertones were heard too. One can only say—and I clarified it today during the deliberations in Brno, during the talks with Prime Minister Pithart, as well as with Federal Finance Minister Klaus—that the Czech political establishment has adopted the Slovak Government resolution in the Slovak Government statement from about two weeks ago as a signal to maintain, continue, and strengthen the common state. And conversely, voices putting this statement into question understood it as a signal against the common state. I tried to explain, and I think I succeeded, these views for and against the Slovak Government resolution—it was not so much the Slovak state as such, but some powers that are mentioned in the Slovak Government resolution—about which we agreed in the coalition talks as to how we imagine their divison. On the other hand, Prime Minister Pithart, for example, said that this is not what they are concerned about—the way communications will be divided, whether they will be federal or republican, and so on—but simply about the nature of the signal. This means that they are concerned whether or not some political signal against the common state comes out of Czechoslovakia.

[Correspondent] However, as you have already told us, it is a success that something in today's communique does not oblige the Slovak political representation in any way to limit its freedom and its further decisions and deliberations. So I think this is the greatest success.

[Carnogursky] Well, I do not know if it is the greatest success, but it is a fact, and I was very careful about this. The fact is that the Slovak National Council Presidium—if it next meets with the Czech National Council Presidium—can freely suggest all the powers to the Republics.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, the last question: What will the Slovak Government use the 200 million korunas for?

[Carnogursky] This will be the most difficult problem to be solved by the Slovak Government. We did not talk about it, but I do not know if we are to hold some sort of a fancy dress party in Bratislava and Kosice.

[Correspondent] Is the 200 million so little?

[Carnogursky] Yes.

Carnogursky 5 Dec Address to SNR Reported

LD0612112991 Bratislava Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Remarks by Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky to the 19th session of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava on 5 December—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] If I were to recapitulate briefly the debate within the government on this resolution, then the discussion concerned, in particular, two aspects of this statement and resolution. The first and the most important aspect was that the statement recalled three or four jurisdictions and stated that they should be at the level of the common state. Specifically, this involved an antimonopoly office, communications, posts and transport—that is if I am not mistaken. In the debate that took place within the government, the argument was raised that it was not appropriate for the government to predetermine an agreement and, in particular, a decision to be taken by direct participants in the discussions on the constitutional setup, in practice, the National Councils—or rather, the National Council presidia—on the division of competences in these branches, when that decision has not yet been made. The second aspect was that, at the time when talks were taking place between finance ministers about principles that are to govern the drafting of future budgets, it would not be appropriate to issue such a resolution because incorrect notions might emerge about what was the aim of that resolution and the like. As I found out soon afterward, another aspect was emphasized by the Czech side, which was contained in that resolution—that is, the mention of a federation and a declaration in favor of a future federation and the like. I must say only that, in my view, Slovakia does not need to declare itself repeatedly—neither at that time nor now—in favor of a federation because it has already done so by taking practical steps.

According to the draft of the state treaty, the content of which was discussed at several rounds of talks between the National Council presidia, and the text of which you all should have at your disposal, as far as I know. Chapter Three, on the competences of the common state, Article Ten, cites these competences of the common state, which were not disputed by the participants in the talks at Papiernicky and from which it is indisputable that it was agreed between the Czech National Council Presidium and the Slovak National Council Presidium, that at the level of the common state there will at least be defense and foreign policy; Article 10, subsection A: "To resolve relations toward other states and international government organizations", the protection of the constitution of the common state, the discharging of duties arising for a common state from international obligations, money, and the issue of currency, uniform monetary, credit, interest rate, and foreign exchange policy, budget of the common state, administration of assets in state ownership and the like. Furthermore, the system of the highest common bodies of the common state—the office of the president, the government, and the Federal Assembly—was practically agreed. Let us say that, in the case of the Federal Assembly, the detail of whether the second chamber will be a federal council or a senate remained open. In this context, we can regard it as a detail. It was furthermore agreed that the budget of the common state will be financed directly from taxes levied on citizens of the republics. This means that these joint competences that I have already mentioned, the joint bodies I have cited, direct financing of the budget of the common state and the legislature of the common state—which I have not as yet mentioned but that also exist and that are indisputable within the extent to which they exist—all these are federative factors.

Therefore, from this viewpoint, Slovakia does not need repeatedly to declare itself in favor of a federation, since it has done so at a minimum in this draft of the treaty, which, I repeat, is indisputable. Therefore, from this viewpoint, the accent or the signal that the Czech side saw in this resolution has been fulfilled, I believe, by other signals—if I can term it so. On the other hand, the cited contentious jurisdictions of which I have spoken have, in the meantime—at least here in Slovakia—reached a very advanced stage on the road to an agreement.

Coalition talks were held on 27 November 1991. Although I am not talking to a coalition public, I will nevertheless allow myself to brief you about them. At these talks, we discussed the organization of these branches, and it was agreed—and here I shall quote from a record made at that time:

Mr. Pavle, minister of transport and communications, his deputy minister, (Krymina), Mr. Martinko, director of the Board of Posts and Telecommunications, explained the existing and proposed organization of communications. They submitted a report containing ten points that define the proposed jurisdiction of the federation in the field of communications with other jurisdictions belonging to the republics. The content of this report was not disputed by the participants as a suitable definition of the jurisdiction of the federation in the field of communications in the prepared organization of communications. Representatives of the coalition are studying the said definition of jurisdictions in the field of communications.

Mr. Martinko, who is the director of the Board of Posts and Telecommunications, and who was for a certain time also a federal minister, is well versed in the matter, and he assured us that it is technically, organizationally, and economically an optimal organization of communications between the federal level and the republican one. Moreover, all those ten points have also been agreed by the Czech side. In future talks, the coalition will propose this division of powers in the field of communications, because it seems to be really optimal and capable of functioning in the future. As far as the post is concerned, it was clear among us that the post is now a republican one and that it should remain so.

As far as transportation is concerned, here again I shall quote from the records made on that day:

Mr. Pavle, minister of transport and communications, his deputy Mr. (Dzurinta) and Mr. (Nemes), an advisor to the federal prime minister, explained the existing and proposed organization of rail transportation. They agreed that the infrastructure of railway transportation—railways, buildings, and so on—should be in the ownership of the republics. Rail transport organizations should be set up in the republic, which would be the legal subjects and would secure railway transportation on the territories of the republics. Republican bodies of railway transportation would create a joint body that would secure coordination of rail transportation between both republics and contacts with international institutions. Representatives of the coalition are studying this scheme.

As regards the antimonopoly office, our preliminary thinking is such that it would be appropriate to have a federal antimonopoly office. Our thinking on this subject is guided purely by economic and organizational considerations. We are not, however, dogmatic about it, although the political aspect of the division of competences in the field of antimonopoly policy is, I would say, relatively small. Technical and organizational—and, to put it simply, purposeful—views of the matter prevail highly in this case. The division of competences that was included in that Slovak Government resolution is no longer topical, or rather the original proposal contained in the Slovak Government's resolution is not topical, because the coalition is now studying the one that I have just read to you.

When I spoke yesterday on this subject with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart, to be truthful, he did not at all register this problem of the division of jurisdictions in those branches I have just spoken about. I repeat, in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Government's resolution was noted exclusively as a signal in favor of a federation and the preservation of the common state. Debates that have, let us say, unfolded around this resolution in Slovakia—again in my view—were understood incorrectly as a signal against the common state. I hope I may be allowed to say that the debate around that resolution did not correspond to the content of that resolution itself, perhaps also because of the motivations of individual members of the government depending on whether they voted for or against that resolution.

Moreover, today, when we are conducting this debate, the problem of that resolution is to say the least, I believe, outdated. From these viewpoints, it seems to me that although the Slovak National Council has the full right to conduct such a discussion or to debate that particular Slovak Government resolution, I believe that, at this moment, that resolution simply and in effect belongs to the political history of this term of office and that it is not necessary to adopt a stand on it in a personal way and, moreover, in a dramatic form. By saying this, I have merely presented my view of the matter. It is up to you what view you yourself will take on that resolution. For us, it is, in essence, a closed affair that came to an end and life goes on. [passage omitted]

KDH: Slovak Coalition 'Must Be Preserved'

LD0512220291 Prague CSTK in English 1524 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bratislava Dec 5 (CSTK)—Slovak parliament First Deputy Chairman Ivan Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement—KDH) today told a KDH press conference the current Slovak Government coalition must be preserved until the 1992 elections as the current alignment of political forces makes it impossible to create a new government before them.

The KDH is the strongest member of the coalition whose other members include the Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN), the Democratic Party (DS) and the Hungarian Independent Initiative (MNI).

Carnogursky said the KDH is opposed to the forming of a minority government.

He said calling early elections in Slovakia is not realistic as it would mean having to adopt a new election law.

Carnogursky said the KDH and the three main opposition parties—the movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Democratic Left Party (SDL)—are united in their efforts to preserve stability in Slovakia. None of them wants to provoke a government crisis, he said.

Asked about a possible government coalition made up of the KDH, the HZDS and the SNS with SDL support, Carnogursky said the KDH is a strictly democratic party which would never create a coalition with leftist parties.

Pithart Discusses KAN, Czech-Slovak Relations

AU0512145791 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK (Slovenska Nedela Supplement) in Slovak 28 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by Lubos Sveton on 15 November; place not given: "We Do Not Communicate About What Makes Us Different"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[Sveton] At its Congress on 26 October, the Club of Nonaligned Activists [KAN] expressed its lack of confidence in you, as it was phrased—because of your political vagueness and association with communism. This attack comes from the right wing. Does it inspire in you a certain aversion to conservative ideas in general? Will this attack become a wind that blows you further to the left? Have you noticed any change in the perception of the left and the right wings in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia?

[Pithart] I do not perceive the KAN position as a right-wing one, and even less as a right-wing conservative position. That is made impossible by the radicalism I sense in the speeches by the KAN leaders. The KAN took a dislike to me after I reacted to the "Hodonin Appeal" [appeal to Pithart to dismiss communists from the government]. This appeal was motivated by left-wing revolutionary ideas, while I opposed it in the name of the right-wing conservative principle of justice. Therefore, I could not be, and in the future I do not want to be, blown in leftward. The perception of concepts like right or left does not correspond in the Czech Republic—and apparently also in Slovakia—to their traditional meaning. They are linked to specific people and groupings on the political scene. Moreover, they are far from free of excessive emotional charge. [passage omitted]

[Sveton] It is said that the level of understanding between the Czech and the Slovak nations is not very high. How would you explain this phenomenon?

[Pithart] I would explain it by mutual isolation. It is paradoxical, but these two nations, linguistically as close as very few others and in a common state for generations, do not understand each other because they do not communicate. More precisely, they do not communicate about that which makes them different. I am convinced that there are many Czechs who say, "I have Slovak friends," and many Slovaks who say something similar. I also know that Slovaks are better informed about the Czech situation than the other way around, but the understanding that I would call metaphorically "the depth of national soul," is insufficient on both sides. It has probably something to do with inadequate self-understanding. Understanding oneself and others, in the case of nations, is a task for cultural representatives on both sides. I believe that, although the common state has existed for more than 70 years, this work has not even begun.

[Sveton] A lot is heard about provocativeness and provocations. If you participated in a demonstration of Sladek's [Association for the Republic Republican Party of Czechoslovakia chairman] followers and wanted to give a speech, would it be provocation on your part?

[Pithart] I would not participate in a demonstration by Dr. Sladek's party. The situation you describe would not be a provocation but an absurdity. I am not aware of any such situation actually taking place. [passage omitted]

DS Leader Predicts Effect of Early Elections

LD0512215891 Prague CSTK in English 1742 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 5 (CSTK)—"The opposition is not interested in joining the (Slovak) Government before the elections, but strives to destabilise the situation to instigate the holding of early elections. After an election victory it would introduce an anti-reform course and tear Slovakia away from the federation", Peter Missik, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party (DS), a Slovak Government coalition member, charged today.

At a press conference in Prague, Missik described the situation in Slovakia as "extremely complicated".

"If the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) were to agree upon the holding of early elections, Slovakia's secession would be very realistic", Missik warned.

He recalled that Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the HZDS, which is the strongest opposition movement in Slovakia, declared recently that early parliamentary elections in Slovakia could be called on April 10-11, 1992. (Elections are currently scheduled for June). Meciar also told a press conference in Bratislava yesterday that the Slovak Government is not functioning and might collapse any time. According to Missik, KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky, who is Slovak premier, confirmed having discussed the possibility of early elections with the HZDS.

But Ivan Carnogursky, first deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council (parliament), today told a KDH press conference in Bratislava that calling early elections in Slovakia is not a realistic possibility because it would mean having to adopt a new election law.

Over 2 Million Sign Referendum Petition

LD0512220791 Prague CSTK in English 1719 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 5 (CSTK)—Over two million of Czechoslovakia's citizens have signed a petition calling for a referendum to be held on the country's future state setup, petition organisers told CSTK today.

Half of the signers also put their names to a statement of support for President Vaclav Havel's recent proposals to increase presidential powers in order to overcome the current constitutional crisis.

One of Havel's proposals is a bill to make a country-wide referendum mandatory if demanded by 500,000 registered voters in the Czech Republic (population 10.3 million) and by 250,000 in the Slovak Republic (population 5.3 million).

Organisers of the referendum petition, called "Citizens' Appeal", said they will turn the signatures over to the Federal Assembly (parliament) before it debates the referendum issue. It is expected to do so during its current session, which ends later this month.

Pithart Rules Out Prime Minister Reelection Bid

AU0512124691

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 30 November, in its CTENI NA SOBOTU (Reading for Saturday) weekend supplement on pages 1 and 2, carries a 2,500-word interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by Igor Sirota entitled "I Will Not Be Prime Minister a Second Time." The place and date of the interview are not given. As RUDE PRAVO notes in an introductory remark, the goal of the interview is to "take a glance at the Czech prime minister's private life."

In his initial replies, Pithart discusses his favorite pastimes (and his lack of time to pursue them); the difference between his feelings as a dissident and a prime minister; his perception of his own weak and strong points; the impact of his political career on his wife and family; and his views on whether a prime minister can have "true friends." In this context, Pithart is asked whether he has any friends among Slovak politicians.

Pithart replies that his friends among Slovak politicians are not necessarily "intimate friends, the type of friends you invite to a family trip with children or who come to your home for dinner." Nonetheless, Pithart continues, he has "absolute trust in Frantisek Miklosko," chairman of the Slovak National Council; "admires Fedor Gal," the former chairman of the Public Against Violence movement; and "is glad" that his counterpart on the Slovak side is Jan Carnogursky. Concerning his attitude toward Jan Carnogursky, Pithart says: "We both are approximately of the same age, we both studied law. When I do not understand him from time to time, the fault is not only his or mine, but rather that we represent our two nations' divergent experience. In other words, it is not Jan Carnogursky himself that stands in the way of understanding. This needs to be highly regarded because many politicians consciously deceive."

Asked whether former Slovak Prime Minister Meciar was meant by this last comment, Pithart replies that, in the case of Meciar, rather than talking about deceiving, "It would be more appropriate to speak about such a degree of spontaneity that one invariably asks whether it is bearable within some reasonable framework." However, Pithart continues, "This applies to the world of words. As far as the sphere of deeds, I would not like to underestimate Mr. Meciar. He is no sissy."

Next, Pithart is asked to comment on the recently publicized case of an attempt to bribe him (involving the general director of the Agrobanka, who allegedly offered Pithart three million korunas to obtain a state-owned building in Prague for his bank). The prime minister replies that he cannot provide any details on the case because he is a witness in an ongoing investigation. He only mentions that, initially, he thought that an attempt to compromise him was involved. Today, however, "I think that the aim really was to make the government do something it otherwise would not have done."

In one of his questions, Sirota inquires what Pithart regards as his "greatest success" and his "greatest defeat." The prime minister replies that he considers the "good work" of the Czech Cabinet to be a success, particularly the fact that the conflicts between the parties represented in it have not affected its operation. As for his defeats, Pithart says: "I am dissatisfied with myself because I have not been very successful in convincing the public that my approach to the Slovak partners has been correct. My basic mistake has apparently been that I have considered some facts, some knowledge about Slovakia to be generally known. As a result, I have not devoted as much time and energy as would have been necessary to explaining with whom we negotiate and why we negotiate the way we do. For this I have earned the reputation of being a man of concessions. At the same time, the idea that it would have been enough to bawl at the Slovaks [houknout na Slovaky] is foolish and irresponsible. Even 100 years ago, it was not enough for Vienna to bawl at us."

The Czech prime minister is also asked whether he wants to head the next cabinet and, if not, whether he has any other plans for the future. He replies: "In the next electoral period I will definitely not be at the head of the Czech Cabinet, and I give you my word of honor that I have not had any time to think about what I will do."

The final question concerns Pithart's belief in the future of a common state of Czechs and Slovaks. He replies that he will do "his utmost for the future of the common state, up to the very last moment. However, being the prime minister of the Czech Republic, as soon as this last moment comes I will work in the interest of the Czech Republic. But even if such a situation comes to pass, I am firmly determined to think about the future and to behave so that, at the very least, relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks are good forever, so that the relations between them be such as to make it possible to set up some better common state in the future, should the present attempt fail."

Antall To Meet Gorbachev, Yeltsin; Treaty Expected

LD0512192691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Excerpt] Several important diplomatic announcements concerning Prime Minister Antall's visit to Moscow were made at a government session. Gabor Bankuti reports:

[Bankuti] Jozsef Antall will hold negotiations and sign agreements with Gorbachev, and with Russia and the Ukraine. Tomorrow we will establish independent diplomatic relations with the two sovereign republics. The Antall-Yeltsin meeting will be held in the Kremlin, right after the Hungarian-Soviet basic treaty is signed. Then the Hungarian-Russian treaty will be signed.

The Hungarian-Ukrainian treaty will be concluded with President Kravchuk in Kiev in the afternoon. The Hungarian Consulate in Uzhgorod will be elevated to a Consulate General, while the consulate work relating to Moldova will be carried out by the Hungarian Consulate in Moscow.

According to spokesman Balazs Laszlo, Russia and the Ukraine play a major role in our relations with the USSR. This is why it is necessary to establish as soon as possible independent diplomatic relations as envisaged by the new Hungarian-Soviet basic treaty.

The government decided today that Hungary will establish a Consulate General in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. The work of the Hungarian Consulate General in Zagreb will be confined in the future to Croatia.

The draft of the 33-article Hungarian-German treaty on friendly cooperation and European partnership has been approved. Germany undertakes to support Hungary's joining the EC as soon as the economic and political conditions are established. [passage omitted]

Antall, Jeszenszky Leave for USSR

LD0512211691 Budapest MTI in English 1809 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 5 (MTI)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall left for Moscow today to hold talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and to sign the Hungarian-Russian and the Hungarian-Soviet basic treaties. Antall is accompanied by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky.

Romanian President Cited on Consulate in Cluj

LD0512194191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Report by correspondent Jozsef Orosz]

[Text] The Romanian leadership still does not consider the opening of a Hungarian consulate in Cluj justified, although, in an exclusive interview with Hungarian Radio, Ion Iliescu, Romanian head of state, recalled that during the days of the revolution, during the time of Gyula Horn's negotiations, he showed readiness on the matter of the consulate.

The head of state does not consider the time now suitable for the opening of Hungarian representation from the psychological point of view. This point of view can only be suspect. Two days before the referendum on the constitution, the anouncement of this news would cost precious votes. Not to speak of the forthcoming general elections next year, when practically neither of the Romanian parties would feel expedient to patronize the matter of the Cluj consulate as a good election method.

Iliescu, Romanian head of state, said in the interview that there is not much point to the consulate, for there is no visa obligation between Romania and Hungary. Of course, just two years ago Ion Iliescu did not consider it impossible that the Hungarian consulate in Cluj should be opened sometime in the future.

Delegation Urges Continued Dialogue With Romania

LD0512223391 Budapest MTI in English 1913 GMT 5 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, December 5 (MTI)—Romanian politicians say they are worried Hungary wants to open an embassy in a "future sovereign Transylvania," and therefore will not even entertain the idea of a Hungarian consulate in Cluj, said a Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee delegation upon its return from Bucharest today. But although the recent Hungarian-Romanian talks did not result in any agreement, they were conducted in an atmosphere of almost unprecedented openness, committee chairman Gyula Horn said.

For the time being, there is no hope for a re-opening of the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj as the Romanian leadership "seems to have no intention to take press briefing today."

During the talks, the draft of the new Romanian constitution was also discussed. Some clauses in the bill, along with a general lack of guarantees regarding the rights of national minorities, worried the Hungarian delegation. It is imperative to continue Hungarian-Romanian dialogue, the Hungarian delegation said.

Kadar Assesses Effects of EC Association

AU0512164591 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET Supplement in Hungarian 2 Dec pp 1,3

[Interview with Bela Kadar, minister for international economic relations, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "The Possibility of Our Integration in Europe—Bela Kadar on the Common Market Association Agreement"]

[Excerpts] [MAGYAR NEMZET] Mr. Kadar, could you please assess the Hungarian-EC association agreement?

[Kadar] The agreement can be seen as successful from all points of view. The fact that the EC modified its negotiating mandate during the talks and again after the French objections on 6 September indicates that we managed to assert our basic interests. This surprised many people, for the simple reason that the Western partners had not gotten used to the new Hungary's negotiating style. The agreement can also be assessed as a success representing common European interests. It starts from the Hungarian side's adaptability and executive ability, and Hungary's accelerating integration will also extend the borders of a developed and stable West Europe toward the East in a geographical sense. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The agreement mentions that, in 10 years, the EC banks and insurance companies will be granted rights to settle in Hungary—in other words, they will receive treatment similar to the Hungarians. Hungarian financial institutions, however, are worried about the competition.

[Kadar] This is partly why we tried to specify a relatively long grace period. However, it is unavoidable for the Hungarian banking system to become "Europeanized" in 10 years. All our market building efforts would seem to lack seriousness if we said that, even in 10 years time, Hungarian financial services would still have to be protected against EC competition. We are facing a hard adjustment process that will require faster decision-making and improved productivity. Naturally, this would have to be done even if we did not want to be part of the European integration.

I have stressed many times that a small country like Hungary has no alternative but to open to the world market. All those who warn that we must not accept any obligations in exchange for the favors granted by the EC—these, of course, are given free—forget one small thing, namely that a small country has no chance of conducting a protectionist economic policy. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] I suggest that we return to the association agreement, more precisely, on the actual effect it will have on the Hungarian economy.

[Kadar] Some 70 percent of Hungarian exports are general industrial goods and 26-27 percent in agricultural products. Some 10 percent of industrial exports are textiles and clothing and 5 percent metallurgical products. The fact that when the agreement comes into force tariff and quantity limitations will cease to exist for some 70 percent of our industrial exports—which is the most significant sector—represents a decisive improvement.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What does this mean in figures?

[Kadar] According to my estimation, our exports to the EC will be around $4.5 billion in 1991. All kinds of tariff and trade limitations will disappear on industrial goods worth $2.5 billion out of the $4.5 billion. Customs duties will be removed gradually over five years on the so-called sensitive products. Therefore, by the second half of the decade, Hungarian industry will have no limitations on exports to EC markets.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] A more critical part of the agreement is the section on agricultural exports. At the beginning of the negotiations, EC favors in agriculture were out of the question. Considering this, it is an achievement that according to the agreement, Hungarian agricultural products will be granted an annual 20 percent reduction in tariffs and levies for three years. To what extent, however, will this help our agricultural sphere which is in a critical state now, and which will later have to reciprocate the tariff reductions?

[Kadar] Hungarian agriculture has lost more than half of its effective demand in the eastern markets. These products cannot be transported a great distance, therefore it is of primary importance for us to get access to the EC markets. That means, however, a serious adjustment to EC regulations. The 60 percent reduction of tariffs on our products in the next three years and the possibility of expanding the quantities by an annual 10 percent for five years will help this adjustment. As a result, we might be able to make up for our losses due to the collapse of the Eastern markets and our agricultural exports may even start to increase after that, particularly if this sector specializes adequately and adjusts its production and development policies to the EC. In return, we will also make it easier for EC products to have access to our market.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] To summarize what you have said: What will we gain and what will we lose by the EC association?

[Kadar] It will give us an encouraging prospect for the future—the possibility of European integration. In addition, in the short term, it will help Hungarian exporters to earn considerably more income. [passage omitted]

The effect on the quantities of exports resulting from the disappearance of limitations will be much greater. As a result of all this, Hungarian products will have free access to the world's largest unit of buyer's market. This will speed up Hungarian growth and modernization led by foreign economic relations. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Can you make a prediction as to when Hungary can become a member of the EC?

[Kadar] We have to wait another five or six years to be able to see the results of the adjustment process. Based on this, we will be able to start new negotiations on the conditions of full membership.

MAGYAR HIRLAP Republishes Democratic Charter

AU0612103991 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Dec 91 p 4

["Democratic Charter"]

[Text] Given that these last few days the Democratic Charter has once again been the center of attention for power politics and the general public, our editorial staff has decided to publish the document again so that it may be faithfully read and understood:

"We, Hungarian democrats and signatories of the Charter, believe, regardless of our party affiliations, that the democratic transition continues to stall in our country.

"Many people are turning away from politics, not only because their living conditions have continued to deteriorate, but also because this was not how they imagined democracy.

"We know that, as in any other historic transition, there has been inarguable progress as well as setbacks during this crucial period.

"We would like to safeguard these results, and that is why we find it necessary to state what kind of a Hungarian Republic we would like to see.

"1. There will be democracy when, in accordance with the spirit of a constitutional state, we respect the law and order and democratic system of institutions of the Hungarian Republic.

"2. There will be democracy when a citizen no longer needs to fear the current government because the law protects the individual's independence vis-a-vis the state's excessive power.

"3. There will be democracy when the state does not delay its withdrawal from a significant part of the economy, when the pace of privatization is accelerated, and when the enterprises and banks still owned by the state no longer represent the entailed property of the current government—in other words, when their leaders are not appointed according to the governing parties' political aspirations but on the basis of their expertise.

"4. There will be democracy when new enterprises can base their business on neutral and supportive rules, and when the launching of new entrepreneurial careers does not depend on the benevolence of civil servants and political officials.

"5. There will be democracy when the trade unions formed by workers—unions that are independent of both employers and the state—defend employees' rights, and when trade union activists are protected against any kind of retaliations through legal guarantees.

[numbering as published]

"7. There will be democracy when the current political forces refrain from influencing the independent judiciary, when the state, guided by the goal of social reconciliation, rejects the idea of arbitrary and exceptional laws, and when political retaliations never take place in the Hungarian Republic.

"8. There will be democracy when the current government majority realizes that the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic limits its legitimate legislative and executive power, and that the Independent Constitutional Court ensures that the Constitution is respected.

"9. There will be democracy when the free local governments elected by the population are not suffocated by central patronage, and when they themselves do not try to prevent their voters from freely observing their management procedures and monitoring their operation.

"10. There will be democracy when all the citizens of the Hungarian Republic, if they so wish, can consider themselves to be part of the Hungarian nation.

"11. There will be democracy when the legitimate legislative and executive power consistently ensures that it does not confuse the concepts of nation and state. While it bears responsibilities toward the nation's members who live outside Hungary, it does not question the fact that as citizens, they are bound to another state. It needs to treat the East and Central European region as a reality, where various changes which reciprocally affect the peoples who live there can only be brought about within the framework of international agreements through peaceful consensus.

"12. There will be democracy when the national minorities who live in Hungary have the right to maintain their own identities and when the state and the current majority actively contribute to this process.

"13. There will be democracy when the state shows neutral patience toward the convictions and ideologies of all its citizens, as long as these do not constitute a threat to others.

"14. There will be democracy when the current legal power abandons the idea of, either overtly or covertly, raising any ideology to the status of a state religion or ideology, when the state's educational institutions do not force any kind of compulsory ideology on their students, and when the current authorities support the multitude of existing educational trends with a goodwill that is independent of party affiliation.

"15. There will be democracy when the current government guarantees the freedom of science and culture, and when it does not distinguish between those who work in these fields on the basis of their political loyalty, ideology, or opinion of the authorities. The final word on the sponsorship of science and culture and on the appointment of leaders to cultural institutions operated by the state should be given to expert bodies which are independent of the government.

"16. There will be democracy when there is a guarantee that the public radio and television services are independent of the government, parties, and local governments.

"17. There will be democracy when the freedom of the press is not limited by a state monopoly, by the financial predominance of banks that depend on the state, or by the intimidation of journalists, and when the current administration provides equal information to all the legal press organs.

"The best possible law or best possible system of institutions cannot in themselves defend freedom unless citizens arise and vigorously defend the laws and their own freedom:

"We, the signatories of the Democratic Charter, raise our voices against phenomena which endanger constitutional democracy, and we will try to ensure that impatient, authoritarian groups that are trying to make exclusions will not be able to turn the Republic's Constitution into a dead letter, so that we Hungarians may be free citizens rather than submissive subjects!

"Those who agree with this Charter should express this through their signature and let it be known that they agree to the publication of their name."

New National Bank President Discusses Policy

LD0512214491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Interview with Hungarian National Bank President Peter Akos Bod and Vice President Frigyes Harshegyi by correspondent Peter Szorenyi; place and date not given; from the "Extra" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Szorenyi] Your are off to meet the miners. What will you tell them? What sort of politics will you carry out as the National Bank's new president? Do you want to save this kind of crisis [word indistinct]. Or will you vote in favor of stringent monetary policies in the future, too?

[Bod] I consider the relatively stringent budgetary and monetary policy indispensible from the point of view that the big budget deficit causes inflation, and burdens lay heavily on the country due to outside indebtedness. Although it would be popular, I cannot promise that credit will be cheaper purely because there will be a new bank president. Nothing will change from this alone. Perhaps I have the advantage that, having become acquainted with the misery of real economy and the problems precipitated there, I am more sensitive to the economy's movements, and I can calculate better.

[Szorenyi] Will you loosen the monetary policy? Your previous post would dictate this, for opposition members of parliament said you were somewhat against the stringent monetary policy.

[Bod] The views of a trade and industry minister are quite different to that of either the finance minister, who is reponsible for the budget, or the Hungarian National Bank president, who is responsible for the forint's stability. Neither as an economist nor as a candidate of the bank of issue, naturally, can I participate in any policy which is contrary to economic rationality. I consider conquering inflation very important. There is a chance for this. It can be done. Unfortunately, this requires a rather stringent monetary policy, perhaps not more stringent than last year's.

[Szorenyi] Why unfortunately?

[Bod] Due to this, those enterpreneurs, who would find the market otherwise, feel, and rightly so, that the price of money is too dear. However, if money were just poured into the economy, swallowed up by the unprofitable areas without any perspectives, this would only increase inflation.

[Szorenyi] There was a government party member of parliament who asked you how long this stringent policy will be maintained and when the enterprises will get some breathing space. One of your vice presidents said that there is plenty of credit but that the Hungarian firms are simply unable to come up to West European standards. How will you solve this duality?

[Bod] Two things are needed. One is to have a project that can be financed and that the enterprise or enterpreneur should have a market. It is no good to give money to those who have no market for this will not generate production. Unfortunately, the 1990-91 market loss resulted in companies of otherwise good technical standards not being able to survive even if interest rates were to drop, let us say, by five percent. However, I think that the bank system must do everything in its power, and perhaps more than before, to see that home and foreign savings is chanelled to those enterpreneurs, and at not too high of a price, who have market and ideas.

[Szorenyi] The previous National Bank president has already implemented a policy in which interest rates are reduced. Do you also favor this?

[Bod] Naturally. Unfortunately, despite the bank of issue's influence, the interest rates of the commercial banks did not drop, at least not noticeably. Therefore, I feel that, as the bank of issue's future president, it is my task to see that the interest rates follow the decrease in inflation. [passage omitted]

[Szorenyi] However, a cut in interest rates could lead to a certain amount of invigoration. Since import liberalization is at 90 percent, it is conceivable that the foreign trade deficit will increase further.

[Bod] Yes, this is a very important dilemma. Here, changing the rates has enormous importance for, on the one hand, a cut in interest rates means that the depositors will get less too, and the depositors won't be to happy with that. The money will be cheaper for those who get loans, so it will be easier to invest. Of course, it is impossible to decide how much of this investment demand is directed toward Hungarian industry or how much of it is directed toward imports. This will be a test of Hungarian industry's competitiveness.

[Szorenyi] Will you be able to call a retreat, say, if in the autumn of 1992 you deem, together with the vice presidents, that too much money is in the economy? Will you able to carry out a tougher, more stringent economic policy? [passage omitted]

[Bod] Naturally, I will be able to: First, because the law lays this down as my duty; second, because I have always listened to the circle of experts, and I have no reason not to listen to them in the banking sector; and third, I can say that as minister of industry and commerce I never supported in an unprincipled manner a subsidy which I could not find acceptable as an economist, whether it was the case of the miners, the metallurgy industry, heavy engineering, or military industry, despite the enormous pressure exerted on me. I consider the current processes as good, and since I have indirectly participated in shaping economic policy, as an economic cabinet member, I think that central bank needs not prepare for a radical change. [passage omitted]

[Szorenyi] What do you think about the MAGYAR FORUM article claiming that the Hungarian National Bank is a body where the inheritors, the officials of the old regime, remain and that this should end?

[Bod] [passage omitted] The experts I know are good.

[Szorenyi] Will you be able to resist these types of attacks? I ask this because a deputy remarked that now that the Hungarian National Bank has become independent there is need for a loyal head.

[Bod] As to why I was nominated is a totally different issue. I interpret this as my being acceptable to many professional, political elements involved. [passage omitted]

In my work, I did not select based on a party. In the past 18 months as minister of industry and commerce, I have not found time in the Ministry of Domestic Trade or in the Ministry of Industry to look into who was a party member, executive committee member, worker's guard.

[Szorenyi] Frigyes Harshegyi, Hungarian National Bank vice president, to what extent are you satisfied with this choice? [passage omitted]

[Harshegyi] Sometimes it is very difficult to make statements about personnel issues since these can be interpreted in various ways. I would not say that the choice was the lesser evil, because, naturally, all of us were asked by the premier how we viewed the possibility for cooperation, and all four of us said that we were well acquainted with Peter Bod and that we would cooperate with him. There won't be a problem.

[Szorenyi] How is it possible to cooperate with a nonbanking expert?

[Harshegyi] Economic, economic policy, financial policy issues, as well as specialist banking issues, arise at our level.

[Szorenyi] Thus, it is possible to preserve the Hungarian National Bank's strict financial policy and its independence from the government?

[Harshegyi] The law guarantees independence from the government. An expression of this is also that, if, for example, we are appointed, it will be impossible to remove us, even if a new government comes to power. The law intends to guarantee precisely that there should not be personal dependence, and this should not exist in the future. Therefore, the independence will always exist in this sense. As for the strict monetary policy, I would replace the word strict with rational [esszerue] because the bank of issue must always watch how the economy stands, how the economy functions. My own business management yardstick, the sole one, is inflation. However, it is not (?solely) the bank of issue and monetary policy which is responsible for the amount of inflation. This, as well as the country's solvency, is what we must watch, primarily.

[Szorenyi] Economists propose that you could have a strong impact on the 1994 elections since, if at the end of 1993 you were to dilute, somewhat, the monetary policy, the people would live better, to an extent, and they would, therefore, vote for the party which is then in government.

[Harshegyi] It is conceivable that economic policy has a different character during an election year. It is entirely clear that there is no stupid government which might, let us say, announce more severe taxes in the year prior to elections. This is why 1992 is very important. This unpopular budget is important because it hopefully will consolidate financial discipline and the country's finances. This is why the bank of issue's president is elected, or appointed, for six years. There are two guarantees against the bank of issue being used for party policy or for helping the general government. The first: One who is familiar with the dependence on the international financial world knows that the bank of issue is under very tight, if not everyday, control. Our creditors—the World Bank, the [International] Monetary Fund, the various financial organizations or private banks—have no interest whatsoever in people politicizing with interest policy here. [passage omitted]

Second, the bank of issue's president undertakes the task for six years. Meanwhile, governments may change. It would be stupid to use this relationship for something other than its purpose, for there to be an intelligent dialogue, just because you are a member of government, acquainted with the government members, perhaps you have a good personal relationship with them. [passage omitted]

Decree Liberalizes Currency Exchange Procedures

LD0612105491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] As of today anybody can work in exchanging money in Hungary. According to a government decree, the only restriction is that the currency buying price at exchange places should not exceed the official medium exchange rates of the Hungarian National Bank. However, selling prices must be higher. The necessary permission will be issued by the regional directorates of the Hungarian National Bank with the condition that the applicant has to speak at least two languages on a basic level and have qualifications as a currency cash clerk and administrator. People with criminal records or who have had procedures initiated against them for committing summary offenses against property within the last two years cannot be given permission to set up a currency exchange.

Hungarian-Language Broadcasters Discuss Programs

LD0412213491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Studio discussion with Anna Jaszberenyi, from Radio Tirgu Mures; Zsuzsa Labanc, from the editorial staff of Radio Bucharest's Hungarian-language programming department; Gyula Helyi, from Uzhgorod television-radio, in sub-Carpathia; Attila Protics-Saros, from Radio Slovakia's Hungarian-language department; Laszlo Baranyi, editor for Radio Timisoara's Hungarian-language department; and Sandor Szep, a Radio Cluj representative, by unidentified moderator; from the "Extra" program—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Moderator] Our program's guests are the leaders, or leading representatives, of the Hungarian radio studios in neighboring countries: Romania, Slovakia, and sub-Carpathia. [passage omitted]

I believe that, in itself, it is a big thing that we are now able to sit in a studio and hold such a discussion. However, the truth is that it emerged at yesterday's meetings and at the earlier discussions that the situation is not necessarily the best regarding any planned or existing cooperation, not to mention the special situation of colleagues in Novi Sad and Subotica, who unfortunately are unable to be here since they must report from a country stricken by civil war. Beyond this, each person works amid entirely different technical, material, and technological conditions in his or her own place or town. The colleagues from Transylvania have said that their situation, properly speaking, is rather particular. I would like to ask you to explain this briefly.

[Jaszberenyi] The question of what these studios can do to improve relations among the people in the region is extremely exciting and also fraught with responsibility. [passage omitted] Transylvania has a marvelous radio station: Radio Tirgu Mures. We have an audience of some 1.5 million who like us, hold us in regard, respect us. I believe in the truth of the word, of information. If we state truth, I feel we will be better able to understand one another. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] I believe Slovakia's recent independence endeavors have created a special situation, a different kind of situation, for Hungarian-language radio broadcasting there.

[Protics-Saros] The Hungarian broadcast in Bratislava transmits for 38 hours weekly in Hungarian. I can say, with a peaceful conscience, that this broadcast has strengthened over the past two years and that there have been no problems which might hamper the broadcast's content, the structure of the broadcast. As for the independence endeavors, these naturally have repercussions on radio, in the Slovak programs. However, they currently do not have an impact on the Hungarian-language broadcast. Therefore, to use the director's words, the Hungarian-language broadcast has a so-called autonomy within the radio. Thus, it is fully independent and autonomous, and it fully is answerable for what it transmits in the programs, for what it puts in the programs. I hope that this situation will remain and that we will not have any particular problems. As for coexistence, our programming policy is that we try to avoid confrontation, and we try in our programs to highlight what links us, so we give priority to the positive examples. No matter what attack might befall us—I do not mean from the radio leadership but perhaps from outside—even then we do not put on boxing gloves, but instead of engaging in polemics we try to react calmly to things. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] Is Hungarian radio broadcasting in sub-Carpathia easier now than a few years ago? Are the possibilities greater?

[Helyi] The possibilities are the same, to put it frankly. I would like to say that the region in sub-Carpathia which is represented is inhabited by 1.3 million people. The Magyar population constitutes some 17 percent. That is an official statistic. (?One cannot believe) greatly in the statistics offices, but that is the essence. Radio broadcasting began in Uzhgorod at the end of the 1940s in three languages: Ukrainian, Hungarian, and [word indistinct] or in the Moldova language. [passage omitted]

There will be a change to that in the first days of January 1992 with the addition of a German-language broadcast.

(?Gradually), there will be four editorial sections working at the radio. I can say that our technical fittings are good. The relationship with Hungarian Radio is also adequate. We are given assistance, and I will also say that we are here so that we, as well, can help one another. [passage omitted]

[Labanc] Radio Bucharest's Hungarian-language program, between 1500 and 1600 in the afternoon, properly speaking, is addressed to the entire Magyardom of Romania, the two million-strong Magyardom of Romania. It has emerged that a total of 9,000 Hungarian-speaking inhabitants live in Bucharest. This proves, properly speaking, the election result of the Democratic Federation of Magyars in Romania in Bucharest, where approximately 9,000 cast their votes for those representing the interests of the Magyardom in Romania.

As for coexistence, cooperation, Radio Bucharest's Hungarian broadcast promotes peaceful social coexistence. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] During our conversation yesterday, you complained that you in Timisoara are not in the best situation since there are not enough people and the technical equipment is not very good.

[Baranyi] Yes, our particular situation, that of the Hungarian editorial staff, really does not give cause for much optimism. However, since this discussion began about the concept of coexistence, I must say that I represent an institution, I come from a place, where coexistence assumes a rather practical form, namely Radio Timisoara transmits programs in six languages: Romanian, German, Serbian, Hungarian daily, and Czech and Bulgarian on Sundays. [passage omitted]

These programs exist, they are there. The programmers, the editorial staff of the various languages work together, and practically nothing disturbs our internal work and collaboration. This constitutes an advantage regarding possible problems with which colleagues elsewhere contend. [passage omitted]

[Jaszberenyi] I can say that—I have not yet mentioned this in the discussion—we broadcast 12 hours of programs daily, of which six are in Romanian, five are in Hungarian, and one is in German. Thus, we also broadcast our programs in three languages. Based on letters, we can say that at the border region which (?is scarcely reached) by the transmission, since it is not a large transmitter which transmits our programs, the audience is very large.; It is very large. They like us. They respect us. They search us out with their problems.

[Helyi] I would like to say that, regarding its special geographical position, sub-Carpathia borders four countries: Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Had the question been asked, this would also mean that the program receiving possibilities extend accordingly. We receive 8,000-10,000 letters annually, primarily regarding the music request program, from Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.

[Protics-Saros] We also receive many letters, not just from Slovakia but also from abroad, primarily from Hungary. However, many letters have come from Romania and Yugoslavia. A painful point for us is that our program cannot be heard well in Bodrogkoez, in eastern Slovakia, because the Kosice transmitter is rather weak. This explains why the colleague from sub-Carpathia also receives many letters from eastern Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] What do you think? Commercial radio broadcasting will sooner or later constitute competition for you within your own countries. Properly speaking, we, from a certain viewpoint, are competitors of one another. [passage omitted]

How do you view your chances of being able to continue to broadcast in Hungarian and to be listened to? [passage omitted]

[Protics-Saros] Regarding the question of to what extent commercial radio will constitute a challenge to Hungarian broadcasts in Slovakia, in Slovakia the possibility is imminent that commercial broadcasts will be permitted and that they will function. If I am correct, there are more than 50 seriously interested parties who have a considerable chance of receiving permission for commercial radio broadcasts. Within this, my information is not accurate, but I have the information that there is a claim or application for three Hungarian broadcasts, too. This will certainly constitute competition in the first phase, if only because they are able to guarantee better conditions, material conditions for the staff. It could easily happen that they recruit our people. This is unavoidable.

As for the program's compilation, I feel that there cannot be much competition because a commercial broadcast understandably will base its program on music and advertisements, and it will be unable to provide listeners with what we provide. I am thinking mainly of culture, literature, music, education. There will not be competition in this sphere. This will be a period of transition for one-two years, when the chances and possibilities even out, and a balance is restored. Thus, state radio will be able to offer its staff what commercial broadcasts can offer their employees. However, it will be necessary to get through this difficult period. Replenishment for us is rather difficult. There are no reserves, so we will recruit, attract people from one another, and that is not a good situation. [passage omitted]

[Labanc] My firm conviction is that as long as Radio Bucharest's Hungarian program deals with the Romanian Magyardom's vital issues, issues concerning their destiny, it will not lose its faithful listeners. [passage omitted]

Reportage on Government Recognition of Ukraine

Sejm Adopts Resolution

LD0612151191 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1332 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Remarks by Sejm Deputy Speaker Andrzej Kern at Sejm session in Warsaw—live]

[Excerpts] We move to the next point on the agenda, the draft resolution of the Sejm of the Polish Republic on the independence of the Ukraine. As you received the document with the text of this resolution only at the very last moment, I will read the text of the proposed resolution:

The Sejm of the Polish Republic greets with satisfaction the independent Ukraine in the family of free nations. The creation of an independent Ukrainian state is an important event, not only for the Ukraine, but also for Europe and the whole world. We believe that the independent Ukraine will, in constructing democracy, assure the full implementation of civil rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of nationality. Respect for the rights of Poles inhabiting the Ukraine and Ukrainians inhabiting Poland to cultivate and develop their own national identity will be a bridge between our nations. The first of December 1991 opens a new era in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. We express the conviction that they will rest on principles of friendly cooperation. We wish the Ukrainian state the recognition of and respect for its independence by all nations and states. [passage omitted]

[Sejm Deputy Iwinski interrupts] The proposed amendment of the first sentence would read: The Sejm of the Polish Republic greets with satisfaction the Ukraine in the family of independent states. [passage omitted]

[Kern continues] I declare that Deputy Iwinski's amendment has been adopted by a majority of 328 votes for, 16 against, with 27 abstaining. [passage omitted]

We move to the vote on the entirety of the resolution, including the amendment adopted a moment ago, and as indicated by Deputy Iwinski. Who is for the adoption of the draft resolution in this version? [passage omitted]

I declare that the resolution has been adopted by a majority of 360 votes for, five against, with 16 abstentions. [applause]

Skubiszewski Issues Statement

AU0612152691 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Dec 91 p 1

["Statement by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski for RZECZPOSPOLITA"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the transformations in the USSR, and especially since the beginning of the emancipation of the republics within the borders of the USSR, Poland has pursued a clear and consistent eastern policy—in other words, a policy of establishing and expanding relations with the peoples who border us in the east. Relations with the Ukraine, a great state and great people, are of priority importance for us.

Almost 14 months ago, in October 1990, I traveled to Kiev, where I signed a bilateral declaration on the principles and basic paths for development of Polish-Ukrainian relations. In that document, we described the Ukraine as a sovereign state. This was a recognition of Ukrainian statehood. Today, we reiterate that recognition, following the referendum that has affirmed independence within the inviolable present borders. We welcome this independence. Our eastern history has been long, hard, and frequently tragic. Today we extend our hand of friendship to the Ukrainian people. We are the first country to recognize the Ukraine and the first country that has decided to establish full interstate relations with it.

This decision expresses our attitude toward the Ukraine, an attitude of firm friendship. Even earlier, we were consistent in this matter. Even earlier, our mutual relations were well-developed and possessed original features, such as an exchange of special government envoys dealing with political matters. Our relations were rich, as illustrated by mutual consultations based on a separate protocol; the agreement on cooperation and youth exchanges, which I hope will be widely implemented; the consular convention; and the economic accord, to which we attach great hopes. Now, these relations will be even more intensive.

The Ukraine will make a major contribution to European cooperation. The Ukraine should become a contributing factor to European security. I address today's statement by the Government of the Republic of Poland to this important task, the question of security. What the government statements say on this question is very important, regarding the Ukraine's participation in disarmament and denuclearization and its signing of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are also counting on full and unrestricted opportunities for Poles in the Ukraine. For our part, we guarantee Ukrainians in Poland similar opportunities.

Council of Ministers Statement

AU0612111591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Dec 91 p 1

["Statement by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland"]

[Text] Taking into account the good state and intensity of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and considering the results of the 1 December referendum on the Ukraine's independence, the government of the Republic of Poland recognizes the Ukraine as a state and resolves to establish diplomatic relations with it.

The government of the Republic of Poland voices the conviction that the Ukraine will make a significant contribution to the construction of a system of security and cooperation on our continent based on international law and the principles of the CSCE. In particular, the government of the Republic of Poland voices the conviction that the Ukraine will respect the commitments resulting from the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and other disarmament commitments, especially those stemming from the START treaty, and that it will permit the implementation of these commitments. The government of the Republic of Poland expects that the Ukraine will join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The government of the Republic of Poland also expresses the hope that, while forming its own armed forces, the Ukraine will take into account the trend to reduce forces that dominates Europe today.

Poland sees independent Ukraine as a partner for close, multilateral good-neighborly relations. The government of the Republic of Poland is convinced that the gaining of independence by the Ukraine will have a favorable influence for the enhancement of cooperation between our two states to the benefit of both nations, their neighbors, and the whole of Europe.

Andrzej Zarebski, government press spokesman.

Walesa Submits Draft Constitutional Law to Sejm

LD0512161591 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1503 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Address by President Lech Walesa to the Sejm in Warsaw; introductory remarks by Sejm Speaker Chrzanowski—live]

[Text] [Chrzanowski] We move to the first point on the afternoon agenda of our deliberations. I request the president to speak on the matter of the draft law on the appointment and recalling of the government, and other changes related to the supreme state bodies.

[Walesa] Mr. Speaker! May it please the House:

I am convinced that, if we do not grant greater prerogatives to the executive power, we will quite simply not succeed on time. Society will not stand this, and rightly so. That which has taken place over the last two years can be understood. There was no completed democracy. But this is now, and it must be effective. The legislative Sejm of the Second Republic has passed a small constitution in the course of 10 days. This Sejm has gained the name of the Polish Constitutional Assembly—thus, did our predecessors work. I judge that we too have not wasted our 10 days. We have behind us the meeting of the Council of Elders, the meetings of the parliamentary floor groups, my talks with the representatives of parliamentary factions, and consultations with the representatives of work enterprise workforces. These 10 days have proved once again that the most urgent matter for the Sejm and state is the legal order. Reality is hurrying things along. The state must function and develop. But is this to take place according to the legal norms of a Stalinist pedigree? The division of jurisdictions between legislative and executive authority is imprecise. The responsibility for the decisions of state importance is blurred. Some cannot be made at all. We are standing still, and we have to act quickly. The old system lies in ruins, but we are held back by its law. A new system has yet to be created. There is a grey zone, dangerous for the state. It is hard to appoint a government, and how easy to undermine its authority!

There are no legal possibilities either to equip it with broader jurisdiction to proclaim laws. Without them, there can be no acceleration of the vital transformations, especially economic ones. A budget is needed—reprivatization, broad privatization; a cut in unemployment; a fight against the recession; restructuring; an increase in security; and the elimination of corruption. All these are needed.

The chief intention of the draft small constitution that I am proposing, is to create legal frameworks within which the government would be strong in support of both the president and Parliament. Regardless of the accepted constitutional solutions, the people remain sovereign, for supreme authority belongs to the people in a Republic. State institutions act only in their name.

The discussion around the draft constitutional changes ought not to hide this most relevant systemic principle. The worker-president does not want any honor, does not want power for himself. My concern is for the fate of Poland. The reforms are necessary—already, yesterday. Let us give them a chance. Let us together open the road for them. I believe that the first Sejm of the Third Republic will go down in history as a reformatory Sejm and an immediately effective one. In this, it will be similar to that Sejm known as the Constituent Assembly. I express the deep hope that the speaker and the esteemed house will share the arguments contained in the document of justification that is appended to the draft, and that it will adopt the proposed constitutional law.

Thank you for your remarks.

Parliamentary Groups Debate 'Small Constitution'

LD0512201391 Warsaw PAP in English 2222 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 4—The parliamentary floor group of the Christian National Union supported on Wednesday the idea contained in the presidential draft of small constitution to strengthen and stabilize the executive power by giving the government special powers but pointed to the danger of making the cabinet too dependent on the president while the competences of the parliament would be restricted.

At its Wednesday meeting attended by President Lech Walesa, the caucus proposed that the small constitution should be limited to matters concerning the appointment and dismissal of the government and should be passed as soon as possible.

According to President Walesa, the need for a strong executive power stemmed not only from the necessity to promptly privatize economy and eliminate economic scandals and unemployment but also from external threats, for instance the developments in the Soviet Union. "The government and individual ministers should be given the possibility to rule effectively but the Parliament should be empowered to change their erroneous decisions," he stated.

The president said the first democratic Parliament of the Republic of Poland should do everything to show Poland and the world that democracy can guarantee effective and wise government and promised he would propose a new prime minister as soon as the parliament provided the new cabinet with due conditions for ruling. He pledged to do "nothing against democracy and majority" while choosing a candidate for prime minister.

On the eve of the Sejm (lower house) sitting which is to debate on the presidential draft of small constitution also other parliamentary floor groups met on Wednesday to discuss the project. The parliamentary floor group of the Democratic Union, the largest one, supported the intention of the presidential draft but opined that the position of the government and the Sejm should be strengthened and the balance of power maintained. The caucus has resolved to support the proposal to strengthen the executive power but thinks that proper solutions should be found to make the position of the government and the Sejm equally strong. This entails significant changes in the draft. It lies in nobody's interest to have the balance of power impaired, leader of the group, Bronislaw Geremek, said.

The floor group opted for introducing the principle of a constructive vote of no-confidence but rejected the provision in the draft giving the government the right to rule by decree. "This issue may be dealt with in a separate constitutional law," Geremek said. He also opined it was possible to adopt the small constitution before Christmas and then form a government.

Deputies of the Democratic Left were very critical of the presidential draft saying that the adoption of the project "meant the slackening of parlimentary control over the decisionmaking process at the highest level." Leader of the caucus, Aleksander Kwasniewski, described as a "new mistification" the view that everything would improve immediately should the Sejm give special powers to the government. The deputies agreed however to giving the cabinet the right to issue decrees with the force of law but only on a strictly defined scale. The caucus also voted for accepting the government resignation and discussing the effects of its operation.

The resignation of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's cabinet was also supported by the parliamentary group of the Polish Peasant Party. They also opted for radical changes in the Constitution and for a strong efficient rule with the balance between legislative, executive, and judiciary powers.

Meanwhile, the Peasant Party Executive Committee opposed the departure from a parliamentary democracy towards the presidential system at which the small constitution draft aims. There is no justification for restricting the role of the freely and democratically elected Parliament, the party said and opined the issue should be solved by a referendum.

According to the caucus of the Confederation for Independent Poland, there is no relation between the adopting of small constitution and designating a candidate for prime minister. A new cabinet should be formed as soon as possible, they opined.

The Centre Alliance parliamentary floor group said the resignation of the present government should be accepted and, like other caucuses, opted for some modifications in the presidential draft aimed at strengthening the executive power.

The draft of small constitution was among topics of a meeting held in the parliament buildings by representatives of the Centre Alliance and the Democratic Union, suggesting a turn in the former party's approach to the largest Sejm group. "It was not a futile meeting," said a Centre Alliance leader, but no further details were disclosed.

Sejm Debates Resignation, Criticizes Cabinet

LD0512221391 Warsaw PAP in English 1909 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 5—The Sejm (lower house) on Thursday accepted the resignation of the government of Prime Minister Jan Kszysztof Bielecki but asked it to stay on and perform its duties until a new cabinet is formed. A total of 375 deputies voted for the resolution accepting the cabinets resignation, one was against and 41 abstained from voting.

Leaders of parliamentary floor groups delivering speaches before the voting spared no bitter criticism of the outgoing cabinet for its failure to halt recession and economic scandals that erupted under the Bielecki premiership but admitted that Poland's winning a 50-per cent foreign debt reduction was that cabinet's great success.

As the deputies accepted the resignation of the Bielecki cabinet, President Lech Walesa nominated Jan Olszewski, the candidate of the five-party coalition which he had initially opposed after the October 27 parliamentary elections, for prime minister. Olszewski still needs to be approved by the Sejm as a prime minister but the house failed to vote on Thursday on his candidature.

The five-party coalition, including the confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), Liberal Democratic

Congress (KLD) Centre Alliance (PC), Peasant Agreement (PL), and Christian National Union (ZChN) received the president's decision to nominate Olszewski with "understanding and appreciation," according to Donald Tusk, leader of the KLD.

They also praised Walesa for his commitment to democratic methods of wielding power, but Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parliamentary floor group called it a "cunning poker hand" not very conducive to a businesslike discussion.

The prime ministerial nominee himself promised to form the cabinet as soon as possible but admitted that his mission is going to be "very tough". He declined, however, to talk about any matters concerning the composition of his future cabinet before the official approval of his nomination by the Sejm.

Outgoing Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki did not show his disappointment over the president's choice and announced that his cabinet will start clearing the ground for the new cabinet as of today but was bitter about some critical statements made on his premiership by the deputies and called them "dishonest and untrue."

Also on Thursday President Lech Walesa appealed to the Sejm to pass the constitutional law. "If we do not give more powers to the executive bodies, we will simply fail to be on time. The society will not stand it any more—and rightly so," he told the house.

The Sejm decided to discuss the president's draft of a small constitution on Friday when it resumes debates to listen first to opinions of parliamentary floor groups on the draft. The lower house also elected the tribunal of state which is chaired ex officio by the first chairman of the Supreme Court.

Bielecki Interviewed on Government Resignation

LD0512234291 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 2035 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Interview with former Prime Minister Jan Krzystof Bielecki by unidentified correspondent in Warsaw on 5 December—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is an unusual day, the day the government resigned, and so we also have an unusual guest. Welcome, Mr. Prime Minister. Here is my first question: Where is the door, which you warned journalists about so much, leading to for you?

[Bielecki] Thank you for this metaphor. I think that, above all, this is the end of a phase for me, the end of a phase that in reality was much more difficult than expected. What we went through together is composed of many events. Let me recall that, as soon as we were appointed, there was an invasion by the Russian Army against Lithuania, then the Gulf war, and many difficult decisions by the government, then the famous war for the tax on excessive earnings, then the problems over the government resignation; so during this entire period, there was a kind of a fundamental choice for me between looking after the achievements—that is, the relatively large confidence of society, considering the situation, and being faithful to it, which means being guided by truth and honesty—and, at the same time, desiring not to be too eager to please, to be someone who avoided difficult decisions. This struggle for the earnings tax was a typical kind of clash where I had to be tough because as I think it was not good to let it pass then, even though the president's advisers suggested something else.

This is a kind of dilemma that one faces in life. But because I was 39 then, and now I am 40, I cannot forget that for the next 20 years or so I would like to live among people and be a normal person who is relatively liked—after all, our generation has been through all that applied to the previous rulers, rulers who were disliked and surrounded by bodyguards, isolated from the public, unable to go out for a beer or for a walk—the rulers who lived in protected buildings surrounded by guards.

I want to be normal, but I want to be myself. And those doors, if that's what we are talking about, they must give me that chance, to continue to be myself but also, at the same time, so that that part of the public, particularly those who voted for me, so that it does not feel disappointed or let down by my attitude. I have said I can carry on functioning in various places and various roles, as one cannot flinch, but one should also know how things are supposed to be.

[Correspondent] But Prime Minister, it is apparent even from that film [reference to film preceeding the interview] and journalists have already written about it anyhow. We have had your government that, without any argument, has had great successes in the international arena. But they also say spitefully, the government boasts about its foreign successes when it doesn't have any at home. How would you balance [word indistinct]? Where are the faults, the errors, the successes? [passage indistinct]

[Bielecki] But everything doesn't go according to plan in life, as you can see. I think that, first of all, we should see what it means to have foreign policy successes. In our specific case, they are not some sort of gesture, the signing of empty treaties, but it is the specific implementation of either issues that, from the aspect of Poland's security, are fundamental issues, and that is how I understand the signing of the treaties with the Germans and also with other Western European countries. But they are also foreign policy measures that yield long-term advantages for the Polish public. And because I deeply believe in our strategic aim to be economic cooperation and integration with the EC, then, if we sign an agreement, the fact that we can carry out business in those markets is, among other things, due to that. Naturally, this is not presenting the public with a gift of ready-made chances to function, but it is the creating of chances.

Today we know how much steel we can export, the quantity of textiles we can export. We know, for example, that it is more profitable to produce clothing for the European and American markets than, let us say, synthetic fabrics, and those really are certain specific possibilities, possibilities that we did not have. The same as on the eastern market—something collapsed there for us, but at the end of the year, we managed to rebuild links, this time not with the Soviet Union as a whole but with the republics. Today we know how we can cooperate with the Ukraine, what the needs also are for us to continue our political gesture—which I think was unusually important—that we were the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence, and now, as a consequence, what possibilities of economic cooperation result from this. Thus, I understand the tenuousness of that question, but I would like, above all, to prove that overseas cooperation can also yield specific economic affects that we so desire and so need.

[Correspondent] But Prime Minister, that is precisely the paradox. You are a very well liked and popular politician, but your policy is not so popular. How do you explain the contradiction?

[Bielecki] Perhaps I will begin with some self-criticism. That is to say that I think we made a number of mistakes in our policy, and one can say today, at this end of the line, that we should beat our breasts about it and apologize to society because it could have been done better. We definitely should not have taken the budget slap-bang as we did; we should have tried to check it out earlier....

[Correspondent, interrupting] What do you mean slap-bang?

[Bielecki] Well, we started on 12 January as a complete Council of Ministers, and we had certain plans worked out earlier and we accepted them. In any case, they were accepted on condition that parallel negotiations be held with the IMF. The question of reduction of debts came up, withdrawal from that 80 percent; and the intuition on how much we could realistically get. And we set ourselves on 50 percent, and it was a success, after various negotiations, phone calls, exertions, and so on. And, in view of that, I believe that there is a whole field here, where it could have been done better and, when in May, we prepared the amendments to that program, when we departed from a rigid exchange rate for the dollar, that does not mean that we began to soften the policy, but to make it more realistic, to give the exchange rate the chance to fluctuate, so that it could, in some way, keep pace with inflation. These things are proof that we were not blind and deaf, that we did not try to be dogmatic, that we were not—as some people accuse us—liberals. We tried to implement a pragmatic economic policy, aware of certain mistakes made at the very beginning.

[Correspondent] You often publicly accused your predecessor of the lack of a document that you called an opening balance. This meant a document that would sum up the state of the state, when the communists handed over power in a symbolic way and Solidarity won the contractual elections on 4 June. What kind of a state are you leaving to your successors? I understand, not withdrawing from politics, [as heard] but on this symbolic day of the government's resignation, how would you present this new opening, closing balance, whatever we call it?

[Bielecki] It has been set down. It must be said, above all, that this report will at last become fact, for many people have asked me about it. It will also contain that opening moment, what Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government received in 1989, and it will show the process of two years of transformation, and I think both the successes and failures will emerge from it. I think that the difference between Poland and, for exanple, the Western European countries lies in this, among other things: If we lived in Western Europe, the fact that inflation fell from 600-odd percent, first of all to 200-odd and then to several dozen percent and then, month by month, to a few percent; or when we even had a month without inflation, in the West this would be, in fact, a big thing. For us, it is all too little.

The level of reconstruction needed by our state is enormous, and while reconstructing the state we must unfortunately infringe on the interests of many people, many habits, many of the well-worn principles of managing a state—this is extremely painful. What kind of state are we leaving behind? I think this will be seen from the provisional budget that we wish to make ready in the next few days and send to the Parliament, as well as saying what we think should be done further in Poland.

[Correspondent] With reference to the provisional budget, can you clarify the current situation? You have resigned. The Parliament approved the resignation, and today the president designated a new candidate as the head of the future government. In this situation, what will happen to the matters that must be continued? That is, to the assumption of the social and economic policy for the coming year and the provisional budget for the first quarter?

[Bielecki] I really do not know how to answer this question, because it depends on what the Sejm is going to do. We may have a situation, highly probable in my view, that tomorrow the prime minister will be approved by the Sejm and as from tomorrow we will have a new prime minister in Poland. And we will have a strange situation—which I witnessed as well—that there was no Tadeusz Mazowiecki, but his government existed with me at its head for a whole week. And this was amusing, or difficult, or complicated, depending on how you look at it. Anyway, then I asked Professor Janowski to lead the work of the government for that period, because it would be difficult to lead a Council of Ministers that was not one's own.

[Correspondent] I am also asking this question from the point of view of responsibility for the continuation of this work.

[Bielecki] This is a debatable issue. Responsibility is responsibility. I am, of course, available, and I will assist and will convey everything I know, including how I see solutions for the future, but we should not tie the hands of the future government. We cannot pass a whole package for the future government so that it does not find itself in a difficult situation. Let it be its conscious choice, both for the prime minister and the whole Council of Ministers.

[Correspondent] Aren't you worried that these issues, such as the provisional budget for the coming year, will divide the Parliament and weaken the coalition? And another question in the same area: Considering the coalition of five, journalists often ask what can link liberals with the groupings that, during the electoral campaign, so often used slogans departing totally from the economic policy realized thus far? What shape is it taking at the moment? Is there a chance that it can be passed jointly?

[Bielecki] In fact, when opinions are fragmented, it can turn out in various ways, for as life shows us, there were people who said that there would be old-age pensions of 7 million zloty. They do not say that today, and, even so, it yielded some kind of electoral success to a given group. Maybe we were a little masochistic in the Congress, for example, (?telling) that whole truth, the whole complexity of the situation linked with old-age and disability pensions, which is a personal drama, undoubtedly, for an 8 million-strong group of people. This is very regrettable; but, on the other hand, for the pensioner, the most important thing, really, is for there to be real money, for there to be no inflation, because in any case, under conditions of inflationary tensions, the pensioner and someone on a fixed income—including farmers—is the first to lose out—to lose the most. And we told that truth during the election campaign and introduced such a radical law. That certainly didn't earn the Congress any points, but....

[Correspondent, interrupting] I think it took them away.

[Bielecki] They say it did, but I am just saying that if we have the prospect of building a group that wants to be present on the Polish political scene, that wants to have people's confidence and even to be liked a little, then we have to be long-distance runners who are not opportunists. And the same goes for the coalition. Our views are known, and we think, simply, that (?while there is) a small margin for concession, the general principle must be maintained. Poland often compares itself to Western Europe; people often tell us what it's like in Germany and in France. Well, for the time being, we are six times poorer as a country, if we compare the GNP [gross national product]—and that is our prospect, that is our goal: to build a rich, prosperous country. But there is nothing behind us to look at either, for all we have behind us is the disintegrating Soviet Union, from which more and more new countries are emerging....

[Correspondent, interrupting] Cuba...

[Bielecki] ...and Cuba, indeed. But the Soviet Union dreams of deep reforms at the moment, or of Russia and the Ukraine introducing their own currency, bringing in a stabilization program, and therefore, the next painful moves for society. And Cuba—which is still practicing joyful communism—is rationing goods more and more and giving a roll of material a year to citizens as the height of communism. But that is not what we are after. We cannot look back. We have to rebuild our state with determination.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, you seem to be saying that we should only escape forward, because that is our only chance. While we are on the subject, during the elections, you started out with the slogan: Don't be afraid of tomorrow. Today, the day of the government's resignation, would you repeat that slogan to us, that we shouldn't be afraid of tomorrow?

[Bielecki] We quite simply thought that, in the categories of chances and not dangers, because if I wanted to talk about dangers, I could say, the public finance situation is dramatic, there are a whole mass of barriers, a whole mass of difficulties. Often we don't understand them, often they are not understood by the governed and those governing, on the path of Polish reforms. And this is a great Polish experiment. However, I think we have a clarity of aim. Leaders and politicians must convince the public, must gain acceptance from the public for their measures via dialogue, via explanation, by correcting mistakes. They must, quite simply, move in the right direction the whole time, because otherwise we'll go backwards, and we've got the Soviet Union—which is also going to start making deep reforms in a moment—or Cuba. And that's really what I do not want to be in my state, in Poland.

[Correspondent] Those who expected that it would, in the end, be you who was nominated by the president as future prime minister, and there were many such people in Poland, today are disappointed, surprised. And you?

[Bielecki] I think that democratic processes won. After all, the president referred to them in his address. I think we are learning certain normal mechanisms for creating the path of various compromises, consensuses, of cabinets. And it is important for Polish democracy to start to function normally, as we have the first Parliament after so many years. And that should be seen, above all, in that light. I can guarantee, if one can put it so, above all to my electorate from the Warsaw district that I am going to work honestly and consciously as their deputy. I think I have at least several ideas as to what could be done. I am going to do that.

[Correspondent] We are also being watched by those who didn't vote for you, Prime Minister. Have you already spoken to Mr. Olszewski today?

[Bielecki] Yes, we did speak for a moment or so, and I said I would try to help, that I was available and would hand over all our achievements that [word indistinct].

[Correspondent] Journalists in the Sejm lobbies were talking about, citing, your remarks that you were ready to accept various posts in the future government, if the situation required it, if the reform program required it. Do you confirm this?

[Bielecki] I don't think I can withdraw if such a need arises. If I am going to be needed, if that is going to be the will of the coalition, there are various possibilities. After all, it really isn't a question here of who is going to hold which post but...

[Correspondent, interrupting] But that is what you are saying, Prime Minister?

[Bielecki] ...that there will be a government that is a reasonably efficient body, where there are reasonably good relations—I would even say friendly, as that is often very important in life—and that has a clear program, that knows in the best way how to win over the public.

This is obviously an extremely difficult task, but it is a very difficult future in front of us.

[Correspondent] I would still like to ask one question that is almost personal but also political. Mr. Prime Minister, what about you? Are you staying in Warsaw? Are you going back to Gdansk? There are various speculations about it here?

[Bielecki] It is difficult to talk about speculations, because I honestly said how I see my nearest future. Because I have been elected from Warsaw, that is why, for me, some decisions have been made. I wanted to run for a seat from Warsaw. I think this is some challenge for me because not to hide in some smaller voivodship for example that it may seem I am more popular, [as heard] but to face competition here in the city where so many famous persons on the Polish political scene decided to run. If so, being aware that the Sejm deliberates sometimes for two, three, four days during the week, and it is necessary to meet with my electorate, I practically will have to be here in Warsaw during the whole week. That is why I have no choice—either separation for some years, and life outside the family or the attempt to sort out life in Warsaw for some years, or at least for the Sejm term. I simply like clear and clean solutions.

[Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for this meeting today, and I think that this program that we invented as the program of our government is finishing slowly. We will continue to work at this pace until the new prime minister takes over the new government, new cabinet. Thank you very much for this meeting. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Good night.

Prime Minister-Designate To Focus on Economy

LD0512201291 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1615 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Interview with Prime Minister-designate Jan Olszewski by unidentified correspondent on 5 December; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] We asked Mr. Olszewski what type of government is planned.

[Olszewski] [words indistinct] experts, a government of professionals, but it will also be political.

[Correspondent] What kind of policy will this government conduct?

[Olszewski] I will try to present broader politics to the Sejm. I think the right time will come to form the cabinet.

[Correspondent] When will we know the composition of the future cabinet?

[Olszewski] If I get the authority from the Sejm to hold talks, I think a week or 10 days at the most will be enough time to decide.

[Correspondent] Returning to politics, will yours be a policy of continuation or a policy of changes and transformations?

[Olszewski] Every policy conducted, despite what it is called, is a policy of changes. Changes happen so fast that we do not realize them.

[Correspondent] What would you like to stress in the work of the future government, the economy or market matters?

[Olszewski] The economy, or the recovery of the economy, is the main subject for discussion.

Olszewski Sees 'Exceptionally Difficult Mission'

LD0512155191 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1450 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Interview with Prime Minister-designate Jan Olszewski by Andrzej Jelenski; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Jan Olszewski, the president's candidate for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers, has spoken with our reporter Andrzej Jelenski:

[Olszewski] I received this news with both satisfaction and with so-called mixed feelings; this is an exceptionally difficult mission, and I must say that, at the moment, I am aware of this burden. One must try to cope, but (?I) am still not fully aware of how difficult the situation is at present, how difficult it will be to meet the challenge, but one must try.

[Jelenski] Sir, you are a politician. You are aware that the creation of a stable government at the moment will be very difficult. It is to be a government of personalities but, on the other hand, also a government of experts.

[Olszewski] I do not see any contradiction in this formula. However, the problem is, of course, the creation of a lasting and stable political foundation for this government, which, in my opinion, ought not to be a party coalition government—this was also the agreement of our five, the five parties that recommended me to the president—which divides up the posts according to a political key, but rather a government of personalities, a government of authority.

PAP Profiles Prime Minister-Designate Olszewski

LD0512192391 Warsaw PAP in English 1604 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 5—Jan Olszewski, 61, a lawyer and columnist nominated for prime minister by President Lech Walesa on Thursday, acted as a defence lawyer in major political trials in the communist Poland for which he was deprived of the right to practice his profession for two years.

In 1975, he protested against amendments to the Constitution introducing the leading role of the Communist Party and alliance with the Soviet Union and since 1976 defended workers fired from work after the worker protests in the central Polish town of Radom.

He co-authored the statutes of the Solidarity Union when it was created in 1980 and was the union's chief adviser.

Under martial law imposed in December 1981 he again defended anticommunist activists in political trials, including those of prominent Solidarity members Adam Michnik, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, and Bogdan Lis.

In the famous trial of the murderers of pro-Solidarity priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, in the mid-1980's he prosecuted on behalf of the priest's family.

A participant in the roundtable debate of 1989, he was also deputy chairman of the Citizens Committee at Lech Walesa. [sentence as received]

Olszewski is a member of the Centre Alliance (PC) party and member of the party's Political Council.

In December 1990, Jan Olszewski was authorized by President Lech Walesa to form a cabinet but resigned from his mission due to a controversy about the role of Leszek Balcerowicz in the future cabinet.

Walesa Promises To Defend Left, Right Wings

LD0512215591 Warsaw PAP in English 1438 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec 5—President Lech Walesa told reporters on Thursday that democracy made him nominate Jan Olszewski for prime minister.

After a meeting with deputies of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Walesa announced he will defend both the left and the right wing in order to defend democracy and strive for normalcy.

Earlier in the day Walesa told the deputies of the SLD parliamentary floor group that he condemns all practices of political ostracism. The SLD deputies welcomed the presidents announcement that "the left wing in Poland must have conditions for creative work."

Asked about his attitude towards decomunization the president declared that he understands it as a process of Poland getting similar to the west. Walesa wants, however, to settle accounts with all the offenders and assured the left wing deputies that he would persecute everybody who stole even a single penny from Poland.

Five-Party Coalition Favors State Power Division

LD0512201191 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 4—The coalition of five centre right parties concluded on Wednesday it was necessary to equally divide competences among the supreme state bodies, that is president, Parliament, and government.

Representatives of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KL-D), the National Christian Union (ZCh-N), the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), the Centre Alliance (PC), and the Peasant Agreement (PL) who met on Wednesday to discuss the presidential draft of small constitution which regulates relations between top organs of state power said the project was a good starting point for debate but contained serious formal and legal errors.

According to the coalition, among the most serious errors in the draft is the provision on appointing prime minister which practically equals the president's designation of a candidate for the post with his actual appointment. The approval of a candidate by the Sejm (lower house) is indispensable, Krzysztof Krol (KPN) stated.

Besides, the centre right parties think that the Sejm, like the president, should enjoy the right to propose candidates for prime minister.

Krol also opined that the provision authorizing the Sejm to give special powers to the government was redundant in the constitution as the Parliament was empowered to do so anyway.

According to Gabriel Janowski (PL), the president should have a strong position in the Polish legal system but should not become directly involved in ruling as the prime minister and the government were responsible for that.

The presidential draft is to be discussed at the nearest Sejm sitting on Friday and is expected to be passed during a successive session.

Liberal-Democrats Issue Economic Policy Document

AU0612084391 Gdansk TYGODNIK GDANSKI in Polish 24 Nov 91 p 3

[Report on a policy document issued by the Liberal-Democratic Congress: "A Chance for Poland (in the Economy)"]

[Text] The Liberal-Democratic Congress believes that a coalition government will only be able to function if all the coalition partners agree on basic principles that will be incorporated into a two-year economic plan.

1. As the excessive budget deficit poses the greatest danger to stability and the transformation of the economy, and in the absence of a possibility to increase budget revenue, expenditure must be reduced in such a way that the deficit does not exceed three percent of the gross domestic product.

2. A policy of maintaining a healthy currency and restricting the credit supply must be continued.

3. The linchpin of government economic activity next year must be privatization and the restructuring of state enterprises as a preliminary condition for increasing efficiency. Privatization must encompass the entire banking system, as well as the social and health insurance systems. The state should assist domestic capital in connection with this.

4. The legal status of state enterprises has to be changed through commercialization so as to permit state intervention. Intervention can be practiced to the extent revenues are maintained through taxes and credits. Unsuccessful intervention can cause the economy more harm than good.

5. The following are essential to improve the functioning of enterprises:

—improving management by raising the importance of expertise and contracting managers;

—defining those types of enterprises that will not be privatized in the near future and creating efficient holding structures.

—purging the banks of "bad debts," which cannot, however, mean the unilateral canceling of enterprise debts.

6. The agreements that have been negotiated with international financial institutions are a prerequisite for reducing Poland's debts and gaining access to international money markets, and that is why they must be observed.

7. Poland's integration with Europe is essential; tariff policy and changes to the law must be subordinated to that end.

8. The restructuring and modernization of agriculture must be a strategic goal. Excessive protection and intervention would lead to the preservation of current structures, which would reduce the competitiveness of farmers on world markets. It is essential that agriculture be protected from unfair competition from foreign goods. It is not possible to provide guaranteed minimum prices for the procurement of agricultural produce without a radical increase in budget expenditure.

9. It is necessary to initiate an extensive program of economic education based on market principles and mechanisms and preparations for gradual integration with the European Community (....)

Results of Hungarian Delegation Talks Reported

LD0512153891 Budapest MTI in English 0845 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, December 5 (MTI)—The Hungarian Parliamentary delegation, which is staying in Bucharest, met Theodor Stolojan, prime minister, Adrian Nastase, minister of foreign affairs, and Constantin Fota, minister of trade and tourism, on Wednesday [4 November]. The Hungarian MPs [members of parliament] held talks with heads of Romanian parliamentary groups, and members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The delegation visited the headquarters of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR) and met senior politicians of the federation.

In the evening, the Bucharest Embassy of the Republic of Hungary gave a reception in the honour of the delegation. The event was attended by senior representatives of Romania's political and cultural life. Those present included Ionel V. Sandulescu and Theodor Melescanu, state secretaries of foreign affairs, Corneliu Coposu, president of the Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party, Radu Campeanu, chairman of the National Liberal Party, Ion Ratiu, a senior politician of the Peasants' Party, MPs and senators of other parties, for instance the HDUR, and Mircea Dinescu, president of the Romanian Writers' Union.

"Our delegation held tough negotiations. Unfortunately, the official Romanian position makes it impossible for us to return to Hungary with the feeling of any breakthrough," Istvan Hegedus, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, told MTI.

"We had mixed impressions. We had perhaps the most useful consultation with the heads of parliamentary groups since it reflected the colourful pattern of Romania's political life. Surprisingly, our least successful meeting was with the Romanian-Hungarian friendship section. That event was attended by some representatives of the Romanian Unity Alliance who, after a while, adopted a sharply confronting tone," Hegedus said.

"Meeting Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, we raised all problems of bilateral relations. The minister spoke about some psychological problems which, he said, were hampering improvements in Romanian-Hungarian ties, for instance the reopening of the Hungarian Consulate-General in Cluj. The minister said the latter would be a natural step. In another interpretation, however, it might be seen as the seat and building of a future embassy. For the time being, these fears are hampering the solution of the question. Concerning the psychological barriers, Nastase said the Romanian leadership would not make unilateral concessions in order to improve relations. The minister added the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty should declare that Hungary renounces any territorial claims to Romania. By contrast, the Hungarian position adopted by the delegation was that it would be sufficient for the basic treaty to refer to the Helsinki Final Act, which holds the modification of borders by force as unacceptable. [No closing quotation marks as received]

According to Istvan Hegedus, the most important conclusion was that the tactic of small steps has to be used and the continuity of negotiations maintained.

"I feel the meeting was highly useful and necessary," said Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, secretary of parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. "We make no secret of regarding the parliamentary committee report on the situation in Harghita and Covasna counties as a political action aimed at condemning the ethnic Transylvanian Hungarians and likely to set off or enhance very dangerous tendencies in Romania. We clearly expounded this position, and the counter-arguments raised failed to convince us," he said.

Stolojan: Hungarian Treaty of 'Utmost Importance'

LD0512152891 Budapest MTI in English 2021 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, December 4 (MTI)—The conclusion of a Hungarian-Romanian friendship and cooperation treaty is of utmost importance, Romanian Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan said at a meeting with a Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee delegation today.

The development of political and cultural ties is inseparable from the progress of economic relations, which, he said, are currently stalling.

Hungary and Romania are both interested in resolving the problems so that they can become true partners for Europe, said Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gyula Horn.

The two nations must begin on the path of reconciliation and understanding, and end their thousand-year-old disagreements, Romanian House of Representatives Liberal Leader Dan Lazarescu said.

The Hungarian parliamentary delegation visit is of great importance from the aspect of bilateral ties, Romanian spokesman Traian Chebeleu said at a press conference after a meeting between the delegation and Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase today.

Chebeleu, however, said, although the ties between the two parliaments and their parties are important, these cannot replace dialogue.

The issue of reopening the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj, establishing new border crossings, and other problems raised by the Hungarian delegation fall under the scope of the governments, added Chebeleu who hopes dialogue by the governments is in the wings.

Chebeleu also reconfirmed the draft of the bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty submitted by Hungary does not contain any clause on the mutual recognition of territorial integrity.

Talks on the treaty are hoped to start this month, perhaps even as early as next week, Chebeleu said.

Defense Minister Signs Cooperation Plan in Sofia

AU0612085891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2008 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/12/1991—A military delegation led by Romania's National Defence Minister Lieutenant General Nicolae Spiroiu paid a visit to Bulgaria over December 3-5 at the invitation of that country's Defence Minister Dimitur Ludzhev.

The Romanian minister was received by President Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, and had talks with his Bulgarian counterpart, with generals and senior officers leading the army of the Republic of Bulgaria.

During the talks questions were approached with regard to the current stage in the relations between the two armies in the context of the military and political situation in the Balkans and in Europe.

A collaboration plan for 1992 was signed.

Stolojan Summarizes Results of Visit to Rome

AU0612104891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1002 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 6/12/1991—Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan told the reporters boarding the plane that brought him back to Romania from his December 5 visit to Italy, that all countries, Italy included, understood that almost two years after its revolution, Romania was on the way to democracy and the market economy. He added that the period of expectations and distrust was over, a new phase was necessary in economic relations, of achieving major projects with foreign investors. Many Italian businessmen are interested in such projects, said the head of the Romanian executive but the great obstacle is Romania's lack of capacity to finance them, the fact that it cannot ensure the necessary technology. Therefore, the solution is, in this case, Italy.

The Italian Government is well aware of the fact that the Italian exporters have to be financed by Italy. Therefore it is necessary for a substantial credit line to be opened to finance the Italian exporters engaged in serious investments in Romania. Premier Stolojan mentioned that promises were given in this respect, and that a decision was going to be taken in the month of December. Discussions are under way as regards the value of this export credit.

"As Romania is a country posing no risk, we were assured Italy would find a favorable solution for us. I am optimistic considering that it is not only Romania that is interested in that, but equally the Italian economy, and when the interests converge, solutions are always found", said Premier Stolojan.

Answering a question, Premier Stolojan explained that Italy's support was necessary equally as far as crediting by international bodies is concerned. He showed his discontent as regards G24 evolutions, as concerns a loan (to Romania) that has been delayed for such a long time, and which has contributed in a way to slowing down the reform in Romania. The Italian authorities promised to give their full support, so that the loan be granted, and their assistance in the preparation of a loan for 1992.

The Romanian prime minister mentioned he was satisfied with the results of his visit to Italy as, he said, "the situation has taken a good course and there is an immense list of (investment) projects in which both Romania and Italian firms are interested".

Implications of Ukrainian Referendum Viewed

AU0512140391 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Dec 91 p 8

[Romulus Caplescu article: "Romania and the Implications of the Ukrainian Referendum"]

[Text] The expected has happened: With a great majority, the population of the Ukraine has opted for independence. Leonid Kravchuk will be the first president of the independent Ukraine; he has been elected to this position in the first referendum, contrary to initial forecasts that indicated that a second round would be necessary.

This event is, of course, a major political event, when bearing in mind that, in actual fact, the Ukraine with its 52 million inhabitants is the second republic in the former USSR, when it comes to size, and the fifth state in Europe (after Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France). If we add to this an important economic potential (because of its extensive agricultural areas, it has always been the breadbasket of Tsarist Russia and then of the USSR; the Donbas coal mining area is of the same importance) it becomes clear that the Ukraine is called upon to play an important role on the European continent.

As far as we, the Romanians, are concerned, from now on the Ukraine will be our most important neighbor. Romania's interest in the referendum is not only explained by this fact, but also (and especially) by the fact that this referendum was also to be held on territories that used to belong to our country: Northern Bukovina, Herta, Hotin area, and South Bessarabia, which were despotically torn away from Romania on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact; as far as South Bessarabia is concerned, this despotism is even two-fold, because first this region was stolen from Romania and then from occupied Bessarabia and completely and arbitrarily annexed to the Ukraine to thus diminish the geopolitical significance of the Republic of Moldova, to deprive it of access to the sea, and to more easily denationalize the Romanians residing in that area. Therefore, in greeting the decision of the Kiev authorities to organize this referendum and even expressing the desire to recognize Ukraine's independence, the Romanian Parliament and Government have emphasized, most clearly and unequivocally, that this referendum cannot be valid for the abusively annexed territories that have never belonged to the Ukraine and rightfully belong to Romania. This is why the recognition by our country of the new independent state can obviously not include the territories ripped off from Romania; otherwise we would look absurd, and we would recognize a territorial rape!

It is undeniably true that the Ukraine is the republic within the former Soviet empire that profited most from the occupation of foreign territories by the Stalinist regime; we are not talking solely about Romanian territories, but also about territories belonging to Czechoslovakia and Poland; moreover, following a decision by the pro-Ukrainian Krushchev, the Crimean Peninsula with a Russian majority population was incorporated into the Ukraine. On the whole, from 1939 to 1954 this Republic increased its historic perimeter by more than 150,000 square kilometers, while the Ukrainian population represented only 72.7 percent of the total population. In other words, on a smaller scale, the Ukraine represents what the former empire used to be, namely a conglomerate of peoples kept together through the stifling pressure of totalitarianism. Now the Soviet conglomerate has split into pieces. After the putsch in August, almost all former republics proclaimed their independence; the referendum in the Ukraine constitutes, if one can say so, the last nail driven into the coffin of the former empire. ("If the Ukraine says 'yes' to the referendum, this will be a disaster for the Union, for the Ukraine, for Europe, and the whole world," Gorbachev warned President Bush during a telephone conversation occasioned by Washington's intention—announced with unexpected promptness—to recognize the independent Ukraine in the not-too-distant future).

Of course, Gorbachev exaggerated when he spoke about such implications at the European and world level, but it is nevertheless true that, in the case of the Republic of Moldova and Romania, for instance, the consequences may be serious. Paris, Bonn, and London probably had such implications in mind when they displayed greater caution than Washington in connection with recognizing the Ukraine. The new president of the Ukraine, Kravchuk, has constantly drawn attention to the "indivisibility and inviolability of the Ukrainian territory." Did this also refer to the Romanian territories that were occupied by force? How can you proclaim and affirm the right to pursue your own road as long as you deny this right to other people? Romania has declared its readiness to maintain good-neighborly relations with the newly independent state, but how viable can such relations be if, from the very beginning, they are based on a great historic injustice? Repairing this injustice would pave the way for developing truly friendly relations and would contribute to the stability and trust in an area in which, as the past has demonstrated, more than once the Romanians and Ukrainians knew how to coexist and cooperate in peace and understanding.

Isarescu Meets U.S. Treasury, IMF Officials

AU0612090591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1929 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/12/1991—At the end of the Washington stage of his visit to the United States of America, Mr. Mugur Isarescu, governor of Romania's National Bank, stated that—generally—the talks he held with the representatives of the Treasury Department, the State Department of the White House, the U.S. Congress, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund focused on the problems of Romania's foreign financing, economic reform, the transition to the market economy.

Referring to Romania's relations with the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Mugur Isarescu appreciated them as having a very good evolution. The financing from the IMF was made in due time, while the technical assistance Romania had received from the Fund was of the best quality.

As far as his interview with Mr. John Robson, assistant secretary of the Treasury Department, is concerned, Mr. Isarescu showed that approach was made of aspects concerning the direct support granted by the American Treasury for the setting up of the Romanian Banking Institute which is to start operating in January 1992.

Opposition Seeks 'Unitary Strategy' in Elections

AU0512152891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1339 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 5/12/1991—Political parties and groupings in Romania, awaiting a marathon, roughly-four-months-long, election campaign, which is to theoretically start on December 9 for the local elections of February 9, 1992 and to continue for the legislative elections late in April the same year, are now setting forth their viewpoints on the aforesaid two elections confrontations and on the Sunday referendum on Romania's new constitution.

Part of the opposition expressed opinions during a round table conference on "opposition before the elections," organized by the newspaper "ROMANIA LIBERA" and attended by Radu Campeanu, chairman of the National Liberal Party, Corneliu Coposu, chairman of the Christian and Democratic National Democratic Party, Geza Domokos, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Union [UDMR] and other representatives of political groupings.

The participants in the round table conference showed that the political groupings they represent make up the Democratic Convention, the main pillar of which is the National Convention for the Establishment of Democracy, which includes six parties (the aforesaid ones and the Civic Alliance Party and the Romanian Ecology Party), as well as several forums made up of various groupings. Without having a structure, the Democratic Convention works as "a club, an association of people sharing the same major targets," and was created "for a unitary strategy" in the forthcoming elections. To this end, they agreed to run in the local elections with common candidates and to support each other according to the real conditions in the constituencies. To coordinate their joint actions at least two "working commissions" are being organized to mediate the problems in the territory and to make election propaganda in favour of their parties.

Aware that in the future elections they will have to confront not only the majority party in Parliament—that is, the National Salvation Front—but also the leftist and extreme leftist parties and numerous other legal parties, the participants in the round table conference announced their determination to carry on an extensive concerted activity and to take separate roads where that thing is not possible owing to "the sharpness of the race."

As for the situation and evolution of the National Salvation Front, all participants agreed that that political grouping was losing electoral ground but warned that the people straying away from it do not join the opposition political parties and showed hesitation.

As for the referendum on the Constitution, the representatives of the aforesaid political parties reiterated their already known stances: The Christian and Democratic National Peasant Party recommended its members not to participate in the vote, the others parties said their members could participate and vote freely, as they wished, and the Hungarian Democratic Union allows its members to take part in the referendum but, as Mr. Geza Domokos said, "When the UDMR approves of its parliamentarians stand taking, their vote should not be positive."

Liberal Leader Explains Opposition to Constitution

AU0512193391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1808 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/12/1991—Mr. Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, member of the Steering Committee, in charge with the foreign relations of the Liberal Party [formerly the National Liberal Party-Young Wing], specified in his press conference on Thursday, December 5 that political formation's stand towards Romania's Constitution and towards the December 8 referendum. The Liberal Party—Mr. Tariceanu said—voted against the draft constitution without contesting the necessity of existence of the supreme legislative act. He declared for a parliamentary republic but specified that it was absolutely necessary the consultation of the people's will by a referendum. He also reproached the inexistence in the Constitution of the principle of the separation of powers in the state and of the stipulations concerning the guarantee of the property. Mr. Tariceanu considered as "an original formula" the existence of a two-chamber parliamentary system.

The Liberal Party leader appreciated the measure of the internal convertibility of the leu as "a serious brake on the development of commercial exchanges, a grave economic error perpetuating a falimentary [in Romanian "falimentar" means bankrupt] economic system."

Referring to the conflicts within the National Salvation Front, Mr. Calin Popescu-Tariceanu asserted inter alia that that political formation leader Petre Roman "tries to get rid of the compromised persons but he should have the courage of radical measures even if some of them diminished his popularity."

Roman Rejects 'Third Way', Profiles FSN

AU0512114291 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 3 Dec 91 p 2

["News Conference of the National Salvation Front, 27 November 1991: 'With One's Back to the Past'"—Part III]

[Text] [Unidentified Reporter] Apparently, at the meeting you held on 26 November with foreign journalists, you said that you regretted that you had not condemned publicly the miners' violence of 13-15 June. Why did you not do it then?

[Roman] Yesterday, I indeed said that the fact that the June 1990 violence had not been condemned contributed to a great extent to the violence that broke out in September. On the question that I did not take a stand then against that violence, I did not take a very clear-cut position. I paid a visit to the University, where I found out certain things and I tried to clarify questions such as: Why were we facing that state of affairs? I condemned violence there, but that was not a public declaration that said: "The violence that took place there is being condemned as such." And this is what I repeat now.

[Reporter] I asked you why you did not condemn the violence.

[Roman] That was the period before the beginning of the legislation and after the free elections; we were a government that was set up on the basis of free elections; thus, it was a legitimate government, and it was the government that proposed to begin the reform. Everything that happened in June 1990 was something that in no way helped us, us meaning, I think, that we were and still are the government that initiated the reform in Romania. Thus, things remained very unclear for everybody, including myself. Things became clearer a little bit later.

[Reporter] Also last night you said, and then you repeated, that the Front will not support Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy....

[Roman] I said that this is an abusive interpretation, and you will see this if you look at the cassette with yesterday's meeting. Now we are approaching an issue that I told you is not topical and does not concern us at the moment, neither within the party nor throughout the country in general.

[Reporter] Mr. Roman, we people involved in the press are aware of very few things. Therefore, we would like to ask you to clarify, once and for all, what are the mistakes of the Roman way of governing?

[Roman] I talked about some of them during the news conference that I held at the end of my period of governing. Then I talked about one of them, a very important one: We did not have the means to explain what the reform was, and why it was unavoidable and most necessary. The explanation would have required a great audience, thus the great capacity to have all paths of the mass media open to us. We did not have it, but still, this does not absolve us from the criticism that this explanation was neither sufficient nor effective. Secondly, many of the necessary and correct decisions taken by the government have not been applied either correctly or adequately. This is one side of my permanent struggle, of our struggle, within the government to impose sanctions for the non-application of some of the decisions. When, after Romania was accepted as special guest to the Council of Europe, we thought about a system that could lead to a firmer application of these measures, I was accused of being a dictator. And it was not accidental that I was accused of being a dictator precisely at that time.

Another mistake was that we failed to invent—maybe it was beyond our power, but a government should have power even beyond its power—a number of instruments of concrete governmental action to be applied in concrete situations. We proposed some of those instruments ourselves, but they remained only at the stage of proposals. We did not conclude them; and one of them is also the issue of social protection. If you follow their path, you will realize that there have been proposals, but they never reached the operational stage. This has also happened in other areas as well, such as the economy for example. A government should govern. It should have governing instruments, and those instruments should be invented and implemented, regardless of the legislative side. We worked out the reform, introduced the mechanisms that will permit us today to reach another sphere as soon as possible, the sphere of the market economy, of a healthy economy, correlated with the world market; however, sometimes these concrete instruments were missing. These, I believe, are the shortfalls and mistakes that we made in our way of governing.

Government Authorizes Private TV Programming

AU1911133591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1256 GMT 19 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 19/11/1991—Upon the request of the Constanta branch of the Society for an Independent Television (SOTI), the Ministry of Communications authorised, with effect from 15 November 1991, the access of "Neptun" Television Studio to the local Eforie television station, for broadcasts Fridays from 0600 to 0800 and Saturdays from 0700 to 0800.

It was agreed that Neptun broadcasts will consist 40 percent of cultural, 30 percent information and 30 percent social-economic programmes.

Following this agreement, two of the three SOTI branches (Bucharest and Constanta) will be now broadcasting their own local programmes.

At present, 13 local television studios are operating in Romania, which are not connected to the SOTI network.

By giving the green light to private programmes, the Romanian Government is supporting the development of alternative television networks to complement the national television service. The authorisations granted are transitory, until parliament adopts the law on the audio-visual media.

International

Markovic, Vance Agree on Cease-Fire Prerequisites

LD0512222291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2046 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—A stable cease-fire in Yugoslavia can only be achieved through the consistent implementation of the Geneva agreement and the maximum involvement on the part of everyone. Apart from that, the Geneva agreement is also a prerequisite for resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] and Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the UN secretary general, came to this conclusion after their meeting at the Palace of the Federation this evening.

This was their second meeting during Vance's fourth mission in Yugoslavia. The aim of Vance's mission is to examine all possibilities for the dispatch of the UN peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

According to information TANJUG obtained from the FEC president's cabinet, during the one-hour meeting Vance briefed Markovic on the results of his fourth mission and the talks he had over the past few days in Belgrade, Dalj, Osijek, and Zagreb. The two sides also examined prospects for the dispatch of the UN peacekeeping forces.

Examining the attempts so far aimed at resolving the Yugoslav crisis, Markovic and Vance emphasized the need for involving other important international groups and countries in addition to the EC and the United Nations.

Chamber Notes Dwindling Exchange With USSR

LD0212130591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1051 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Moscow, December 2 (TANJUG)—The contracted 3.2- billion-dollar commodity exchange [between] Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union will be less by at least one-third, according to estimates made by the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy office in Moscow.

The reason for this is dwindling production in the Soviet Union, which has been falling at a rate of 7.5 percent in the past five years.

In 1989, the Soviet Union exported 124 million tonnes of oil, and the amount was halved (to 61 million tonnes) in 1990. This year, it will export 55 million tonnes of oil and the prospects for 1992 are also glum, barely 30 million tonnes.

Having this in mind, the Soviet Union, although opposing sanctions against Yugoslavia, has in practice virtually imposed an 'oil embargo'. Of the promised quantity of 'at least five million tonnes' (perhaps 5.5 and even six million), the Soviet Union delivered just over two million tonnes of oil to Yugoslavia in the first 10 months of this year, so that the overall deliveries will hardly reach three million tonnes by the end of 1991.

In the first nine months this year, the Soviet Union has failed to deliver ten important articles to Yugoslavia and this has jeopardized trade relations between the two countries. Deliveries of aluminum, nickel and woodpulp have been halved, and only 119,000 tonnes of the agreed 2.2 million tonnes of coke was delivered in the first nine months of this year.

The standstill in trade between the two countries will further delay the repayment of the several-billion-dollar Soviet debt to Yugoslavia which has been one of the generators of inflation in Yugoslavia for a number of years.

No one knows how these matters will be resolved because the war- struck Yugoslavia has not shown any initiative or set out ways to overcome the situation to the bewildered Soviet Union, which is itself on the verge of break-up.

Libyan Mercenary Found Killed in Slavonia

AU2911165891 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Report by Branislav Bozic]

[Text] Of many news from the western Slavonian battlefield, we first selected the one on Banja Luka Corps Command Nikola Uzelac being promoted today from the rank of lieutenant general to the rank of colonel general. The news was received by the fighters and officers of this Corps, as well as the Slavonian territorials, and particularly the people of Bosnian Krajina and many refugees with a really indescribable delight. The general has been receiving congratulations messages from all sides, ranging from ordinary people to the highest leaders of the country, including General Veljko Kadijevic.

Regarding the fighting, it is a little bit calmer in this region today than it was recently, most probably due to a rift in the ranks of the Croatian fighters.

Modified planes of the Croatian agricultural aviation, probably those form Virovitica, today flew over the positions of the units of the [Croatian] National Guard and Ministry of Internal Affairs and showered them with leaflets that also fell on the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Slavonian territorials.

The leaflet, signed by the heretofore unidentified Main Committee for the Salvation of Croatia, says that due to treason, we quote, Bosnia-Hercegovina [Herceg Bosna], a larger part of Lika, Slavonia, Posavina, and many towns have been excluded from the Croatian National corpus [korpus]. It is also said that Croat forces have received aid in armament and instructors from Europe and that victory failed only because of treason within the

Croatian leadership and the headquarters of the Croatian National Guard and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore, all people who are in the trenches are called on to set off for Zagreb to crush the traitors in the leadership and headquarters. Everything points to the possibility of the leaflet having been written by Paraga's Ustashas and that one may expect an armed conflict between Paraga's and Tudjman's followers in Zagreb soon.

One more case points to the fact that a real chaos is reigning in the Croat fighters' ranks. In one of the actions carried out near Lipik, many of them were killed, including a mercenary, a Libyan citizen. An official identity card was found on him. His name is (Ibrahim Gadafi Abu Sala), and his passport number is 895157. It says on his official identity card that he has the right to detain citizens, enter their apartments, confiscate items, and to do all that without a written permit. Therefore, this is what Tudjman's regime is like: enabling a Libyan to do in the Balkan territory virtually everything he wanted. This is what that democracy is like.

Ammunition Smuggled From Albania Discovered

LD0212181391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1426 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Borders between Albania and Yugoslavia are being violated frequently of late, the information service of the Third Military District Command (with the seat in Skopje) revealed today.

Apart from frequent illegal crossings into Yugoslavia made by Albanian citizens, the number of thefts of property of our citizens is on the rise, as well as the smuggling of propaganda material. A large quantity of infantry ammunition was smuggled into the country yesterday and today from the territory of this neighboring country.

According to the information service of the Third Military District Command, the border security service of the Liman Kaba watchtower near Debar discovered a large number of boxes containing ammunition. Boxes with 46,800 7.62 mm caliber bullets were discovered about 10 meters from the border line inside Yugoslav territory on 1 December. Boxes with 28,000 bullets of the same calibre were discovered today at the same place.

An investigation is under way. The smuggled ammunition is now stored in military buildings, the information service of the Third Military District Command says.

Federation Protests to Austria Over Citizens

LD0512185691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1508 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia today sent to Austria a note of protest regarding the activities of the Foreign Ministry in Vienna aimed at taking over the consular protection of Yugoslav citizens from the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia in other countries.

The note was presented to Austrian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Dr. Walter Siegl in Belgrade today by Assistant Federal Foreign Secretary Boro Denkov.

The Federal Secretariat said that such actions were yet another in a series of instances of Austria's inadmissible ivolvement in the Yugoslav crisis and present gross interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country.

The Austrian side is expected immediately to stop the said activity and similar ones, because, if it does not do so, the Yugoslav side will retain the right to take corresponding steps to protect the interest of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Secretariat also said.

It was underscored that Yugoslavia and its diplomatic-consular offices are the only ones responsible to protect the interests of the citizens of Yugoslavia, including those from its republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

It was also said in Belgrade that a large number of countries had rejected the possibility that Austrian embassies "take over" this role, which is incompatible with the elementary norms of international behaviour.

Austrian Economic Delegation Arrives for Talks

LD0512143491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2007 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 4 Dec (TANJUG)—An Austrian economic delegation, led by Dr. Albert Rohan, head of the Foreign Ministry East European section, paid a one-day visit to Slovenia today.

The Austrian delegation held talks in the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Transport and Communications Ministry in Ljubljana. They also held talks in the Directorate of the Republican Administration for Air Traffic and the Slovene airline Adria Airways.

The talks focussed on strengthening economic cooperation between Austria and Slovenia. It was agreed to set up an Austrian-Slovenian mixed commission which would will help Slovenia solve problems in the period of transition to a market economy.

Minister on German Break in Traffic Links

LD0512202191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1538 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 5 (TANJUG)—Acting Federal Minister for Transport and Communications Stevan Santo said here today that Germany's decision to break off traffic links with Yugoslavia would affect a number of European and Middle East countries, as it would disrupt Europe's integrated system of traffic links.

Santo told journalists that all traffic between Yugoslavia and Germany proceeded normally today and that the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat and Federal government had by noon today received no formal notification from the government in Bonn about the suspension.

German Government spokesman Dieter Vogel announced yesterday that his country was suspending all traffic agreements with Yugoslavia, effective immedietely, but that the decision affected only the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

Germany's ambassador in Belgrade could not confirm today the suspension, Santo said.

Describing the decision as an "unprecedented act of political pressure by one sovereign country on another," Santo said the Yugoslav Government would demand through international institutions full observance of all documents signed by the government in Bonn.

Santo said under existing regulations a unilateral decision to suspend air traffic agreements had to be announced at least one year in advance, and three months in advance in the case of road traffic.

Secretary for Transport and Communications of the Serbian Province of Vojvodina Danko Visekruna said today that Germany was by its decision violating one of the fundamental principles of the Danube convention, signed in 1948—freedom of navigation of the Danube as an international waterway.

Federal

JNA Corps Commander Considers War Over

LD0112142891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1352 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] Rijeka, Yugoslavia, Dec 1 (TANJUG)—General Marjan Cad, commander of the 13th Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), said today that, in his opinion, "the war in Yugoslavia is over".

The area of Gorski Kotar in the Croatian region of Istria is heading for "a peaceful and stable future", if the regional crisis committee continues with the policy it has pursued so far, he told reporters.

General Cad made the statement to TANJUG and reporters of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, a paper published in the largest Adriatic town of Split, on the occasion of the withdrawal of JNA units from the area and the evacuation of the equipment and weapons of the 13th Corps.

"The residents of Gorski Kotar do not have to fear of what will happen when the last JNA unit has left the area", he said.

The comment was made in view of growing uncertainty of the local population accentuated by numerous articles in the Croatian press which claim that the Army will destroy the port of Rijeka after its withdrawal from the area.

Stressing that there have been no conflicts whatsoever in the area, General Cad said that "the Army has never had any pretensions on the area" and that relations with the civilian authorities and the conduct of the citizens "have never given the Army any reason to defend itself or retaliate".

The evacuation of the Corps will last another ten days or so, he said and added that the equipment and personnel would first be shipped to the port of Bar and than transferred to eastern Hercegovina.

General Cad, a Slovene who had also commanded the Corps during the crisis in the Republic of Slovenia, said that he would retire on January 1 next year and that he would live in Rijeka just like any other pensioner.

General: Withdrawal Leaves Croatia 'Defenseless'

LD0312185791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1826 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Kragujevac, Dec 3 (TANJUG)—Major general of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Milan Aksentijevic said the Yugoslav Republic of "Croatia still does not feel that the withdrawal of the JNA will leave it defenceless in one part of its territory."

In a conversation with journalists today Aksentijevic said the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia had by "expelling the JNA lost a force ready and willing to sacrifice itself to defend its territory."

Slovenia and Croatia have unilaterally proclaimed secession from Yugoslavia.

General Aksentijevic, who was arrested by the Croatian authorities on September 13 on a road near Karlovac and held imprisoned for 72 days, said he had not been the victim of betrayal inside the JNA, although, as he said, "the Army is also under the grindstone of the ethnic mill."

Aksentijevic said that he had spent 46 days in solitary confinement in Zagreb's [word indistinct] prison and that on occasions he had been questioned by up to eight interrogators for 24 hours a day.

Aksentijevic was on November 25 exchanged for Canadian citizen of Croatian origin Anton Kikas, arrested by the military authorities during an attempt to smuggle into the country 19 tonnes of firearms and ammunition for the Croatian armed formations.

Aksentijevic said the military prisoners were "appealing for the war to be ended and all problems resolved in a peaceful and civilized manner," and were "asking for the peace to be preserved in the multi-national Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as a failure to do so could provoke a tragedy of unimaginable proportions."

Army General Staff Member Views Control Over Forces

AU0312215291 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Interview with Milan Pujic of the Yugoslav Army General Staff by correspondent Veronika Seyr in Belgrade; date not given—recorded; Pujic statements in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Pujic] The negotiations between Yugoslavia and the EC have had a negative effect on the Yugoslav crisis. Therefore, the state Presidency has tried to make the UN peacekeeping forces mediate peace. We see such activities as a chance for peace, if the blue helmets are really deployed in a just way, namely in the areas where fighting is taking place.

[Seyr] Does the Army exercise control over all fighting units of volunteers, of regular troops, and of reservists, and can the Army guarantee that there has not been and will not be any looting and massacres?

[Pujic] As regards the Yugoslav People's Army, I can guarantee that we have complete control over all regular forces that are involved in the fighting. However, there are also units at the front lines that do not have any links with the Army. They are pursuing a private war. They are armed units of various parties. Here, looting and murders also take place. Of course, this happens at the front, and this happens in every war. We cannot prevent this, and this hurts the Army and the efforts for peace.

[Seyr] How high is the number of human, material, and military casualties in this war?

[Pujic] We do not have any exact figures, but the number of casualties is very high. There are about 5,000 to 7,000 dead on both sides, but the numbers that are disseminated are exaggerated by ten.

[Seyr] Are the dead Slovenes, Croatians, Serbs, Montenegrans, or, or...? Has this played any role, or does it play any role now?

[Pujic] Nationality has never played a role in my life. I have never been in a dilemma in this respect. I myself am a Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina, but I remain a Yugoslav with all my heart, no matter what happens to this country.

Kostic on Diplomatic Activity of Presidency

92BA0169A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with Jugoslav Kostic, SFRY Presidency member, by Toma Milic; place and date not given: "Jugoslav Kostic: 53 Percent of the Population Wants To Remain in Yugoslavia"]

[Text] In spite of all the pressures and challenges, the SFRY Presidency is right now initiating perhaps the greatest political activity since its formation. Of what does that activity consist, and what results are expected? We asked Jugoslav Kostic, member of the SFRY Presidency.

[Kostic] On both the internal and external sides we are concentrating forces on restoring peace in Yugoslavia, above all on preventing an escalation of the conflict into Bosnia-Hercegovina. War in Bosnia would have more tragic consequences than in Croatia. The three strongest political parties in this republic should prevent those conflicts and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] should frustrate them.

The problem of our internal conflicts we might be able to resolve ourselves unless foreign aid is called for. Unfortunately, certain countries of the EC (Germany, Italy, and Austria) are in practice already becoming actors in our crisis rather than judges making unbiased judgments. It is unbelievable how certain countries are behaving: humanitarian aid to Croatia is being sent in warships, international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is being announced without establishing their state borders, mercenaries are being publicly recruited for the war in Yugoslavia, economic and political sanctions are being adopted, and a peace conference concerning Yugoslavia is being insisted on. Fortunately, the world is already catching sight of these activities and reacting much more realistically to our events.

We desire a Yugoslavia consisting of those nationalities and ethnic minorities who wish to remain in it, and that is approximately 53 percent of the total population of the present federation. To that end, we have formed an advisory body to the SFRY Presidency, whose task is to bring about the political and economic conditions for achievement of that objective.

[Milic] Will the JNA remain in Croatia in the positions reached following the battle for Vukovar?

[Kostic] The JNA is not on the offensive or on a mission of conquest in Croatia or on the other battlefields. Its position has been defined by the SFRY Presidency: to separate the belligerents. That is in fact how it would have been if it had not been exposed to everyday attacks in Croatia. It turned out that wherever the Croatian paramilitary forces respect the truce, there is no conflict, and that means that the JNA is not causing the incidents and the provocations. For that reason, we anticipate a fair solution—that the 'blue helmets' will be posted on the line separating the belligerents, not on some imagined borders.

Kostic answered in the affirmative the question of whether the upcoming exchange of prisoners, the largest since the conflict in Croatia began, would also include General Aksentijevic, remarking in addition that the principle of "all for all" does not mean that the ringleaders of the massacres of Serbs on the Vukovar and other fronts will be turned over to the Croatian side. They must be tried for war crimes.

As for election of a new prime minister and federal secretary for foreign affairs, Kostic feels that we are entering a "more peaceful phase."

The job of the SFRY Presidency will also be made easier in that there have been announcements that Tupurkovski and Bogicevic will once again take part in its proceedings after a lengthy interruption.

In a statement for POLITIKA at the end of the interview, Jugoslav Kostic said, "On the diplomatic side, the collective chief of state is also carrying on abundant activity, especially toward the permanent members of the Security Council and the nonaligned countries. That activity will continue right up until the meeting of the Security Council that will be devoted to Yugoslavia next week. According to the first reports I have, the platform of the SFRY Presidency for getting out of the crisis and halting the military conflicts in Croatia is encountering understanding among our friends in the United Nations and other regional communities. We therefore anticipate that the Security Council will send peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia and will halt the blockade of our country."

Croatia

Ukraine Recognized, International Status Sought

LD0512200391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Zagreb, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—The Croatian Assembly this evening passed a unanimous decision to recognize the Ukraine as an independent state. The assembly also endorsed decisions on submitting a request for admitting the Republic of Croatia to the Council of Europe, as well as in the Central European Initiative (former Hexagonal). The assembly also passed a separate conclusion entrusting the government with "setting in motion the necessary steps for Croatia to obtain membership in all international governmental and other institutions of interest for the Republic of Croatia, especially UN membership."

Assembly Denies Markovic, Loncar Legitimacy

LD0612021691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2310 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Zagreb, Dec 5 (TANJUG)—The parliament of the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia has denied legitimacy to federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic and Foreign Minister Budmir Loncar, both from Croatia.

At its session this evening, the republican parliament ruled to "deny further recognition to and reject the activities [words indistinct] which produce or might produce any effect on Croatia."

A number of deputies who took the floor in the debate demanded that Markovic and Loncar be stripped of Croatian citizenship and barred from returning to Croatia "because of aligning themselves with the enemies of the Croatian people."

The Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav bicameral parliament announces for next week a session to vote on confidence in Markovic and Loncar. The other chamber, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, voted no confidence in these federal officials a fortnight ago. The federal parliament is working in the absence of the deputies from Croatia and Slovenia.

The Croatian parliament today decided that "the need has ceased for Stipe Mesic to participate, either as member or president, in the work of the presidency of former Yugoslavia."

Addressing parliament on this occasion, Mesic said: "I have done my duty—Yugoslavia no longer exists."

Mesic, a Croat, took the helm of the collective presidency last summer. Although it was Croatia's turn to head the body under the rote system, Mesic failed to win the necessary votes from the other members of the presidency. He was nevertheless elected to the post, when pressure brought to bear by the E.C. on his opponents in the presidency.

At the time of the controversy, Mesic was making statements promising he would be the last president of Yugoslavia.

Conditional Presence of UN Troops Accepted

LD0612022491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2315 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Zagreb, December 5 (TANJUG)—The parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia on Thursday [5 November] evening agreed that the United Nations' peacekeeping troops be deployed in its territory "but only temporarily" and on condition that they protect the existing borders of the republic which has unilaterally seceded from Yugoslavia.

In its conclusions, the republican parliament agrees to receive the blue helmets on condition that "they must protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and the establishment of legal order in Croatia."

As a further condition, parliament says that the areas supervised by the peacekeeping troops "cannot be exempted from the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia."

The Yugoslav presidency, which requested the U.N. to send a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia, maintains that it should be a duty of the blue helmets to protect Serbs in Croatia from a genocide being practiced by Croatian authorities.

The Croatian parliament upheld the republican government's proposal that an international tribunal for trying war criminals be set up to "try the leadership of the Yugoslav Army and all other criminals."

Forces Allegedly Use Chemical Weapons in Kordun

AU0412144191 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Report by Sinisa Samatovic from Kordun]

[Text] The latest example of the behavior of the Ustasha forces in the Karlovac-Kordun battlefield best shows that they are overcome by panic. Last night, they opened fire on the barracks in (?Mekos) with the banned weapon, chemical mortar bombs [tromblonska hemijska mina], fortunately without consequences.

However, this was not enough for Tudjman's fighters. They opened tank fire on (?Turanj) from their new stronghold at Logoriste. The attack was short thanks to the brave corporal of the Yugoslav People's Army, Drazenko Danilovic, who precisely launched a projectile that destroyed the enemy tank.

As we learned today from Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Dragovic, Ustasha storm troopers tried to carry out an infantry breakthrough through Karlovac suburb (?Sajevac) toward the positions firmly held by the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Podunavlje fighters. The attack by the Croat paramilitary forces not only failed, but they were completely defeated this time again.

In the Karlovac-Kordun region the night passed with sporadic fire to which the Kordun defenders failed to respond.

Doctors Claim Banned Warfare Means Used

LD3011200791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1830 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 30 (TANJUG)—Doctors at the Military Medical Academy (VMA) in Belgrade possess irrefutable proof that banned means of warfare have been used in the war in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia and that there have been cases of mutilation of the living and dead.

VMA head, Gen. Mihajlo Djuknic and head of the VMA Institute for Pathology, Col. Petar Spasic have told TANJUG that VMA specialists have been coming upon wounds caused by banned means of warfare, predominantly dumdums.

Commenting reports about massacres committed by Croatian paramilitary formations in the town of Vukovar, Gen. Djuknic and Col. Spasic said that teams of experts would do most of the identification of the victims of the three-month battles in Vukovar in the town itself, and that a hundred of so bodies brought to the VMA while the fighting was still underway would be identified at that military medical institution.

The Croatian para-military formations surrendered to the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Vukovar on November 18.

Gen. Djuknic and Col. Spasic said that the work on the identification could take weeks, and that it was, therefore, too early to talk about how the victims had died. Gen. Djuknic and Col. Spasic urged that as many as possible physicians from the country and abroad be engaged for the job, because, as they specified, identification becomes more difficult as time passes.

Head of the Forensic Medicine Department in Vukovar, Capt. Zoran Stankovic told TANJUG a few days ago that investigating military authorities were looking for proof of the crimes admitted by captured members of Croatian paramilitary formations.

Capt. Stankovic said that experts had so far identified around 100 dead, that none of them were massacred but that bullet and shell-splinter wounds were found on them. Capt. Stankovic set out, however, that experts were yet to identify over 100 more bodies in ten different spots in Vukovar.

The Yugoslav Defense Secretariat has announced that it will soon publish a book on the crimes committed by Croatian para-military formations. The book, as its author, Col. Miodrag starcevic has said, contains documents, testimonies and photos which tell of the "brutality and bestiality" of Croatian forces.

Unit Leader on Osijek's Future, Hungarian Troops

LD2711191591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1247 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Erdut, 27 Nov (TANJUG)—Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan told journalists in Erdut today that Osijek will fall much more easily and more rapidly than Vukovar. Nevertheless, we would like to tell Mr. Kramaric, the town's mayor, and Franjo Tudjman that it would be better if they themselves were to surrender Osijek so as to avoid unnecessary destruction and loss of life. My men are under immediate Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] command, and we are members of the Serbian Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem region territorial units, Arkan claimed, and we will comply with the cease-fire. If we were not I would not be in Erdut, but at the combat front line.

I am aware, Arkan added, that Ustashas and the stinking mercenaries will not comply with the cease-fire agreement. They confirm this by staging round-the -clock provocations and perfidious attacks. This is why we will still have war in this area. We will not await the development of events with our arms crossed. We are tigers, and we will not allow the year 1941 to recur, when Serbs were taken into slaughterhouses and into Jasenovac [camp]. Unless the opposite happens, and if the Ustashas fail to comprehend their ultimate defeat, we will have to march on Zagreb and defeat them militarily totally.

Arkan pointed out the possibility of an attack on Serbia from neighboring Hungary because, he said, according to reliable information I have, Hungarian troops are massing on the border, and missile launching pads have been moved in the direction of our border.

According to Raznjatovic-Arkan, his units have so far captured six tanks from Ustasha formations. They kept two for their own use and four were passed on to the JNA. My estimate is that Ustashas still have about 300 tanks, but we will do everything we can to get them into the right hands, to those who have been deprived of them by treachery.

Pathologist: No Evidence of Vukovar Massacres

LD2711060391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2102 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] Vukovar, Nov 26 (TANJUG)—Head of the forensic identification service in Vukovar, Captain First Class Dr. Zoran Stankovic told TANJUG's reporters today that military expert teams in this Croatian town have identified around 100 corpses.

Stankovic said that the military investigation bodies in Vukovar are looking for evidence of the crimes admitted by the captured members of the Croatian paramilitary troops. He underscored that video and photo documentation of the victims was being gathered in the identification center.

Croatian paramilitary formations, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav People's Army and Serbian territorial defence troops, on the other, were engaged in violent clashes in Vukovar for three months. Vukovar is a larger-sized Croatian town closest to the border with the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

Vukovar has been controlled by the Yugoslav Army for a week now and military expert teams are mopping up and working on the identificiation of the victims.

Dr. Stankovic's team includes investigative judges of the Belgrade and Novi Sad court martials, forensic specialists of the Belgrade Military-Medical Academy in Belgrade (VMA) and crime experts.

Dr. Stankovic, a forensic specialist in VMA, told TANJUG's reporters that the corpses found in the two yards near the Vukovar hospital were identified, that these people had either died from bullet wounds or explosives and that there were no massacred corpses among them.

Dr. Stankovic told TANJUG's reporters that ten sites in Vukovar have been marked, that they would be investigated in the near future and that each contained more than ten cadavers.

He said that the mass graves near the soccer stadium "Sloga" till have not been investigated and that the experts' work was difficult because of the mines planted all over Vukovar.

Several days ago, three soldiers were killed while helping the exhumation of five JNA troops, who were later cremated.

Draskovic's Letter to President Tudjman

92BA0169B Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Nov 91 p 7

[Open letter from Vuk Draskovic to Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia: "The Same Executioners, the Same Victims"]

[Text] As I looked at the horrifying evidence of the madness of your Army in Borovo Naselje and Vukovar, horrified and struck dumb, I decided to write to you and to present to you, along with the letter, a copy of the novel *Noz* [*Knife*]. The Ustasha massacres of Serbs committed in 1941 are now being repeated in detail. In my description in the novel of the killing of my people half a century ago, I was describing in advance its present suffering inflicted by your Army and your state.

Nothing has changed. The same executioners, the same victims. The same knives, the same mallets, the same necks and skulls. The same hatred, the same madness.

An Italian newswoman was taking pictures of the slaughtered Serbs, shaking all over and shouting: "Where is Europe, to see this, where is Amnesty International, where are the world's newsmen, where is the Vatican?"

I asked the same question! Where are the Croatian newsmen to take pictures of those scenes of the deepest human abyss in order to show them to the Croat people?

Only the Croat people can triumph over the cosmic evil and cosmic shame of the Croat people. That undertaking is not in the power either of Europe or of the Vatican or of Lord Carrington, nor in the righteous anger of the Serbian soldier and his weapon.

I refuse to believe that the Croat people are genocidal. I refuse to believe that evil is woven into its national tissue and that those people are incapable of remorse and spiritual cleansing.

It will rather be the case that for decades now those unhappy people have been removed from the truth. It will rather be the case that for decades now the Croats have been looking at a false face in a false mirror. Had they ever become aware what actually happened at Jasenovac or Jadovno in 1941, neither Vukovar, nor Gospic, nor Borovo, I am convinced, would have occurred once again in 1991. Those Croats who have become aware of the truth have in fact experienced a catharsis. Those Croats are today neither with you, Mr. Tudjman, nor with Paraga, except that many out of fear do not show it publicly.

You will perhaps say that you personally never cut anyone's throat either in Borovo or in Gospic. And you will also say that you personally are against massacres and that you did not order them.

I can and want to believe that you did not order the massacre and that inside yourself you are against massacres, but I reject even the very thought of your innocence. Not only because you are the chief of state whose Army is slaughtering people, but also because, actually above all because you, Mr. Tudjman, have been preparing for decades the return of the Ustashi and because you, by denying those knives that go back half a century, sharpened the Ustasha knives today.

The gates of the hell of Vukovar were opened the instant that you, as a historian, began the first words in that sentence of the big lie and the great sin to the effect that, according to what you learned in Jasenovac, "only 40,000 people" were killed. By reducing the scale of the crime by a factor of 20, you pardoned the criminals. Recently, in The Hague, you diminished the victims of Jasenovac still more. By deceiving Europe and Lord Carrington, you have applied additional makeup to the bloody face of Pavelic's cutthroats, but this time out of a need to conceal the bloody face of cutthroats who are under your command, although, according to your announcement, you did not issue the orders for the slaughter.

The orders for the slaughter were issued to them by your untrue historical writings, false postwar films, false books, writers of false memoirs, false sermons by monks and bishops, false testimony for decades, and the false silence of the communist leaders of the people slaughtered in Jasenovac. The belief has prevailed that the crime can be concealed and that this crime will pay.

So that even now, so I hear, Croatian television and propaganda are trying to portray to the world the Serbs massacred in Vukovar as massacred Croats. And the Roman pope, in his "holy sermon," refers to slaughtered Vukovar, that repetition of the Serbian people's Jadovno, as a "symbol of Croatian resistance." The old methods are used to deny the new crimes and cut off the last line of retreat for the salvation of the Croatian people itself.

Instead of opening the door of the truth to the Croat people, so that it might be healed of the evil that has sprung from falsehood, that people is being thrust into collective solidarity with genocide and exposed not only to the horrors of an extension of the war, but also to fatal self-destruction by moral, intellectual, and spiritual cancer.

As a historian, besides, you certainly know that crimes always provoke reprisal. The Serbian patriarch is almost every day issuing an apostolic oath to the Serbian soldiers to refrain from the Old Testament principle of an eye for an eye.... I shudder at the possibility that the Ustasha madness can overpower the prayers of the patriarch and erase the border between Ustashism and Croatism. Blind revenge would not only be horrible, it would cover with a scab the Christ-like face of the Serbian soldier and the Serbian people.

I nevertheless believe that the Serbian soldier, in spite of everything, will preserve his honor and his soul. But what about your soul, Mr. Tudjman? Do you sleep peacefully in the face of the knowledge that you above all have brought unhappiness on the Croats? Tens of thousands of dead, three times as many mutilated, 300,000 homeless, so many villages and towns devastated.... That is the result and those are the consequences of your administration and your strategy.

I would, of course, be unfair if I put all the blame on you. Even more responsible, perhaps, are those who allowed the madness to gain momentum in Croatia. The Yugoslav Army should have struck with full force that morning when the dawn found the first Ustasha rifle on an Ustasha soldier. It was then that the straitjacket should have been pulled over the madman, and that could have been done in just a few days, without bombardment and unnecessary killing.

But what is to be done now? There are only two possibilities. The first is that the Croat majority will, as in an act of communion, face the painful, but healing truth and take the knives away from the Ustasha cutthroats. The second possibility is that those knives will be taken away and the criminals punished by the army of the people for whose throats the knives of the Ustashi were in fact forged.

The first way is shorter; it leads to a speedy peace, to some kind of healing, and to a hope for the future. That way, Mr. Tudjman, is less disastrous and much more honorable for the Croatian people.

Article Examines Draft Law on Minorities

92BA0167A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Nov 91 p 6

[Article by Goranka Jurseko: "Ethnic Rights Guaranteed"]

[Text] The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Declaration on Independent Croatia, the Charter on the Equality of Serbs and Other Minorities, and also the provisions stipulated in The Hague document constitute the points of departure for the Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and on the Rights of Ethnic (National) Groups in the Republic of Croatia, said Dr. Zarko Domljan, chairman of the Commission of the Croatian Assembly for Protection of the Rights of Nationalities and Ethnic Minorities, when he opened the debate of that document on Thursday [21 November]. Adoption of that law, along with the monitoring mechanism drawn from international conventions, is a condition for international recognition of the Republic of Croatia. That is why the law needs to be adopted as soon as possible, no later than the end of this year.

Regular Enactment Procedure

The text of the law has been drafted by a team of experts that included Dr. Zdravko Tomac, Vladimir Seks, Dr.

Milan Ramljak, Zivko Juzbasic, Dr. Davorin Rudolf, Neven Jurica, Dr. Zvonko Lerotic, Dr. Vladimir "Djuro" Degan, Stjepan Herceg, Zdravko Mustac, and Andjelko Sikiric, while the document from The Hague provided specific instructions as well as specific wordings. This text is a working draft, because the government, deputy caucuses, and the working bodies of the Croatian Assembly must still take a position concerning the law, and then it will be sent to the Assembly deputies for adoption. There was a question of whether urgent procedure might be followed in its adoption in view of the demands of international entities. However, the opinion prevailed that the law should be adopted in two phases because of its sensitivity and importance, that is, through regular procedure.

The law consists of 59 articles and nine chapters, and it establishes human rights and freedoms, cultural autonomy, the particular autonomous status of the regions in which the Serbs comprise an absolute majority, as well as international supervision, judicial protection, and punishable acts. The preamble elaborates minority rights. The freedom to use the written and spoken languages of national or ethnic groups is guaranteed through cultural autonomy in opcinas in which they constitute a majority of the total population. Wherever minorities constitute more than 12 percent of the population, they can exercise the right to use their native language in public life and official relations and in government bodies. The free use of national banners and symbols is also guaranteed, along with the right of proportional representation in republic bodies of government.

Two Autonomous Districts

Most of the draft law is concerned with the autonomous status of the territory in which Serbs constitute an absolute majority. It lists 11 opcinas in Croatia that are to have a special position. Thus, the Autonomous District of Glina would be made up of the opcinas Dvor, Glina, Vrginmost, Kostajnica, and Vojnic, and the Knin Autonomous District would consist of the opcinas Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Titova Korenica, and Donji Lapac. These two autonomous districts [kotari] would be outside the parishes [zupanije] and would have to be administered by the government of the Republic of Croatia, and ethnic rights of Croats and other ethnic groups would have to be guaranteed, but they would be independent in adopting decrees and ordinances within local jurisdiction. District courts related to subject matter within the jurisdiction of that district might be established, and they could have their own police departments.

The judicial system would have two levels. The district assembly would be the supreme body of government in that district, and it would also have its representatives in the Croatian Assembly.

A commissioner of the Croatian government would oversee enforcement of the decisions of republic authorities and this law and the parallel republic police and courts, which would try cases that are not in the jurisdiction of the district court.

The law's concluding provisions cover international supervision and judicial protection, but when the treaty envisaged between the republics and the former Yugoslavia takes effect it will be possible to enforce the actual text. That is why the law does not spell out the issue of demilitarization of the areas with special status, because that, in the interpretation of Vladimir Seks, is a subject in international treaties which can ensue only after international recognition of the Republic of Croatia and its borders and also the national boundary between the former Yugoslav republics and other states.

Several Hours of Debate

The observations in the several hours of debate were mainly general, but there were also several specific proposals. One called for this to be a constitutional law, but Vladimir Seks said that the Constitution has prescribed what can and cannot be a constitutional law, and that this in any case does not qualify. Nevertheless, it was said that the two-thirds majority by which this law must be passed is indication of its seriousness.

The criterion of the absolute majority, which is the basis for determining areas with special status, results in polarization in the opinion of Drago Roksandic and could result in fighting for territory, which would be harmful both to the majority nationality and to the minority, and he therefore calls for personal autonomy. In his view, that naturally includes collective ethnic rights as well. Roksandic's demand for formation of a chamber of ethnic communities was supported by Boris Tepsic, with the proviso that the members be elected in democratic and secret elections through which the Serbs, but also others, might express their ethnic entity. Tepsic also said that a historical new agreement ought to be drafted in Croatia between the Croatian and Serbian peoples, one that would be based on the principles of equality, equal rights, and freedoms. He called for the constitutional law to regulate elements of that agreement on which trust would be built between the two nationalities.

He was answered by Neven Jurica, who believes that reflections of that kind go in the direction of restoring dual sovereignty, which is not possible under the Constitution.

Fears of Minorities

The most frequent topic mentioned by representatives of the smaller ethnic minorities in Croatia, such as the German, Austrian, Czech, and Slovak groups, was the question of living together. That is, they feel that preference for one nationality could be detrimental to these smaller groups and place them in a subordinate position relative to the Serbs.

At the end of the debate, Domljan said that this is only the beginning and that the debates to follow in coming days will probably produce more ideas and proposals that will find their place in the law.

Chapter IV—Special Autonomous Status of Areas in Which Serbs Constitute an Absolute Majority

Article 16

The areas in which Serbs constitute an absolute majority are constituted as autonomous entities with separate legal status within the Republic of Croatia, but which are unified and indivisible on the basis of constitutional principles.

These areas consist of the opcinas: Dvor, Glina, Kostajnica, Vojnic, Vrginmost, Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Gracac, Knin, Obrovac, and Titova Korenica.

The borders of the opcinas referred to in Paragraph 2 of this article are established in the Law on Territories of Opcinas in the Republic of Croatia (NARODNE NOVINE, Nos. 39/62, 5/63, 13/65, 54/65, 27/67, 6/68, 21/68, 30/70, 1/73, 6/74, 42/74, 1/75, 9/78, 31/80, 40/81, 5/86, and 27/88), specifically the provisions of that law which were in effect on 31 May 1990.

Article 17

The areas with special autonomous status referred to in Article 16 of this law comprise the following autonomous districts: the opcinas Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Titova Korenica, and Donji Lapac—the Autonomous District of Knin, and the opcinas Glina, Vrginmost, Kostajnica, Dvor na Uni, and Vojnic—the Autonomous District of Glina.

The Autonomous Districts of Glina and Knin are outside the administrative division of parishes.

The system of government of the Republic of Croatia, prescribed by the Constitution, laws, and other regulations, as well as this law and international treaties to which the Republic of Croatia is a party, applies fully on the territory of the Autonomous Districts of Knin and Glina.

Article 18

In the areas referred to in Article 16 of this law, the assemblies of the autonomous districts and opcinas and the bodies of the executive branch of government within them are elected and appointed on the basis of the principles of proportional representation of the inhabitants with respect to the nationality (ethnic group) to which they belong.

Article 19

The regulations and decisions adopted by the assembly of an autonomous district and opcina and their executive and other bodies must protect the ethnic rights, status, and interests of Croats as well as members of other national and ethnic groups living in the areas with special autonomous status.

Article 20

Croats and other inhabitants of the autonomous districts and opcinas referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of this law who are not Serbs have the same rights and obligations as the Serbs and also all the special rights and obligations set forth in this law for members of national or ethnic groups.

Consequences of Army Victory in Vukovar

92BA0167C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Nov 91 p 7

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "To Stand Still or To Advance"]

[Text] Is Vukovar the turning point in the war raging through Yugoslavia? Will the guns fall silent after Vukovar, or will the barrels heat up? Domestic and foreign observers have been commenting rather euphorically on the defeat of Croatia's paramilitary formations in Vukovar and Borovo Naselje, while at the same time the German and indeed also French press have been writing about the "turning point and collapse of a symbol and myth."

It is beyond doubt that the defeat at Vukovar is a difficult psychological and propaganda blow for the Republic of Croatia, especially because things do not stand much better at Dubrovnik. Nevertheless, from the military standpoint the military significance of those towns should not be exaggerated. The main body of Croatia's paramilitary formations was not located in those areas. Vukovar is a military defeat for Croatia, but it also might signify the beginning of a real protracted war if the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] stops now on the line Osijek—Vinkovci. Over the last 10 days or so, the Croatian media have even been able to turn the effect of Vukovar's loss from the propaganda and psychological standpoint to their advantage and to completely offset the military triumph of the JNA.

As for the Army, the victory at Vukovar has restored a portion of its lost prestige, it gained self-confidence and valuable experience in street fighting, and it has hardened both soldiers and officers. The 1st Mechanized Guard Division and the 1st Guard Brigade, these were the units that actually won the victory in Vukovar, will now be able to pull their forces out of the city and set up on the line Osijek—Vinkovci, which will appreciably strengthen the front of the JNA in this region. The JNA will no longer have to keep forces around and in Vukovar, and this is a factor that to some extent changes the balance of power in Slavonia.

The Sorrow of the German Newspapers

The speculation and chattering of the German newspapers and their commentators on the "Pyrrhic victory of the JNA in Vukovar," about how "the JNA lost 2,000 dead in this city," which are the guesses of German military specialists, are actually at the level of similar "analyses" in the Croatian newspapers, which go on to write about the "100 planes brought down and hundreds of tanks destroyed." Even former generals of the JNA, who are now appearing on the programs of Croatian Television in the uniforms of the National Guard Corps [ZNG], do not have the courage to acknowledge these figures. The facts are different, since the beginning of the war in Croatia, a war imposed on the JNA, it has lost about 600 dead on the region of that republic. Officers represent all of 31 percent of the dead, which is sixfold higher than the normal proportion of officer deaths in war.

The Army's cautious advance at Vukovar was actually dictated by the need to protect the lives of young soldiers, but also the civilian population sheltered in the city's cellars. Had it wanted to do so, the JNA could have dropped so-called aerosol bombs, and resistance in the city would have been broken in a very short time. But then the civilians would also have suffered, just as Iraqi citizens suffered in an underground bunker on which an American plane dropped such a bomb during the war in Kuwait. Result: About 400 Iraqi civilians dead, a command post of the Iraqi Army destroyed for the United States. In war, all is relative.

We can understand, then, the regret and undisguised sadness of serious German military commentators, who only a month ago allowed themselves in WELT to write "that Vukovar will never fall," and we can also understand their satanization of the JNA and Yugoslavia, especially Serbia, but they are right when they say that "the JNA was not prepared for that kind of war" and that "the armed formations of Slovenia and Croatia took excellent advantage of the conception of nationwide warfare in their attacks on the JNA." This was actually a strategic surprise, which the Army received and suffered in such a tragic and stoic way. It is also in keeping with Napoleon's dictum that "every army that wants to stay modern must modernize its tactics every five to eight years," and in the context of the severe political and ethnic divisions, the JNA should have thought about how much and in what way this would affect its own composition. After all, even the Army does not live under a glass jar.

But what has happened, Vukovar is the end of just one phase in the war. Winter, which will soon be upon us, will impose its own rules of warfare, in which there are many unknowns.

Victory Through an Offensive

The Frenchman Marshal Foch once said: "What we are unable to do rapidly we will not do at all.... In every offensive, speed is more important than force." That soldier's postulate, of course, has its exceptions, and Vukovar, incidentally, is one of them, but it is also more than certain that the JNA must quickly take military advantage of the result of the battle for that city if it wants to win this war. If Croatia's paramilitary forces are left the time to build new fortifications patterned after those at Vukovar, then it is not possible to foresee the end of the war. Speed, which means high mobility and maintaining a rapid pace of combat operations, even between 80 and 100 kilometers a day, is one of the conditions for bringing a conflict to an end rapidly.

The concentration of the main strike and achievement of superiority in personnel and materiel at a particular place and time; surprise; aggressiveness in combat (never ceasing the assaults, breakthroughs, and pursuit of the adversary); preservation of the combat effectiveness of one's own troops by proper organization, command, and high morale, along with realistic planning of operations, striving neither for "too much" nor "too little"; good coordination of all branches, arms, and services, as well as attack through the depth, which signifies a strike against the enemy in the depth of his deployment and order of battle—these are all conditions of victory in this war. Put briefly, these are the principles to which the JNA must adhere if it wants to wage the war offensively. The offensive—there is nothing new about this—is the main element of every victory in warfare. No one has ever won a war by defense alone, just as there is no war in which the strategic objective was to remove the blockade of garrisons nor prevention of interethnic conflicts.

So, how are JNA units on the fronts to operate under winter conditions? Low temperatures and frozen terrain are not any great obstacle to the movement of heavy armored vehicles; light and heavy armored personnel carriers travel over dry snow up to 70 cm deep, medium tanks up to 80 cm. While the tracks pack down some of the snow, the tank pushes most of the drift ahead of it. Modern tanks have snowplows mounted so that they can clear their own way. Even helicopters have problems with snow, because when they land their rotors create a cloud of snow as much as 20 meters high. Frozen earth is rather difficult for digging foxholes and trenches, so that a foxhole for four infantrymen takes on the average four hours to dig, but this can be speeded up with explosives.

If the JNA decides to embark on a broader offensive in the region of Slavonia, it will do so somewhat differently than up to now, that is, from what we have been able to see in operations up to now: The tanks have gone in advance of the infantry, which has used them as a screen. That is why there have been certain losses in the tanks, because it was easy for the tank hunters in the Croatian paramilitary formations to wait in ambush for the tanks. In order to prevent that, the infantry of the JNA must advance in armored personnel carriers ahead of the tanks, and, in the course of that advance, self-propelled 122-mm howitzers, popularly known as "nails," should penetrate 500 to 1,000 meters behind the infantry and support the infantry assault with their fire. The JNA infantry should deal with the tank hunters, so that the M-84 tank is not in a situation of defending itself with its 125-mm cannon against members of the National Guard Corps, a single member, who is firing his "wasp" on it at a range of 50 meters. While at the same time the accompanying infantry is far behind the tank?

The infantry is the arm that in modern doctrines must neutralize the enemy's antitank weapons. But the JNA has had problems precisely with the number of infantry necessary, and that is perhaps part of the answer as to why the tanks have sometimes been left alone. Probably the number of tanks in tank platoons will also be increased, and that will bring about an altered structure of tank battalions.

A strong offensive of the JNA at this point in Slavonia could in just one to two days of combat surround the first line of Croatia's paramilitary formations and cut their supply lines. Because it is thought that neutralizing unprotected personnel requires an average of 10 155-mm shells per hectare of area, for the area of the front in Slavonia, amounting, say, to 100,000 hectares, that would require one million shells. Each 155-mm shell weighs 65 kg, and to transport them Croatia's paramilitary formations would have to have at least 12,000 five-ton trucks on the territory of Slavonia alone. There is no logistical system able to meet that requirement within a period of a few days, certainly not the logistical system of the paramilitary formations of the Republic of Croatia.

To halt the offensive of mechanized armored units of the JNA, in particular the 1st Mechanized Guard Division, Croatia's paramilitary formations must possess excellent artillery. They cannot do this with light antitank systems. Fortified cities do not have to be taken at any price; they can be blocked off and left to fall by their own weight. In the situation when Yugoslavia's Air Force has pilots who have flown as many as 65 combat missions apiece, that is, experienced combat pilots, war pilots, such as no one else in Europe has at this point except Yugoslavia and to some extent the Soviet Union, winter is not on the side of Croatia's paramilitary formations.

Croatia, of course, will certainly try to gain as much strength from the military standpoint in the meantime, but the big question is what weapons it can still get from the West either covertly or overtly. Any radical violation of the embargo would mean that the JNA also gets what it has even paid for in advance....

This war, by all appearances, will be won by logistics. It will all be clear with the first winter freezes and temperatures below freezing.

Serbia

Belgrade TV Assesses Croatia Nationality Bill

AU0512220691 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Ratko Dmitrovi commentary]

[Text] Regarding Bonn, Rome, and Vienna, that is to say the political logic and interests that reign in these centers, all conditions have been met for the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The Assembly of the Republic of Croatia last night adopted a constitutional law on the rights and freedoms of man, and the rights of ethnic and national minorities.

About ten days before that, the leader of the Croatian Party of Rights, Dobroslav Paraga, was arrested. According to the initial assessments in Germany and Austria, the situation in Croatia is now crystal clear. Neofascists have been blocked and removed, and the rights of national minorities are guaranteed in accordance with high European principles of tolerance. Is this really like that?

First of all, not only that the situation concerning Paraga is not clear, but is becoming increasingly complicated day by day. There is no ideological difference between Paraga and Franjo Tudjman. Both are ultranationalists. Paraga is not the man who could be described in this republic as the pioneer of neofascism. Before the Croatian Party of Rights set up its armed forces, combat units loyal to Tudjman, the forces of the Croatian Democratic Community, had been promoting the symbolism of fascism throughout Croatia. Paraga is the political premature baby of Franjo Tudjman, who is only obliged by the burden of (?responsibility), the role of a statesman, and the international public to disguise his radicalism, anti-Serbianism, and bestiality in ruling with political pluralism.

As regards the bill on the rights of national minorities that was adopted yesterday, it does not represent a step forward at all. On the contrary. This document has definitively transformed the Serbian people in Croatia into a national minority, with their cultural autonomy and local self-management being generously guaranteed. This does not mean anything in practical terms, because in every country where there is a rule of law, cultural autonomy and local self-management go without saying. Citing the model of autonomy in South Tirol is only a verbal trick applied with the aim of enhancing the impression of the Europeanization of the Croatian Constitution.

This is in fact why Tudjman had been instructed by his political fathers in Bonn and Rome to present the new assembly document to Europe as a replica of the autonomy in South Tirol.

If Serbs in Croatia accept the offer made from Zagreb's upper town yesterday, which they certainly will not, they would be accepting to be transformed from a nation into a national minority whose rights would depend on the goodwill of the assembly deputies or, what is even worse, the current mood of the president of the republic. The adopted bill contains a provision according to which the president of the Republic of Croatia, among other things, approves the use of symbols of national communities.

And finally the thing that is most important. The area populated by the Serbian people in Croatia would be controlled by the Croatian army, with the symbols and attitudes that simply forced Serbs in Croatia to defend themselves with arms. The bill that was adopted in the Croatian Assembly yesterday is only important to the extent that with it Croatia finally admitted that the war started because of the erroneous policy of the Croatian Democratic Community toward the Serbian people in Croatia.

Fearing that Croatia will get a new political elite through a possible coup, which they could not support, Germany, Italy, and the Vatican will soon recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. This is creating all the conditions for the continuation and spread of this war, whose limits no one can guess.

Kosovo

Kosovars Request UN Troops for Kosovo-Metohija

LD0512222991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1953 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Pristina, Dec 5 (TANJUG)—A group of 16 ethnic Albanian members of the Yugoslav parliament today appealed to the United Nations to send blue helmets to the province of Kosovo-Metohija of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

In a memorandum sent to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, the ethnic Albanians say in explanation of their request that it is necessary to ensure a "just resolution of the political and state status" of Albanians in Yugoslavia.

The memorandum accuses Serbia of practicing "repression and apartheid against ethnic Albanians" and invites peace-keeping troops to prevent a "possible massacre" which might be perpetrated by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and security forces of the biggest Yugoslav republic.

Last month the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, which rallies some one dozen parties and associations of the province's ethnic Albanians, appealed to The Hague conference on Yugoslavia for peacekeeping troops for Kosovo-Metohija.

Ethnic Albanians account for 90 percent of the population of Kosovo-Metohija and 17 percent of the population of Serbia, and have the status of minority under the constitution.

Kosovars Investigated for Celebrating National Day

AU0512140491 Zagreb Radio Croatia in Albanian 2145 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] About 30 people, mainly intellectuals, were summoned to the station of the security services in Ferizaj [Urosevac] yesterday and today because of their participation in the 28 November [Albanian national day] celebrations in Kumogllave. Three Muslim clergymen, Zejnullah Derguti, Lutfi Halili, and Sylejman Roshi, were also summoned to the police. The last was sentenced to 60 day's imprisonment by a summary procedure solely because the text of an oration delivered at the funeral of an Albanian soldier was found in his pocket.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Markovic Arrives in Sarajevo for Izetbegovic Talks

LD0512122891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1137 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council, arrived in Sarajevo today where—as TANJUG has learned—he will meet Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, and other officals.

No details have been announced about the reasons for the meetings and talks in Sarajevo.

Markovic Holds Talks With Izetbegovic, Pelivan

LD0512221591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1902 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, December 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic today made a brief working visit to Sarajevo, capital of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, where he met with its president, Alija Izetbegovic, and Prime Minister Jure Pelivan.

No details were reported about the Markovic-Izetbegovic talks.

Markovic and Pelivan discussed the "economic difficulties and blockades which Bosnia-Hercegovina has to face as result of the armed conflicts in the country," it was announced.

Bosnian Serbs Condemn EC Sanctions

AU0512201491 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] At a news conference organized by the Serbian Democratic Party, it was said that the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are above all an expression of hegemony and the wish to impose the acceptance of the unilateral secession of Croatia and Slovenia.

Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, proposed that the solving of the crisis be returned to the Yugoslav institutions, and that the EC be asked to stop providing goodwill services. He also proposed that a process for Slovenia's recognition by Yugoslavia be initiated, and that an appeal be sent against the recognition of Croatian and Slovenia until this is done by Yugoslavia.

The Serbian Democratic Party also invited the representatives of the three constitutive peoples to hold negotiations on solving the political crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina. As Radovan Karadzic said, if these talks do not begin next week, the Serbian Democratic Party will not consider itself responsible for what might happen.

As regards the deployment of the blue helmets in Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was said that this republic is part of Yugoslavia and that only the SFRY Presidency can make such a decision. At present there is no reason for the deployment of the blue helmets.

Velibor Ostojic, minister of information in the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, addressed journalists by asking them why nothing is being said about attacks on TANJUG journalists in Zagreb and some other similar events.

Bosniak Group Wants UN Troops on Serbia Border

AU0512200891 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] At its news conference today, the Muslim Bosniak Organization presented the view that the question of deploying UN troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina is of the same importance as in Croatia. These troops should primarily be deployed on the borders with Serbia and Montenegro, because the Muslim Bosniak Organization considers them a potential source of aggression against Bosnia- Hercegovina. The deployment of these troops in Neum and Mostar, as was proposed, would mean the recognition of new borders within our republic, which the Yugoslav People's Army has already marked.

In order to protect the economic interests of the republic, the Muslim Bosniak Organization proposes the introduction of a new currency in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which would be called Banovac, as it was called in the old Bosnian state. The journalists were also informed that the Muslim Bosniak Organization was invited by the Assembly of the Serbian people to hold talks on the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Muslim Bosniak Organization will study this proposal, but will not accept it if the Assembly of the Serbian people is to play a role in it, because this would at the same time mean the founding of an assembly of Muslim or some other peoples. These negotiations could only be negotiations among political parties, Muhamed Filipovic, vice president of the party, stressed.

Mostar Garrison Denies Troops Put on Streets

LD0212121791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1108 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Mostar, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—The Mostar public security office claims in its communique today that the presence of a large number of armed soldiers wearing helmets and other combat equipment in the streets of Mostar yesterday afternoon and last night upset the citizens and seriously aggravated the political and security situation in Hercegovina's capital.

It says that the soldiers from the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] garrison were positioned at the town's main crossroads and other strategic facilities between 1630 and 1830 although they did not check the citizens' identification documents or carry out other controls. The same source says that afterwards the soldiers were witdrawn to the barracks while military armed patrols remained in the town.

The JNA garrison, however, denies that members of the army were positioned at the town's strategic points or that the soldiers appeared in large numbers.

The Mostar garrison command has announced that at that time there were only military patrols in the town as security for the regular soldiers who yesterday visited the town in their spare time and that these patrols returned to the barracks after the soldiers returned from the town.

Army Command in Mostar on Peace Problems

LD0312234391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1656 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Mostar, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—We are exceptionally interested in preserving peace in Mostar and Hercegovina and for our part we will do everything necessary to contribute to this, stressed the representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] military commands based in Hercegovina, Colonel Savo Lukic and Lieutenant Colonel Milen Simic at today's press conference.

Simic said that the army has reliable information about the existence of organized extremist groups in Mostar, whose objective is to disturb the citizens and provoke the members of the JNA. Simic said that these extremists have also been making lists for the assassination of JNA members and prominent citizens of Mostar, with the aim of provoking conflicts and military clashes.

In the talks with the Dubrovnik authorities, we are trying to be as constructive as possible and to find a solution acceptable for both sides as soon as possible. As far as the JNA's demands are concerned, we are asking only for Dubrovnik to be demilitarized and for the Ustashe forces to surrender their arms and leave Dubrovnik, said Colonel Savo Lukic who, in reply to a direct question from the reporters, answered that he considers all armed formations of the Republic of Croatia not only as irregular, but—judging by their character and everything they have done—as a creation of the Ustashe.

Army Prevents Mostar Territorials Arms Inspection

AU0612105191 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] The Military Command in Mostar yesterday prohibited the members of the Territorial Defense Headquarters in Mostar commune from carrying out a regular inspection of their arms and equipment stored in two Yugoslav Peoples' Army barracks.

Nijaz Kahrimanovic, commander of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defense in Mostar commune, informed the relevant organs of the Mostar authorities and Bosnia [passage indistinct] about this and asked for further instructions.

The Military Command in Mostar did not give any reasons for the prohibition.

Banja Luka Mission Disagrees With Zagreb Report

LD0512161991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2025 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Banja Luka, Dec 4 (TANJUG)—Members of an EC monitor mission based in Banja Luka, a town in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, today distanced themselves from a confidential, i.e., internal report drawn up by their colleagues in Zagreb.

Members of the mission Botonagis Pandilis and Ton Snells told TANJUG today that the mission has made no suggestions to its collegaues in Zagreb and Belgrade that could be the basis for the sharp attacks against the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) contained in the controversial report.

Pandilis and Snells said their primary task was to escort the JNA convoys leaving Croatia and crossing to the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, adding that they had no knowledge of the report or the plan to send it to the EC monitors headquarters in The Hague.

Emphasizing that their mission did not imply siding with any party to the conflict, the members expressed hope that the report and the "fuss about it" will not spoil their relations with the JNA and its Banja Luka command.

According to a statement issued by the Dutch Foreign Ministry today—The Netherlands is current president of the EC—this is an "unofficial and unaccepted report of an internal nature" not seen by the ministry officials.

The Hague believes that the report was prepared by a single monitor group on its own, but that the headquarters of the monitors in Zagreb did not accept it and, consequently, did not send it on to the EC Presidency.

'Serious' Economic Situation Examined

92BA0167B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 21 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by D. Stanisic: "Squabbles Do Not Help the Economy"]

[Text] The economic situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] has been utterly unable to get the serious attention of the republic government. Every attempt so far has almost always ended in failure. That is what happened once again yesterday. Yesterday's session of the government was devoted to preparing tomorrow's session of the B-H parliament, which will take up the largely interrupted economic—as well as other—flows in the republic, the hope being to arrive at specific measures or proposals on how to overcome this. The members of the B-H parliament naturally expect that in all of this the government will be taking the principal initiative.

To be sure, yesterday the members of the government had before them a document that, one would say, described in detail the full extent of the distress and trouble of those in the B-H economy and the somewhat more favorable status of those in the social services. It contained 13 specific measures with precise deadlines for performance. The first of them stated that the "basic precondition for beginning normalization in the conduct of the economy's business and the functioning of all public and social services in the republic is cessation of the military conflict in the Republic of Croatia and the channeling of political talks concerning the system of government and relations through a peaceful democratic dialogue...."

Is the Government in a Crisis?

Certain ministers of the government, that at least is the impression, seem not to have been disposed yesterday to concern themselves with the economy, the social services, and their problems, and so they gave the discussion the direction they pleased (this is a scenario that is now familiar). The emphasis was on mutual criticism, accusations, and charges as to the inconsistency of the government's methods and the content of its activity. All of which was spiked with the general divisiveness and cross-eyed views of the same things, which once again led to the question that to some extent had been pushed aside and forgotten: Is the government in a crisis?

Branko Djeric first made an objection to the report that was presented to the effect that it abounded only in observations, and then he went on to say that "it should also set forth the results of the government's one-year tenure." He categorically asserted that "the government has not achieved a single one of the objectives that were set to the extent that was desired," and in that same context he mentioned that "the drop of production has not been halted, consolidation of public enterprises has not been completed, there have been no solutions in the social services...," along with the remark "that the people who ought to be working on that are busy writing various press releases." It is high time, Djeric said, for us to be a bit more critical of ourselves and not just to write "it has fallen off, it has not fallen off."

Jure Pelivan, B-H prime minister, did not concur in those remarks to the effect that "all the blame can be attributed to the government, nor should it be looked to for the causes of the situation through which we are living." Milivoje Nadezdin was against generalizing, although he did not dispute the fact that "the government could have done a great deal more." Deputy Prime Minister Muhamed Cengic said that it is "high time that we agree on who should do what in this government and who should have done what, but did not." According to him, there have been objective reasons and difficulties, but there have also been shortcomings on the part of the government. Cengic related the need to change the method of operation, which is the result of the fact that reliance was put on a program that was drafted in peacetime, to a current situation in the republic. "B-H," he said, "is divided between the Serbs and Croats, and the Muslims get what is left. Individuals cannot divide up B-H while the government sits by and watches all that." Friday, Cengic concluded, is the day when the government must say what it wants. Haris Siladzic insisted on spelling out the facts concerning two things: "What we have encountered, and what has encountered us."

No Meeting of the Minds

According to Siladzic, this government has been unable to operate normally, nor has it been given a chance to show what it knows. The main source of all the government's shortcomings, Momcilo Pejic is convinced, lies in party bias, and this needs to be acknowledged. "This is the greatest shortcoming of this government, and that is why its restructuring is urgent."

In the flood of accusations, individuals also touched upon certain problems in the economy. Pelivan, for example, warned that "Energopetrol" must assume obligations for 10,000 tons of petroleum from reserves that were consumed who knows when.

The debate on amending the Law on the Government of B-H also took place in an atmosphere of diametrically opposed views. The way this move toward more effective operation of the government, essentially the first specific effort of this kind, is seen was perhaps best characterized by Minister Pejic, who said: "The deputy ministers are going in one direction and the prime minister in the other." The main fight was over Article 7 (a), which envisages the innovation of forming a small cabinet (consisting of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers as permanent members, and ministers would be included according to the subject matter under discussion). Various issues were raised in the debate: from what the cabinet would do, would the decisions it made have the same legal force as those made by the government, to whether they would actually be two parallel governments or a government within the government. Minister Siladzic was an outspoken opponent, and when the bill carried with 13 votes in favor, he called for all decisions in the government to be adopted by a vote in the future.

The question was also raised of forming the Croatian communities "Herceg Bosna" and "Bosanska Posavina," but it was agreed that there would be more extensive discussion of that in today's session of the government and more specific positions taken.

Sandzak SDA Plans Muslim Government

92BA0184E Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 91 p 13

[Article by Z. Saponjic: "Defense in the Shadow"]

[Text] If all the forecasts and conceptions of the leaders of the Democratic Action Party [SDA] of Novi Pazar are borne out, at the beginning of next month someone will be named to form the Muslim government of Sandzak. The task was supposed to be done still earlier, but at the moment the party is quite preoccupied with preparations for the First SDA Congress, which will be held in late November in Sarajevo. According to Rasim Ljajic, the party's secretary, another problem is the absence of a large number of members of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak [MNVS], who have been abroad for a long time now, where "they are working to internationalize the Muslim question in Serbia." "We will take advantage of the gathering of members of the National Council of Sandzak at our congress in Sarajevo to hold an assembly in which we will designate someone to form the government, and we are not backing off from our conception," Ljajic said.

On the basis of what can be heard and noted down in Novi Pazar, this move by the leaders of the most numerous Muslim party is by all appearances the first attempt to realize the "result" of the referendum held recently concerning the Sandzak's autonomy.

They say in the party headquarters that designating the person to form the government and its formation do not signify formation of any government parallel to the present authorities of the Republic of Serbia, but only establishment of a shadow government whose principal task would be to "rescue what can be rescued in Sandzak." "We Muslims in Sandzak do not have to take the consequences for which Milosevic and the present regime of Serbia are exclusively to blame. We want to protect our region from hunger, which after institution of the economic sanctions is threatening more and more, and we are not to blame for it, because our two deputies in the Serbian Assembly are the only ones who voted for acceptance of The Hague documents," Ljajic said.

The leaders of the SDA went on to say that an additional economic blockade of that region is being threatened from Serbia and that Sandzak "is already under occupation of the police and the forces of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] withdrawn from Slovenia," and so, according to them, this is one additional reason for forming the government of Sandzak.

According to the plans that already exist in the SDA, the future government would have only a few portfolios, the most important of which would be those for the economy, information, and defense and security. The task of the economic ministry would be to "urgently reestablish economic relations with Western and Arab countries." That of the information ministry to "spread in the world the truth about the Muslims in Sandzak," but certainly the most interesting role will go to the defense ministry of Sandzak. Secretary Ljajic says that the party will try to find for that post a specialist who will draw up the "necessary defense plans for Sandzak in case of possible aggression." "It will be the task of that ministry to prepare this region so that if the worst happens, there will not be a repetition of 1941 and the other wartime years, when genocide was practiced here against the Muslim people," added the secretary of the SDA for Serbia.

In response to the direct question of what that specifically means and whether preparations for defense also include the arming of Muslims, Ljajic answered that all of that will be in the jurisdiction of the future ministry and that only the minister will be competent to answer all such questions.

In the SDA headquarters in Novi Pazar, they are aware, they say, that this planned role of the security ministry runs counter to the statement that this is only a question of forming a shadow government, but they add that the state of war dictates all their activities. The ministerial portfolios, they say, will be offered to responsible people with a reputation regardless of nationality; however, they expect that the government will be monoethnic, that is, Muslim.

The government and agencies of Serbia have still not responded officially to all of these statements, but the reactions of the Serbian authorities among Muslims, and especially among Serbs, in the Raska region are awaited with great attention. The Serbs in that region say that they do not expect anything of the Serbian authorities other than finally putting life into a law-governed state in this region as elsewhere.

Macedonia

Vice President Georgievski Submits Resignation

LD0612040791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2019 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—The 27th session of the Macedonian parliament, which was opened two days ago, effectively started its work this afternoon, following a number of adjournments and breaks, at 1800 GMT instead of at 1430 GMT.

Parliamentary deputies listened to the Dimitriy Dimitrov, minister for education and physical culture, who briefly explained his resignation and then adopted without debate the minister's request and the proposal of the government president, Nikola Kljusev, that Dimitrov be relieved of his post. It was concluded that President Kljusev should submit his proposal for a new minister of education and physical culture in the Macedonian Government at the next session of the republic's Assembly.

Ljupco Georgievski's resignation as vice president of the Presidency of the Republic of Macedonia was then placed on the agenda. In his explanation, almost 90 minutes long, Ljupco Georgievski said that the fundamental motive behind his resignation is "his disagreement with the way Macedonia's policies and state have been managed by the Macedonian authorities in the past ten months." Georgievski accused the new authorities of "indulging in demagoguery" and said that "the revival of neocommunism in Macedonia" came as a result of the new policies. Georgievski also attacked the government and the president of the Republic of Macedonia for their "hesitation" and "lack of action" in, as he said, "taking the necessary measures."

No Celebrations Held for Republic Day

LD3011142391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Skopje, 29 Nov (TANJUG)—Republic Day in Macedonia is passing like any normal nonworking day, without any pomp and ceremony. In the republic's capital last night there was no sound of the firing of gun salutes which on previous occasions heralded the formal marking of the day of the creation of Yugoslavia, nor was there the mass departure of young pioneers to the banks of the Vardar to swear allegiance to the "tricolor" and deck themselves out in pioneers' scarves. The Skopje papers of VECER and NOVA MAKEDONIJA do not have a "festive front page" today. The independent daily REPUBLIKA on the front page of its double issue, instead of greetings, carries in capital letters the slogan "Comrade Tito we salute you," or "Comrade Tito we are cutting each others' throats."

Parliamentarian Interviewed on Independence

92BA0167D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Nov 91 p 10

[Interview with Petar Gosev, head of the Macedonian delegation in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly, by Dragan Bisenic; place and date not given: "Macedonia Does Not Want Slovene Butter"]

[Text] With adoption of the new Constitution, Macedonia has joined the ranks of the Yugoslav republics that have voted in favor of their independence and sovereignty. Macedonia, however, has not embarked on the same road as Slovenia and Croatia. Its way has been much slower, more thoroughly prepared, but also more open to dialogue, as Macedonian politicians put it. Will Macedonia encounter problems similar to those of Slovenia and Croatia, will it create its own army, its own currency, and other symbolic trappings of political sovereignty? We talked about this with Petar Gosev, who heads the Macedonian delegation in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly.

We Will Respect The Hague Agreement

[Gosev] Macedonia has not embarked on the Slovene road. They made decisions one after the other, but we waited out the period of the Brioni Declaration, during which we did not adopt unilateral acts. We will also respect The Hague agreement which has been reached and the mutual ties between the new forms of association of the Yugoslav republics if agreement is reached. If Yugoslavia is a customs union or monetary union, which would not be an insignificant connection, we would respect that, as, of course, we would the protection of human rights—individual rights, collective rights, and minority rights. Those things already presuppose institutions in common. Now, however, things have taken such a turn that there seems to be no desire to reestablish any ties at all. Those who are waging the war seem to think that in the future they will be living on different continents.

[Bisenic] Because Macedonia is now a sovereign and independent state, it will certainly seek disassociation from the previous community, that is, a share in the final balance sheet of Yugoslavia. How do you think that division should be done?

[Gosev] We first need to negotiate and find the criteria. Concerning the debts, for example, things are clear. The federal debt should be distributed among the republics. The best criterion is the republic's share in Yugoslavia's social product. We need to find a key for foreign exchange reserves, for property. It is certain that we will not find the fairest solution, bills will be presented, both real and fictitious. However, some people do not even want to come to such talks.

[Bisenic] How will that job be done in the case of the Army?

[Gosev] Macedonia wants to resolve that issue by treaty. We would like to be both a neutral and demilitarized state, insofar as that is possible. But at this point we must have a minimal defense system within the limits of our needs. That is why we do not preclude cooperation with others even on this question, because others in the world also set up joint defense umbrellas. Macedonia's leadership is in context [as published] with the Army. Conflict has been avoided up to now, although there have been problems because of military equipment being carried away from here. People are bitter because they know that they took part in creating those things. The new Constitution gives the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] a different status in this region. In Macedonia, no stress has been put on any conflicts with the Army, but rather we have endeavored in every way to behave correctly toward what up until now has been the Yugoslav Army. They have neither been attacked nor insulted. They have been doing their job within the framework of the existing system and within the framework of the previous Yugoslav federation. When that no longer exists, it is a good thing for us to observe that that job was done within the framework of those principles and that we must move on to different solutions.

Macedonia Did Not Want Too Much

[Bisenic] Will Macedonia also have its own currency?

[Gosev] To create one's own currency, there are many conditions that need to be met. However, Macedonia did not take steps in time to protect itself from the costs of the war being passed on to us, so that this will have to be done now. Perhaps trade will go back to bilateral payments, because even if Macedonia created its own currency, it would be weaker than the weak dinar.

[Bisenic] People in Macedonia are often looking in the direction of Serbia at what its leadership is doing.

[Gosev] I consider Serbia the most responsible for the situation in Yugoslavia. Serbian policymakers should ask themselves why everyone around is afraid? It cannot look just to others in placing the blame. It is possible that we have failed to understand some issue in the body of Serbian interests and that we are at fault, but we cannot be to blame generally.

[Bisenic] The leaderships of Serbia and Macedonia did nevertheless meet, and it was possible to resolve those issues.

[Gosev] Macedonian politicians have in fact taken up every initiative for talks. Some of those talks were initiated even at a time when there was a need to show for propaganda purposes that Macedonia and Serbia were together. Macedonia is not the one who has wanted too much. But when any politician has resisted any position of a Serbian politician, then all that is the worst was written about him. When Tupurkovski supported Serbian policy, he was praised to the skies, and conversely. It has been the same way with me and President Gligorov, with all the fabrications and spicy stories. I have never taken an anti-Serb position. But I am a person who has his own position and individuality, and Macedonia has interests which are legitimate, just like the interests of others. Accordingly, the abhorrence of Serbia in Macedonia was directly generated by Serbian policy, which must ask itself why Serbia has so many enemies?

[Bisenic] Is there authentic anti-Serbism in Macedonia?

[Gosev] That cannot be denied, but that is peripheral.

[Bisenic] But the same thing is also being said on the other side.

[Gosev] Now you are trying to arrive at symmetries. A response has been made here to intensified antipathies. Anti-Serbism in Macedonia is not determining the course of things, but in Serbia that could be a significant flow. In any society, groups can be found that will not agree with a particular policy.

[Bisenic] It is said that you will join with certain other distinguished politicians and public figures in establishing a patriotic party.

[Gosev] No. Those are fabrications. I will be in this Social Democratic Party so long as it exists, and when it does not exist, then in no other.

Willingness To Talk

The Macedonian delegation will participate in the proceedings of the SFRY Assembly only on the basis of a joint agreement reached within the framework of The Hague agreement, on the basis of verification in the Macedonian Assembly, and on the basis of a jointly adopted new platform concerning new relations in the future association. We are ready for any rational conversation. Of course, if issues like the balance sheet for the division are on the agenda, the delegation will probably be changed and strengthened with specialists and competent people.

Cooperation With Everyone

We all represent someone's sphere of interest. Macedonia is constituting itself as a sovereign republic, and our global direction cannot be anything other than cooperation with all in the mutual interest. We ought to strengthen ties in the Balkans, and Macedonia will pursue that policy. We want to relativize the importance of borders between the Balkan states to the maximum extent, and that should be the credentials for all of us to join the European Community.

But processes in the Balkans are going in the opposite direction. I am convinced that at the moment there is no other way than to follow the world's megatrend of strengthening integrative ties. That is the reason why we are paying the price for those who are going in the opposite direction from the trends of civilization. Put simply, we do not want conflicts with anyone. We want the maximum cultural, economic, and political cooperation. We are ready in advance to accept everything that advances that cause. It is the minimum condition for us to be respected as an equal entity.

Malevski Comments on Ties With Greece, Bulgaria

92BA0169C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Nov 91 p 10

[Interview with Denko Malevski, Macedonian foreign minister, by D. Bisenic; place and date not given: "Justice Is on Our Side"]

[Text] Macedonia, following adoption of the new Constitution, is a sovereign and independent state, and in its policy it is unceasingly endeavoring to gain the goodwill of its neighbors. Each of the neighboring countries—Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia—have in their political spectrum forces expressing clear claims concerning the territorial or ethnic structure of this republic, which is still a Yugoslav republic.

"Fear of something being done behind our backs has been deeply inscribed in the consciousness of the people of Macedonia," says Denko Malevski, Macedonian foreign minister, commenting on statements concerning friendship and extremely good relations being exchanged between Serbia and Greece. "Viewed historically, that has been the case, but when a meeting is scheduled for Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, for which there was an initiative, that means discussion of the region. Then the question arises of how it is possible that that state which is in the middle—Macedonia—is not invited to participate in a discussion of that kind. That is why there is an objective fear. The best way to overcome it is through cooperation."

[Bisenic] What is your comment on the statement of the Greek prime minister to the effect that Greece will never recognize the "Skopje republic"?

[Malevski] The Greek authorities have quite a few problems explaining to the public how a policy that has been conducted for several decades no longer holds water at this point. Which is why there have been these frequent excursions to extremes, now warm, now cold, now we should talk, now we will never recognize Macedonia. This is a process of bringing Greece's public opinion closer to accepting a reality. I personally would not give great significance to that one statement. Nevertheless, whether some people like it or not, justice is on our side.

[Bisenic] According to what the Greek press has written, Alija Izetbegovic supposedly said that Macedonia could renounce its minority in Greece if the Macedonian state were recognized. That has been denied both by the Macedonian president and by Izetbegovic.

[Malevski] This is obviously a misunderstanding. I do not know exactly what was said and how that conversation took place in the press conference, but the fact is that Greece has obligations toward ethnic minorities living on its territory. This follows from documents that we signed in the framework of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The state of Greece must do that in compliance with international documents.

[Bisenic] Does Macedonia expect within the framework of European integration that Macedonians living in Bulgaria and Greece will be integrated into a single geographic entity?

[Malevski] We favor the principle of respecting the sovereignty of states in this region. That is why we emphasized in the Constitution that Macedonia is a republic within the borders of the present state and said in the parliament that we have no territorial claims whatsoever toward our neighbors. It has been clearly stated, then, that we have no idea whatsoever of creating a large state by conquering territories of other countries. However, in advocating a Europe without borders, we have defined our objective. If we respect each other as sovereign and independent states, if we respect each other's territorial integrity and shape policy on those same European principles, in time the borders will themselves become an anachronism even in this region, just as they have in West Europe.

The important thing at this moment is that the Balkan states accept those European principles, that they do not use ethnic minorities in order to undermine other regimes, and meet their obligations under the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and work toward integration of this part of the continent. Then the time will come to resolve that entire complex of the problems of peoples who live within borders that are not really fair. It is impossible in this scrambled Balkan region to insist on the principle of "one nationality—one state." Perhaps that would be fairest, but it is impossible. To insist on that now signifies war and unhappiness.